

A Security Community

**Poland and Her Visegrad Allies:
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia**

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Wojciech Gizicki

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INTRODUCTION

The success of actions in relation to security policy depends on numerous factors. The approach and involvement of particular participants taking part in international relations creates practical solutions, and determines the shape and quality of this policy. No matter how different the extent, range, possibilities, intentions, and time of this involvement, it is clear that without the participation of countries and international organizations, it is impossible to effectively engage in specific solutions. Particular countries play a vital role in influencing the quality of security both at a global and regional level. Harmonious international cooperation is therefore indispensable. Power becomes more and more multidimensional. The importance of several strong and stable countries is increasing at the expense of small, often undemocratic countries and nations. This breeds international tension and conflicts. Uncontrolled migrations, the resulting tensions and nationalist or terrorist threats can become a serious issue.

Francis Fukuyama calls for the strengthening of institutional structures of countries and international organizations¹. He also sees weak countries as a threat to security and stability. What is more, he states that all entities engaged in international relations should be responsible for the creation of new institutions in countries and bolstering those already existing. Democratic processes taking place around the world are an undeniable and indisputable value. However, in this time of the so called “war with terrorism”, democracy, as highlighted by, among others, Joseph Stiglitz, takes a hit at the international level². Therefore, one cannot expect that global problems, including those connected with the lack of democracy and fragile security, will be solved by the efforts of one superpower only, e.g. the United States. What is needed is broad, unanimous, and effective international cooperation. International institutions need to reform in such a way to be able to effectively exploit arising opportunities.

In light of the above remarks, it appears justified to indicate a few conditions and processes which have a key influence on the modern international reality, including security. Three of them can be classified as the most important, namely globalization, regionalization, and institutionalization. On the one hand, they determine international relations differently, while on the other, they appear to be partly converging. They equally concern the legiti-

1 F. Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, New York 2004.

2 J. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York 2002.

macy to redefine the roles of particular entities, countries, and international organizations. At the same time, they highlight an increase in reliance, but also highlight the possibility and necessity of cooperation. Thus, it would appear that classifying them as completely rival and unable to be reconciled is not well-grounded. State Authorities have to take into consideration a broader international context while shaping their policies, including security. International and supranational organizations have to take into account the ongoing processes in the global space, as well as the perspective and developmental objectives of given countries. From this perspective, it is necessary to rationally organize one's international relations between the assumptions of realistic and liberal theories. A growing dependency between international entities in different aspects, i.e. economic, political, and socio-cultural is dominating in globalization.

It is also worth highlighting that a considerable amount of global international issues are of key importance to the future of humanity, its security, surety, and existence. The global promotion of democracy and the rule of law, as well as the prevention of threats, poverty, and destitution are also important in the political aspect of globalization. Despite this, the strengthening of institutional structures of countries and international organizations can also be observed. Regionalization based on natural factors – historical and geographical, and also socio-economic – determines the political and economic cooperation of closely related entities. They remain in constant interaction

and cooperate to achieve specific benefits, including those connected with security. The regional activity of particular countries favors consolidating, securing, and maximizing mutual and international benefits. In the process of institutionalizing, countries strive to safeguard mutual needs and expectations in the international reality. There arises a need for active and effective action, and also for cooperation within the framework of organizations and international structures. The more security is being threatened at the regional or global levels, the more it is necessary to facilitate swift reactions and close cooperation between countries and international organizations. Thus, specific internationalization of sovereign countries' actions is needed. Actions undertaken by a specific country (e.g. tightening its border security) are not a sufficient argument to ensure security. Nevertheless, countries still remain the basic subjects in political relations.

Security is one of the basic values in the life of an individual, society, nation, country, and also at the international level. However, modern security is composed of efficient utilization of the potential within diplomacy and strength. A balanced relationship between soft and hard power, as it was often stated by, among others, J. S. Nye, is an indispensable condition for the development of a stable and peaceful world³. International relations require that multilateral and multidimensional actions are undertaken, and that they include the involvement of all

3 J. S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York 2004.

security entities⁴. This refers to international organizations, intergovernmental institutions, both at the global and regional level⁵.

The modern and complex international reality requires an increase in regional involvement and cooperation. This could significantly bolster global actions. The legitimacy of such cooperation is also highlighted in the Charter of the United Nations, in Art. 52⁶. Regional agreements and their actions must be based on the accord between their rules and objectives, and actions undertaken by the UN. Thus, regional organizations make up a supplementary and consolidating element in the UN's universal security activity. Rendering further effective cooperation and sustaining dialogue in order to rationalize mutual security undertakings is of key importance here. Security policy in a given area or region can be shaped by regional institutions. This activity is focused on promoting peace and safety. Thanks to this, we can strengthen and create

4 H. J. Giessman, R. Kuźniar, Z. Lachowski, (eds), *International Security in a Time of Change. Threats-Concepts-Institutions*, Baden Baden 2004; A. Hurrell, *On Global Order. Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford 2007; P. D. Williams, (ed.), *Security Studies. An Introduction*, London-New York 2008; R. Jackson, G. Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford 2010.

5 D. Lake, P. Morgan, (eds), *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World*, Pennsylvania 1997; M. P. Karns, K. Mingst, *International Organizations. The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, Boulder 2004.

6 "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations", [www.un.org].

strong foundations for mutual trust between the entities involved, and prevent local feuds and conflicts. The creation of local security communities is also of significant importance. Both NATO (the Preamble to the Washington Treaty⁷) and the European Union (Art. 3 of the Maastricht Treaty⁸) have such a character. Both of them are based on a specific closeness of ideas, goals, and cultural identity, and have also clearly defined their membership requirements. They are especially open to European countries that explicitly identify themselves with basic rules, including the development of democracy, individual freedom, lawfulness, and peaceful cooperation⁹.

7 “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security (...), [www.nato.int].

8 “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. (...).

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”, [www.europa.eu].

9 R. Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*, London 2003.

In the light of the aforementioned assumptions, it would appear justified to state that the cooperation within the Visegrád Group is a good example of a community approach to the problems of security, both at the regional and global levels. A common history, cultural heritage, and the Central-European regional identity comprise an opportunity for overcoming mutual biases and searching for constructive foundations for cooperation. This concerns many levels. It can be confirmed by clearly-defined objectives relating to foreign and security policies in all the Visegrád countries. This resulted in a definitive conviction that it is necessary to cooperate in this field. It has become clear that particular, though relatively convergent objectives will be easier to accomplish when displaying unity and cooperation. It was not always perfect and unanimous; however, it has been established and systematically maintained, and yielded the assumed effects. What is more, this cooperation is still in effect; despite its objectives having already been fulfilled. The Visegrád countries are well aware of the many areas that link them together. Not only did they declare, but are also practicing mutual support and undertaking common actions in the areas of politics, economy, society, and culture. This is facilitated by both territorial proximity, and also – many a times difficult – historical experiences.

This monograph aims at presenting the character of the Visegrád Group in the area of security. This initiative, being a cooperation platform formed by the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary can be seen as a spe-

cific security community. This is the main thesis of the discussed study, presented in this book. It is also relevant to raise more detailed research questions.

1. What is the basis for the community cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia?
2. What effects have this cooperation yielded so far?
3. What are the potential opportunities for sustaining the aforementioned cooperation?
4. Where do similarities and differences lie regarding particular dimensions making up the security policy?
5. What can be brought into the Euro-Atlantic security area by the Visegrád countries and the entire V4?

This study has been designed to achieve the target objective, verify the introduced thesis and comment on the presented research questions. It consists of an Introduction, eight chapters and a Conclusion which summarizes the whole and forecasts further development of the analyzed cooperation. The structure of individual chapters, with the exception of the second, is the same: the first presents the general characteristic of the processes incorporating the entire V4, the second presents Poland's characteristic traits, and the third presents the characteristics of the remaining V4 nations of Czech, Hungary and Slovakia. The analysis includes similar issues or problems

with identity, which is justified by the attempt to compare them among the particular nations. For obvious reasons, most of the text is dedicated to an analysis of the specifics of Visegrád cooperation from the perspective of Poland. However, the part concerning the involvement and problems with security for the remaining V4 countries, Czech, Hungary and Slovakia, is also essential. It seems, therefore, that this allows for achieving the essential goal of the research studies.

The first chapter is devoted to the region's geopolitics, its specificity and its translation into the legitimacy of Visegrád cooperation. The indispensable historical and geographical heritage of Central Europe, which is relevant to the shaping of current multidimensional politics, as well as to security, will be indicated. The second chapter presents the origin of the Visegrád Group as a stable platform for cooperation and showcases specific successful and problematic initiatives between the four discussed countries. A statement that the legitimacy of cooperation can be argued both in light of successful initiatives and of difficult moments serves as an important summary of this part. The third chapter presents the legal basis for the security policy of the countries of interest. There are many similarities and closely related legal solutions in this part as well. They make it possible to utilize this basis for practical and broad-scale actions. Regarding fundamentals, constitution regulations and national safety strategies were of interest to our study. The fourth part of the study is devoted to the analysis of the challenges and threats

accompanying selected countries and the entire initiative. They are to a great extent convergent, and therefore require univocally joint action. Simultaneously, they highlight the closeness of interests in the Group in overcoming them. The fifth chapter focuses on the analysis of internal policy solutions. We also take a closer look at the issues related to the services and institutions involved in safeguarding this area of national activity and also at the assessment of the feeling of security in citizens. The sixth chapter is devoted to foreign policy. The Euro-Atlantic area is a priority direction for security-related cooperation. The EU and NATO are of top importance in the discussed area in all of the V4 countries. Therefore, cooperation with these organizations has been described extensively. The character of military forces and military cooperation is the subject of the seventh chapter. Our basic research interest encompasses two dimensions: organization and equipment, and activity in the field of foreign operations. In this respect, the Visegrád countries have a considerable impact on the shaping of international order. The last, eighth chapter focuses on the issue of economic safety. This is one of the most important dimensions of security after the Cold War. The successes in this field or lack of them largely impact its other dimensions, including the sense of individual, social and national security.

This monograph will critically study the current areas of cooperation. Our focus will be directed both at the positive and the negative aspects of the undertaken actions. It did happen that obvious and successful joint projects

were disturbed by conflicts of interests and colliding visions within the Group. It is also fundamental to conduct a comparative analysis of system solutions on the subject in question. It appears important to highlight the potential areas of cooperation and indicate the actual possibilities for its particularization, also at a broader and global level. The presentation of a range of common interests and objectives of strategic importance for the member states, as well as of the whole initiative and in a broader Euro-Atlantic context is an opportunity for a regional initiative like the Visegrád Group. It seems that one such dimension is the support of new integration ideas on the EU's forum, e.g. in respect to developing the new EU's security strategy which would fulfill its expected role. Going further in a similar direction, one could search for support platforms for actions undertaken within the framework of NATO.

A starting point for this analysis is a thesis stating the existence of a community of ideas linking the integrating entities, which is present in Karl Deutsch's communication theory and in the constructivism theory. This translates into the Visegrád Group being treated as a special security community¹⁰.

10 K. Deutsch, (et al.), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, New York 1957, p. 6:

"A SECURITY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become „integrated". As INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions assure, for a „long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population". (...). A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. If the

An assumption that cooperating entities are linked together not as a result of chance or accident is of fundamental importance to the communication theory¹¹. The will to cooperate stems from solid grounds located deep within these entities. The basic importance in shaping international relations, including integration processes at various levels, is attributed to sovereign nation states. The cooperation with other sovereign political entities takes place at many multidimensional levels. Such cooperation, including joint responsibility in making political decisions based on diplomatic contacts in the international space is also of key importance. Social and individual bonds and relations are equally important. Their character is multidimensional. There also exists awareness of functioning in the area where one can identify both “our” and “other people’s”. This, however, does not make cooperation impossible and does not lead to treating “others” as enemies. Furthermore, this theory assumes the necessity of systematic communication, sharing information, and cooperation between entities. An important tool in this process is the development of an appropriately comprehensible communications system, language, signs, and symbols. This means the functioning of comparable and mentally-

entire world were integrated as a security-community, wars would be automatically eliminated. But there is apt to be confusion about the term “integration”.

11 E. Adler, M. Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998; G. Delanty, *Community. Key Ideas*, London 2003; A. J. Bellany, *Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses Or Global Integrators?*, Basingstoke 2004; A. Tuscisny, *Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously*, *International Political Science Review*, 4/2007.

-comprehensible communication patterns as well as the maintenance of a psychological dimension of community identity. What is more, the development of a mutual sense of trust, acceptance and social affinity, and also highlighting common values and interests is of key importance. A common belief that it is possible to address problems peacefully, resolve quarrels, and achieving commonly assumed benefits is necessary. All this is to serve one superior purpose, which is the creation of a well-functioning and integrated community, encompassing a group of neighboring countries, which will secure their clearly-defined interests in a specific geopolitical area. In this respect, the elimination of wars, peace, stabilization, cooperation, kind respect, and mutual support between national societies are of fundamental significance. This results in the development of stable cooperation mechanisms, including instructions and practical dimensions of cooperation in a clearly-defined area. The above should be accompanied by a realistic assessment of the international situation, and of states involved in integration processes. We should not aim at the creation of premises that are idealistic, and thus often impossible to implement. The target assumption is also to strengthen the belief concerning a complementary approach to the development of both sovereign states, integrating institutions, groups or associations of states.

Similar enduring relationships between several political entities can be found in the assumptions of the constructivism theory¹². One of the basic assumptions says that international relations are based on historical and social relationships between similar entities. Their interests are connected with a particular social environment. Identity is an element that determines and verifies states' interests, also in respect to cooperation with other states. Political entities have their own specific features. However, the complex social reality makes it necessary to redefine one's objectives, intentions, and actions. This can be seen, among others, as a transition from autonomous actions to cooperation with other, similar entities. This stems from a need to jointly achieve established goals. An international reality and a secure community are created not on a material, but consciousness level. It is a product of human thoughts, aspirations, and ideas which are important and understood in a similar fashion. A regional community can see specific areas, at a given time, as important, and then create and search for optimal cooperation circumstances. A specified identity, norms and particular interests of states are based on the amount of involvement in the creation and strengthening of a given community. The proper use of negotiation and competitive tools is of fun-

12 P. Katzenstein, (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York 1996; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder 1998; J. Weldes, (et al.), *Constructing of Insecurity*, Minneapolis 1999; A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge 1999; D M. Green, *Constructivism and Comparative Politics*, London 2002; K. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Oxford 2007.

damental importance. Thus, a community is created on the basis of an agreement on the issues that are most fundamental for the entities creating this community.

A study of processes taking place in the field of security requires an interdisciplinary approach. This has been common and clearly observed since the fall of the bipolar division of the world which took place in 1989. Therefore, this study employs several research methods. The most basic are document analysis, system analysis and the comparative method. Linking many research methods is indispensable due to our wish to present the fundamental assumptions in respect of security policies of the V4 countries. This is necessary in order to evaluate potential similarities in the adopted formal and legal, and also practical solutions in the given country, as well as to point out the legitimacy of treating the Visegrád Group as a fairly durable security community. What is more, at some points we will use the behavioral method, connected with quoting and analyzing statistical data. This is based on the existing materials, gathered mainly by leading research centers in each of the V4 countries¹³.

The analysis of the cooperation within the framework of the Visegrád Group, especially in the fields of security and defense, is nowadays commenced mainly in the co-

13 Demographic, economic and financial data provided by: Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, [www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu]; Central Statistical Office of Poland, [www.stat.gov.pl]; Czech Statistical Office, [www.czso.cz]; Hungarian Central Statistic Office, [www.ksh.hu]; Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, [www.statistics.sk].

untries making up the group. More studies can be found in the period between the system changes in the discussed countries (i.e. after 1989) and their joining NATO (1999). It appears that it was justified from the research point of view, due to the clearly defined objective of the Visegrád cooperation. Nevertheless, achieving this objective did not result in abandoning their systematic cooperation which started in 1991. The V4 countries are still cooperating on many levels, despite some opinions, inclining the merely symbolic character of this cooperation. After their EU accession (2004), there appeared analyses and studies regarding the activities of the V4 countries both in NATO and the EU, encompassing their particular actions as full members of both these organizations. However, there still exists a need for broader promotion of the region in English reference books. Keeping this in mind, this study gives us an opportunity to popularize the rich tradition of the ongoing multilevel cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia¹⁴.

14 The book is the result of cooperation with researchers from each of the V4 countries. Therefore, the author would like to express his gratitude to Pavel Hlaváček, PhD from the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Czech Republic, Péter Wagner, PhD from the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Budapest, Hungary, and to Jaroslav Ušiak, PhD from Matej Bel University, Banská Bystrica, Slovakia. The presented monograph is additionally an inspiration for the monograph of the coauthor in the second half of 2013 on the security policy of the Visegrad Group with the participation of the above-mentioned researchers.



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PART ONE

THE GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The theory of geopolitics enables us to explain the specificity of geographic and historical conditions, and their impact on particular socio-political phenomena. Geopolitics had a tremendous influence on the fates of the Visegrád countries. The difficult destinies of each of these nations were intermingled. The effects and results of three periods can be felt to this day, namely the reign of the Jagiellonian dynasty, the Habsburg dynasty, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Virtually each of the modern Visegrád Group countries at some time was a part (though at a different level and significance) of these military, political, and historical powerhouses. The achievements of Christianity and Catholicism, which are so deeply entrenched in the history and modern times of the region, had strong influence the shaping of the specific commu-

nity space. The consequences of such a state of affairs are affecting the current situation in Central Europe. On one hand, this area is closely connected to Western European civilization with its clear political, economic, and cultural achievements. On the other hand, it is marked by a substantial impact of the Eastern achievements, even with temporary submission and subordination, especially to Russia. How should we deal with such a situation? First of all, it is an incessant area of influence from both sides. Second, it is an opportunity to unite them and to draw from the positive achievement of both these aspects. The mere term Central/Middle Europe points to such an understanding¹⁵. It appears that this is first and foremost a chance to play a positive, stabilizing role in the modern, integrating Europe, which supports the desire to nurture the idea of community and cultural identity, so close to its history and modern times. However, there are some specific divisions and hindrances which boil down to geographical conditions, and in this way we have economic and political division to the East and West of Europe. Often, this results in the necessity to undertake determined actions aimed at the promotion of one's space in the European area, among others, by such countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Therefore, in many intellectual and political circles it is deemed justi-

15 J. Zielonka, *Security in Central Europe: Sources of Instability in Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics with Recommendations for Western Policy*, London 1992; R. Cowen Karp, (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: the Challenge of Transition*, Oxford 1993.

fied to define this part of the continent as Central Europe or East-Central Europe¹⁶.

This stems mainly from the fact that these countries can be characterized as having similar, complex histories, cultural proximity, and favorable conditions for frequent and effective social communication. What is more, the conviction of being able to play a vital role in the shaping of cultural dialogue between East and West is also an important argument. Finally, a clear indication of the perpetual functioning between Germany and Russia in the geopolitical zone cannot be omitted. The belief regarding definitive independence, especially from the impact of Imperial Russia, dominates here. The manifesto included in the views and work of, e.g. Tomáš Masaryk¹⁷, Oskar Halecki¹⁸, Jenő Szűcs¹⁹ can be interpreted in such a spirit. Despite differences present in these concepts, we can observe some clear community elements based on the aforementioned historical and cultural identity. This fact has also been highlighted by modern international analysts and

16 It will not be our goal to provide a detailed explanation of the differences connected with this. The idea of Central Europe dominates in the concepts of Czech thinkers; whereas among Poles, the idea of East-Central Europe prevails, including a clear interest in the old, eastern areas of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Irrespective of these differences, there exists a dominating belief on the necessity to separate oneself from the German term *Mitteleuropa*.

See e.g.: J. Kłoczowski, H. Łazkiewicz, (eds), *East-Central Europe in European History*, Lublin 2009.

17 T. G. Masaryk, *The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis*, London 1966.

18 O. Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization: a History of East Central Europe*, New York 1952.

19 J. Szűcs, *The Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline*, Budapest 1983.

thinkers dealing in this region of Europe. Among them, they include such persons as Timothy Garton Ash²⁰, Norman Davies²¹, and Gerard Delanty²².

As it appears, it is also necessary to further orientate towards common political, economic, and social goals, especially within the framework of the EU and NATO. It would then be possible for the Visegrád countries to play a more important role in the integration processes. Therefore, there exists a need to highlight the legitimacy of the cooperation within the Visegrád Group, and to attract more attention to its offer connected with jointly-drawn objectives. This does not entail highlighting the region's distinctness, its competitive character, but pointing at its potential and actual importance. It would make it possible to leave the popular notion of the region as a periphery, isolated from great politics in Europe. The Visegrád Group countries cover an area of over 533.000 km². Their population has exceeded 64 million. In both cases this is more than 12% of the EU's total area and population. These countries have experienced numerous instability spells, as well as strong authoritarian and totalitarian influence, especially in the 20th Century.

20 T. G. Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague*, London 1990.

21 N. Davies, *Europe East and West: A Collection of Essays on European History*, London 2006.

22 G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke 1995.

Table 2. Populations and Areas in V4.

State	Populations (million)	Areas (thousand km ²)
Czech Republic	10,5	78,8
Hungary	10	93
Poland	38,5	312,6
Slovakia	5,3	49
V4 State	64,3	533,4
EU	501	4325
V4/EU	12,8%	12,3%


Source: personal research work.

Both world wars and the period of subordination to the USSR (and Warsaw Pact²³) left a clear mark in the socio-political field of the V4 countries. Each of these countries, however, demonstrated bold resistance against such anti-national and anti-state influences, especially on the part of the Soviet Union. The events that occurred in Hungary in 1956, the unrest in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, several anticommunist spurts in Poland with its climax in 1981 and the introduction of martial law, all serve as examples here. Each time, this indicated natural liberation ambitions in the discussed nations and countries. It finally led to bloodless democratic revolutions in 1989.

23 V. R. L. Hutchings, *Foreign and Security Policy Coordination in the Warsaw Pact*, Köln 1985; D. Holloway, J. M. O. Sharp, (eds), *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?*, New York 1986; V Mastny, M. Byrne, (eds), *A Cardboard Castle?: an Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991*, Budapest 2005.

The concept of Central Europe started its revival in the socio-political consciousness after 1980²⁴. Since the Second World War, for nearly forty years, the countries of this region, though they formally existed, were functioning in international politics practically as a part of the Soviet system. The geopolitical maps of Europe before and after the system changes, which started in 1989, are clearly different (see maps 1 and 2). This largely concerns the vicinity of the Visegrád Group. Due to Germany's reunification, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the neighborhood of each of the analyzed countries has changed drastically. New, sovereign state entities were established, though they were unstable and unpredictable (Belarus, Ukraine, and Serbia, among others). Due to the above, there arose a necessity to redefine personal objectives and assumptions, especially concerning foreign policies.

24 A. H. Dawson, R. Fawn, (eds), *The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe*, London 2002; F. Briška, Z. Pástor, (eds), *Geopolitical Importance of Central Europe (V4) and its Prospects*, Banská Bystrica 2002; P. Nečas, S. Szabo, *Back to the Future: Geopolitical Security or Chaos?*, Košice 2006.



Map 1. Map of Central Europe 1989 (made by Beata Hohub).



Map 2. Map of Central Europe 2013 (made by Beata Hotlub).

Thus, it appears that the above-mentioned values and examples of manifesting the necessity for democratic changes can comprise one of the substantial arguments in a discussion regarding the place and meaning of this part of Europe in integration processes, both at the level of the EU and NATO²⁵. However, these are not the only indicators of the aforementioned potential. The modern and actual contribution of the Visegrád countries in the field of regional and global stabilization and security is of fundamental importance²⁶.

Poland

The formation of the Polish state in the 10th century led to a significant change in the geopolitical situation in Europe. The development of statehood strengthened many areas of life. The Baptism of Poland in 966, the Congress of Gniezno in 1000 and the Union of Lublin in 1569 are all inextricably associated with the things of utmost importance for the creation of Poland's statehood. Under the Jagiellonian dynasty (1399-1586), Poland was a political

25 Z. J. Pietraś, M. Pietraś, (eds), *The Transnational Future of Europe*, Lublin 1992; J. Lasicová, Š. Volner, *Security at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, Banská Bystrica 2007; S. Koziej, *Między piekłem a rajem: szare bezpieczeństwo na progu XXI wieku*, Toruń 2008; W. Gizicki, *Polityczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, Toruń 2008.

26 A. Ash, *The Politics of Central Europe*, London 1998; S. P. Ramet, (ed.), *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Cambridge 2010; Z. Sabic, P. Drulák, (eds), *Regional and International Relations of Central Europe*, Basingstoke 2012.

and military power. Activity in the wars with Turkey at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, including the Battle of Vienna, bears witness to the military power of Poland, which could effectively defend its sovereignty, borders and Europe against Turkish invasion.

Thus, Poland's location in the central part of Europe carries far-reaching implications for the country's security policy. The location on the border between two cultures and civilizations, between the Orient and Occident, has always had – and will certainly always have – a direct impact on the development of both the internal and external policies of Poland. The multitude of armed conflicts and wars fought on the territory of Poland illustrates the extent to which geopolitics affects its safety. In this dimension, the aftermath of warfare in social, economic and political life is of particular importance. The scale of destruction and loss has always been significant, both in the material dimension and, especially, in the sphere of human existence. This can be seen most clearly in the 20th century²⁷. Revived and independent after 123 years of partitions, Poland was free to exercise its sovereignty only for twenty years, until 1939. During six years of war, Poland struggled with German occupation and – after 1945 – with more than 40 years of subordination to the USSR. However, at that time, it did not lack the determination to make changes. The changes associated with the emergen-

27 J. Skrzyp, Z. Lach, *Geostrategiczne położenie Polski przed i po transformacji ustrojowej*, Warszawa 2008; J. Tomaszewski, *Poland in Central Europe in the 20th Century*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 1/2008.

ce of the „Solidarity” movement in 1980 initiated the decline of the socialist system in Poland, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. The undisputed fact is that the events of „August ‘80” in Poland were the first step on the road to democracy in this part of Europe. This led to mostly bloodless transformations throughout almost the entire region in 1989. This activity in Poland has been emphasized by the international community. This made it possible to take leadership in shaping security among these countries in this part of Europe.

The geopolitical conditions of Poland’s security consist mainly in its location, the changeability of its borders throughout history, its neighborhood, economic opportunities, the political system and political activities on an international scale²⁸. Taking all this into account, it seems reasonable to consider these conditions both in their historical and contemporary dimensions. The peripheral surroundings of Poland after 1989 changed radically. The unification of Germany occurred on the western border, a turbulent fall of the USSR happened on the eastern border, and there was a peaceful division of Czechoslovakia to the south. As a result of these chan-

28 R. Szeremietiew, *O bezpieczeństwie Polski w XX wieku*, Warszawa, 2000; R. Kulczycki, (ed.), *Zagrożenia, polityka i strategia oraz system bezpieczeństwa RP w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2003; B. Balcerowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warszawa 2004; Z. Lach, (ed.), *Geografia bezpieczeństwa i obronności Polski*, Warszawa 2004; W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System*, Warszawa 2011; M. Marszałek, G. Sobolewski, T. Konopka, A. Cyran, *Bezpieczeństwo RP w wymiarze narodowym i międzynarodowym*, Kielce 2011.

ges, Poland increased her closest political neighborhood from three to seven nations²⁹. The immediate vicinity of Germany and Russia has significant implications for the formulation of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy and security. The consequences of the situation between the two former great powers with current imperial ambitions are obvious. Therefore, it is of essential importance for Poland to skillfully take advantage of these opportunities and minimize the risks arising from such a geopolitical situation. It seems that this also has an impact on the entire region, including all of the V4 countries. Thus, on the one hand, the geopolitical situation of Poland is connected with tragic periods in its history, and on the other, it offers the possibility and opportunity to use this geopolitical potential and play an important role in the international politics of Central and Eastern Europe. It seems that nowadays – after 1989 – the foreign policy formulated and pursued by Poland, together with the security policy, gives hope for the fulfillment of Poland's ambitions to act as the leader of transformations in this part of Europe³⁰. This will depend on many factors, such as if Poland seizes this opportunity. Still, the most important of these are its commitment and systematic cooperation

29 Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Russia.

30 R. Wiśniewski, *New Challenges in Poland's Cooperation with the States of Central Europe*, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 1998; J. Gajewski, *Polish Foreign Policy Towards the Central European Region*, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2005; M. Gniazdowski, *Poland's Policy in the Visegrad Group*, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2008; R. Morawiec, *Poland's Policy in the Visegrad Group*, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2010.

aimed at solving regional and global problems. What is also important is cooperation without confrontations or escalating conflicts with its neighbors.

The position of Poland in the international security system has been changing throughout history. However, the significance in shaping security has always been important. Regardless of its current political and military force, Poland has been perceived as an important element in this area. Today's political situation in Europe predestines Poland to play a major role in the stabilization processes and to be an advocate of European integration, especially in the east. Therefore, the regional importance of Poland is beyond any doubt. Increasingly often, there also appear views advocating the legitimate ambitions of Poland related to its significance in terms of global security. Today, it is clear that these objectives are consistently implemented. The security policy has essentially remained outside the range of disputes in which Polish politicians and political parties are involved. This can be observed in an analysis of the content of the expose speeches of successive prime ministers since 1989. In the section devoted to foreign issues – including security – they pointed to, among other things, the lack of conflicts with neighboring countries, a stable situation in the region and the need for extensive international engagement. What was emphasized were the legitimacy of, and the lack of alternatives for, strong relations with Western European civilization within the EU, though the issues that were also promoted were the

interests of Eastern European countries and the close alliance relationship within NATO and its relations with the United States.

Membership in international organizations and activities aimed at obviating and mitigating conflicts are not without significance for these initiatives. NATO membership (1999) and EU accession (2004) were in recent years the priorities of Poland's foreign policy. Undoubtedly, joining these organizations was a real challenge for Poland. The potential benefits of membership depended on the way in which the negotiations would be conducted. With its accession to NATO, Poland has gained guarantees of security. Undoubtedly, integration with the European Union complemented this fact. Poland has gained more credibility in the international arena, also owing to increasing its economic and political stability. Admission to NATO and to the European Union together with other Central and Eastern European countries put an end to the division of Europe that had lasted more than 50 years and had been initiated by the Yalta Conference.

It seems that, in the foreground of the present-day international situation, both from the Polish perspective and from the perspective of the whole region, issues of nationalisms, illegal migration, organized crime, and terrorist threats stand out. Poland has marked its presence and commitment in each of these areas, also as a result of its geopolitical conditions. Its location between the East and the West imposes increased international activity on Poland.

Visegrad Partners

The **geopolitical position of Czech and Slovakia** in the XX century was unusually dynamic and complex³¹. The words of both subjects were interwoven with federal periods and independent existence. After the end of the First World War, in the period of 1918-1938, both nations functioned in the framework of the so-called First Republic of Czechoslovakia (CSR). After the Munich Agreement in 1938, Czech was annexed by Germany, Slovakia as Hitler's ally declared independence and formally lasted as an independent nation during the entire period of the Second World War. After it finished, both nations were once again federalized in the framework of the communist Bloc. This situation lasted until 1989. As mentioned above, Czechoslovakia, similar to Poland and Hungary, was able to confront the USSR's politics. The Prague Spring in 1968, an attempt to create the nation's political liberalization, despite failure and suppression by the Warsaw Pact Armies, had as an effect, among others, broadening Slovakia's autonomy.

The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989 ultimately led to the creation of two independent, sovereign nations. As of the 1st of January, 1993, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic function on the map of Central Europe. Both nations led dynamic internal and

31 J. Musil, (ed.), *The End of Czechoslovakia*, Budapest 1997; L. Cabada, S. Waisová, *Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic in World Politics*, Lanham 2011.

external politics. They can independently describe their priorities and directions in this area. The effect is involvement on behalf of transatlantic cooperation and full membership in NATO³². Czech did this in 1999, together with Poland and Hungary³³. Slovakia, as a result of Vladimíra Mečiar's orders in the years 1993-1998, clearly delayed its negotiation processes and as a result of this was accepted into the Allies in 2004. Completing such active politics for both nations was their successful accession to the EU in 2004. Both nations carry out stabilized territorial politics with their nearest neighbors³⁴. Nevertheless, after 1989, their closest, external surroundings changed. Presently, Czech has four neighbors: to the east borders it with Slovakia, to the north with united Germany and Poland, and to the south is Austria. Slovakia shares its borders with five nations. To the west are Czech and Austria, to the north Poland, to the south is Hungary, and to the east is Ukraine.

32 J. Simon, *NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: a Comparative Study in Civil-military Relations*, Lanham 2004; D. Marek, *The Czech Republic and the European Union*, London 2010.

33 R. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, New York 2002.

34 B. Hnízdo, *Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionů*, Praha 1995; O. Krejčí, *Geopolitika středoevropského prostoru: Horizonty zahraniční politiky České a Slovenské republik*, Praha 2000; O. Krejčí, *Geopolitics of the Central European Region: The View from Prague and Bratislava*, Bratislava 2005; V. Středová, *České, slovenské a československé dějiny: moderní přístupy k soudobým dějinám*, Hradec Králové 2006; H. Svatoňová, (et al.), *Geography in Czechia and Slovakia: Theory and Practice at the Onset of 21st Century*, Brno 2008.

The **geopolitical situation of Hungary** after the XX century is also as complex and dynamic as in the remaining V4 partner countries. In 1918, after the fall of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy, the Republic of Hungary was proclaimed, which in 1919 was dominated by a communist government. In 1920, Hungary, inheriting the Austria-Hungarian side of the world conflict, successively lost 2/3 of its territory (including access to the sea) and its population³⁵. In addition, they were devoid of the possibility to actively participate on the level of sovereign defense politics and forced to pay war compensation. Despite their renewed and formal proclamation of the monarchy in 1920, Hungary did not have an appointment to the throne. In the years 1941-1944, Hungary entered into alliance with Hitler and fought on its side against the USSR and was in the state of formal war, among others, with Great Britain. In 1944, there was an attempt to sign an agreement with the allies, which only in 1947 gave Hungary the right to exist within its borders from 1920. After the end of the II World War, as of 1945, Hungary remained under communist rule and the influence of the USSR. In 1956, there was an attempt to create a democracy. The Hungarian revolution, however, ended with a ruthless break in by Russian military forces. In 1989, as a result of the Triangle Table debates, there was a move away from communist authori-

35 This was a consequence of the agreements made from the Treaty in Trianon in 1920. See: *The Peace-Treaty of Trianon from the View-Point of International Peace, Security and the Co-Operation of Nations: an Appeal by the Lawyers of Hungary to the Lawyers of All Civilized Nations*, Budapest 1931.

ties and the democratization of the nation followed. Similar to the cases of Czech, Poland and Slovakia, Hungary univocally opted for transatlantic integration and cooperation. After successful accession to NATO (1999) and the EU (2004), they achieve their political sovereignty in each dimension³⁶. This is particularly evident after 2010 and after Victor Orbán assumed power once again. Hungary accepted a new constitution, and decidedly stands for self-determination in many areas, which is usually criticized (and often unjustified), particularly from the EU. We do not question, however, the legitimacy of international cooperation on behalf of security and development.

After 1989, Hungary increased its territorial neighborhood from five to seven nations. Currently, to the north it borders with Slovakia and Ukraine, to the south with Croatia and Serbia, to the west with Austria and Slovenia, and to the east with Romania. Hungary was the only V4 nation that shared a border with the former Yugoslavia. That is why the Balkan conflict was a serious problem for this nation. War in the direct neighboring territory demanded particular political involvement, eventual readiness to defend themselves, as well as activity on behalf of the Hungarian minority in the former Yugoslavia.

36 J. Terényi, *Hungary's Foreign Policy Perspective of Central Europe*, Foreign Policy Review 2010.

PART TWO

THE FOUNDATIONS OF VISEGRÁD COOPERATION

Shortly after the collapse of the Cold War, the political changes and the start of a new chapter in the politics of sovereign Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, there appeared a clear vision of Euro-Atlantic integration. However, this idea, though shared by each of these countries, was achieved in the early days on the basis of their individual abilities. Dominant was the belief that membership in NATO and the EU can be achieved on the basis of independent action. What is more, among the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian politicians, one could hear the opinion that there was a need for individually accomplishing the internationally defined objectives. Moreover, it was believed that this would be done on the basis of competition for first place and through more effective action. The situation changed dramatically after re-defining the real

possibilities and reviewing the international environment in the early nineties of the twentieth century.

The character of these changes was extremely dynamic, and countries relying solely on their own capabilities and intentions, especially in the case of a new democracy, did not seem real. Therefore, despite the initial skepticism of Central European countries, they became aware of the need for closer cooperation. It was not, however, to be like an official organization, but possess the nature of a solid platform for consultation and dialogue at an inter-governmental forum³⁷. An important aspect in the area of common values and the Central European identity was support from the intellectual and scientific circles. They formulated a clear vision of the merits of closer cooperation on the basis of geographical, historical and cultural closeness. It was certainly an important argument for political cooperation.

Regional cooperation between the three and soon to be four³⁸ Central European countries was based on the signed on February 15, 1991 Declaration of Visegrád. The document in all of its contents emphasizes specific objectives, ties and the common heritage of the three Central

37 P. Leszczyński, M. Szczepaniak, *Grupa Wyszehradzka. Współpraca polityczna i gospodarcza*, Toruń 1995; M. Rhodes, *The idea of Central Europe and Visegrád Cooperation*, *International Politics*, 2/1998; B. Góralczyk, *Współpraca Wyszehradzka. Geneza, doświadczenia, perspektywy*, Warszawa, 1999; R. Zenderowski, (ed.), *Euro-pa Środkowa - wspólnota czy zbiorowość?*, Wrocław 2004.

38 The cooperation was formed between Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the parties of the agreement became the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

European countries that wish to jointly pursue their vital interests. What gives them a real chance for such cooperation is particularly „similar in nature and significant changes taking place in these countries, the traditional, historically formed system of mutual contacts, cultural and spiritual heritage and the common roots of religious traditions. In the diverse and rich cultures of the peoples living in these regions lie the main achievements of European thought”³⁹. The Visegrád countries quite successfully meet the objectives set out in the Declaration. In this regard, a complete break with any of the dimensions of the totalitarian regime was essential. The main task was to build a new, democratic, modern state, which was to be based on civil liberties and a free market economy. A definite priority was also clear involvement in building a peaceful, integrated European space.

They managed to overcome the difficulties and to take a common position on the most important issues, such as in the field of security cooperation. An example of this was the bilateral treaties among each of the Visegrád countries. However, alongside these successful and beneficial initiatives, within the Visegrád cooperation, there was no lack of issues and difficult moments. At the beginning stages, the Visegrád initiative was not kindly and seriously accepted by all subjects and international environments. Some countries, particularly other post-

39 Visegrad Declaration 1991: *Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration*, [www.visegradgroup.eu].

-communist democracies, perceived it as a threat to their personal interests. Several Western European centers did not believe in the merits and the possibility of the success of the project prepared and maintained by the weak and newly regenerating former socialist, not yet fully sovereign entities⁴⁰. It should be remembered that for several years after 1989, the territory of Central Europe still stationed Soviet troops, and the political elites were heavily influenced by the former communist activists.

All Visegrád countries faced economic problems, including rapidly rising unemployment and galloping inflation⁴¹. In addition, between individual members of the Group, there appeared more or less serious conflicts. On the one hand, all this was a serious problem, and on the other, it made them aware of the need to intensify efforts in the area of the main goals of each country: integration with Euro-Atlantic structures and forging long-term, secure foundations for sovereign statehood and regional cooperation. Therefore, it seems that the ongoing initiative was strengthened not only by common successes but also, paradoxically, by defeats. They made us aware of the fact

40 A. Michta, I. Prizel, *Postcommunist Eastern Europe: Crisis and Reform*, New York 1992; R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye, S. Hoffmann, *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991*, Cambridge 1993; A. Z. Kamiński, L. Kościuk, *The Disintegration of the USSR and Central European Security*, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1/1993; J. Kukułka, (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w Europie Środkowej po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa 1994; A. Cottey, *East-Central Europe After the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security*, London 1995.

41 J. P. Hardt, R., F. Kaufman, (eds), *East-Central European Economies in Transition*, New York 1995.

that the basis for national and international success can only be effective cooperation. Coordination of activities, taking into account the specifics of a particular state's entities, gave hope, and, as it turned out, resulted in the fully achieved fundamental objectives.

The fundamental success of the Visegrád cooperation is the fact that it has not ceased. The primary goals have been achieved. Cooperation, undertaken mainly for rational, pragmatic reasons⁴² (rather from reason than simply love), has continued, despite the emerging concerns and differences, often in basic matters. This shows that the Visegrád countries are aware of the existence of much more lasting ties that connect them to a significant extent. The differences already mentioned, instead of leading to mutual abandonment, encourage searching for a common denominator.

The present-day diversity of ideas, goals and interests – especially in Europe (EU) – is a distinct stimulus to engage in the necessary cooperation. The shared heritage – the Central European identity that has already been mentioned – provides feasible bases for the continuity of the

42 Such reasons are natural as far as international cooperation is concerned – they do not question the argument concerning the existence of other, more lasting bases for the V4 cooperation. See: J. Vykoukal, *Visegrád: možnosti a meze stredoevropské spolupráce*, Praha 2003; P. Bajtay, (ed.) *Regional Cooperation and the European Integration Process: Nordic and Central European Experiences*, Budapest 1996; P. Bukalska, M. Bocian, *New Visegrad Group in the New European Union: Possibilities and Opportunities for Development*, Warsaw 2003; M. Csáky, E. Mannová, *Collective Identities in Central Europe and Modern Times*, Bratislava 2002; A. Jagodziński, (ed.), *The Visegrad Group – A Central European Constellation*, Bratislava 2006.

cooperation that has now lasted more than two decades. If there are a number of issues – also within the EU – that require the support of many countries, it is the Central European platform in the dimension of the Visegrád cooperation that may serve as a significant common ground for activity. Nonetheless, it depends on the V4 countries whether their position will be an authentic, powerful and articulate manifesto.

Integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions was the principal goal that inspired each individual member of the V4, as well as the Visegrád Group as a whole⁴³. The realization of this goal was of crucial significance both in the regional perspective and in the perspective of individual countries. Owing to full membership in NATO and the EU, each country individually and the region as a whole secured for itself a sense of safety inherent to participation in a stable and collaborative organizational reality. This goal was also implemented in view of responsible engagement of the V4 countries in the shaping

43 J. B. Spero, *The Warsaw–Prague–Budapest Triangle: Central European Security after the Visegrad Summit*, Warsaw 1992; A. J. Williams, (ed.), *Reorganizing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture*, Dartmouth 1994; J. Przewłocki, B. Osadnik, (eds), *Bezpieczeństwo państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: nadzieje i realia*, Katowice 1995; F. Gazdag, *A Comparative Analysis of the Visegrad Countries and their Endeavors to Integrate into the North Atlantic Alliance: Final Report to the NATO Fellowship Program, 1996–1997*, Budapest 1997; S. Gorka, *What's in the Packsack?: Contribution to European Security from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary*, Budapest 1999; A.A. Michta (ed.), *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO*, Seattle and London 2001; J. Howorth, J. Keeler, (eds), *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, New York 2003.

of security on the regional and global scales. Hence, integration with NATO did not exclusively result from the realization of particular interests – it also answered the postulate to reestablish a permanent order and a stable space of security in the new circumstances that followed the end of the Cold War⁴⁴.

This is of considerable significance due to the fact that all of the Visegrád countries, particularly Poland, were important elements of the Warsaw Pact – a bloc that until 1991 was perceived as the major confrontational threat for NATO, which is the reason why joining the Treaty during the years that immediately followed the political transformation was an unquestionable success. It seems that the accomplishment of this goal in such a short period of time was possible owing to the cooperation and mutual support of the V4 countries. This is especially visible in the case of Slovakia, which had to wait for its membership a couple of years, longer than the remaining partners. At that time, it received supportive help from the other three countries that formed a unique pressure group. As far as EU membership is concerned,

44 A. A. Michta, *East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s*, New York 1992; J. L. Lampe, D. N. Nelson, (eds), *East European Security Reconsidered*. Washington 1993; G. Gorzelak, (et al.), *Central Europe in Transition: Towards EU Membership*, Warsaw 2001; P. Luif, *Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Problems, Perceptions, Policies*, Vienna 2001; B. Balcerowicz, (et al.), *Transformation in Central European Security Environment*, Warszawa 2002; M. Madej, (ed.), *Cooperation on Security in Central Europe - Sharing V4 Experience with the Neighboring Regions*, Warszawa 2010; R. Fawn, *Visegrad: Fit for Purpose?*, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 3/2013.

the consistent standpoint adopted by the V4 member countries was evidently visible to so called „old members”. The initiatives of the V4 countries in their EU accession endeavors were particularly evident against the background of the remaining candidates⁴⁵.

The Visegrád countries were highly rated at the stage of accomplishing responsibilities resulting from the association and pre-membership agenda. A common standpoint and support for particular individual and group interests were manifest in the vast majority of fields. The aforementioned initial skepticism as for the evaluation of chances and of the success of the consistent initiative evolved into a positive image and the growing prestige of the Visegrád countries and of the entire region in the eyes of Europe. This favored its promotion and fostered political, economic and social confidence. When considered from the viewpoint of the territorial and population potential of the entire V4, which means treating it as one organism, it can be placed at one of the leading positions within the EU. It can be a significant trading partner with a considerable potential for development. All these provide the bases for its possibly greater significance within the EU.

45 P. Włodarski, *Współpraca wyszehradzka*, Warszawa 1993; G. Izik Hederi, *Eurasion Conference on „Political Dialogue between the European Community and the Countries of Visegrád – the Future of Central Europe”*, Budapest, 5–7 November 1992. Budapest 1994; F. Gołembski, *The Visegrad Group – an Exercise in Multilateral Cooperation in Central Europe*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 3/1994; B. Lippert, H. Schneider, (eds), *Monitoring Association and Beyond: The European Union and the Visegrad States*, Bonn 1995.

A valuable initiative inspired in 1992 by the V4 was the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)⁴⁶. In addition to a desire to strengthen cooperation between the members of the Visegrád Group, particularly in the political dimension, the reasons for the creation of CEFTA were primarily associated with two important things for the V4 countries. First of all, there was a necessity to respond to the dramatic situation related to economic transformation. This level of activity completely failed after the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which stimulated ostensible trade in the former socialist countries. Internal trade volumes fell by almost half. The second reason was diplomatic engagement and guidelines from the EU, directed to the Central European countries, possible future members of the European Union. This association and pre-membership dialogue required that economic issues be regulated. There arose the necessity to counteract rivalry, discrimination and competitive tendencies in Central Europe. Essentially, this concerned the creation of a free trade area, the esta-

46 L. G., Tóth, *Trade Among the CEFTA Countries in the Mid-1990s: How to Promote the Expansion of Intra-regional Trade Flows in Central Europe*, Budapest 1994; A. Inotai, *Economic integration of the Visegrad Countries: Facts and Scenarios*, Budapest 1994; P. Bożyk, (ed.), *CEFTA a integracja ekonomiczna w Europie*, Warszawa 1996; A. B. Kisiel-Łowczyc, *CEFTA: Środkowoeuropejska Strefa Wolnego Handlu*, Gdańsk 1996; M. Szczepaniak, (ed.), *Państwa Wyszehradzkie: systemy polityczne, gospodarka, współpraca*, Poznań 1996 L. T. Orłowski, D. Salvatore, (eds), *Trade and Payments in Central and Eastern Europe's Transforming Economies*, Westport 1997; G. Csáki, (ed.), *Foreign Direct Investment in the CEFTA Countries*, Budapest 1998; M. Dangerfield, *Subregional Economic Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: the Political Economy of CEFTA*, Northampton 2000.

blishment of economic cooperation and market stability, as well as the improvement of living conditions. The text of the agreement clearly mentioned the promotion of “the harmonious development of the economic relations between the Parties” and the fostering in the Parties of “the advance of economic activity, the improvement of living and employment conditions, and increased productivity and financial stability”⁴⁷. Although it is difficult to unambiguously evaluate the efficiency of CEFTA, it seems that it has achieved its essential purpose. It served as a permanent platform for cooperation between its members and assisted the process of adjusting the economies of Central Europe in the context of meeting the EU criteria. Moreover, the initiative became attractive to a number of other countries in the region⁴⁸.

Financial support from the EU is of great significance to the Visegrád Group members. These countries are still adjusting a number of their sectors to European standards, especially with regard to investments and social development. Thus, from the very beginnings of their membership in the European Union, they have been jointly engaged in the preparation of an optimal financial perspective for the EU. Important policies in this area included strong mutual support and the manifestation of

47 *Central European Free Trade Agreement*, [www.worldtradelaw.net].

48 In addition to the countries of the Visegrád Group, other countries were also admitted as CEFTA members at different times: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia i Slovenia.

common interests in the financial perspectives from 2007 to 2013⁴⁹. This issue is one of the cornerstones of V4 summits organized at the stage of discussions on the project. The position on the principal issues – reached through negotiations and presented, among others, to the European Commission – is uniform⁵⁰. It was pointed out that it is necessary to support modernization, especially in the areas of the economy as well as social, research, scientific and agricultural policy initiatives. The two principles that would justifiably serve as the basis in this case were the ideas of solidarity and subsidiarity, as they postulate the obligation to give support to those entities that need it more than others. Thus, on the one hand, the member countries of the Group skillfully manifested their essential interests, but on the other hand – they were able to effectively and rationally justify the reasons why it was essential to make such final financial decisions as would, in general, correspond to their expectations. This further attested to the existence of a relevant influence exerted by the Central European region on EU politics⁵¹.

The Visegrád countries did not confine themselves to merely maximizing the benefits they gained owing to their membership in the European Union. They form a

49 M. Gniazdowski, *Grupa Wyszehradzka a negocjacje Nowej Perspektywy Finansowej UE na lata 2007-13*, Warszawa 2005.

50 An example of this was a manifesto addressed to the European Commission by the V4 Prime Ministers on August 30, 2005, which set out the Group's expectations and proposals.

51 A. Sobják, *Rethinking the Future of the Visegrad Group at a Time of Heated Debate on the Future of the EU*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 4/2012.

unique pressure group and a platform for support for the remaining countries in the region that are at the stage of membership negotiations with the EU. This mostly concerns the Balkans⁵² and Eastern Europe⁵³. Such a commitment is hardly surprising, taking into account the fact that the countries are direct neighbors. It is in this perspective that we can note strong, declarative, and at the same time substantial support for these regions. The idea of an „open door” dominated at the level of political discourse associated with the possibility of the accession of other countries. The conviction as to the legitimacy of this approach stems from the belief in the necessity to build a stable space of security in Europe, also – and perhaps in particular – with the participation of the Balkan and

52 J. Jensen, *Europe Bound: Faultlines and Frontlines of Security in the Balkans*, Szombathely 2003; M. Gniazdowski, T. Strážay, (et al.), *Strategia Unii Europejskiej dla Regionu Dunaju. Implikacje dla Polski i Grupy Wyszehradzkiej*, Warszawa 2011; T. Strážay, *Visegrad Four and the Western Balkans: A Group Perspective*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 4/2012.

53 K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, (ed.), *Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union: Developing Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: A Visegrad Perspective: Thinking about an Eastern Dimension*, Warsaw-Bratislava 2003; M. Dangerfield, *The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union's 'Eastern' Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?*, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 10/2009; I. Albrycht, (ed.), *The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and V4 Agenda*, Cracow 2010; V. Pulišova, T. Strážay, (eds), *Ukraine and the Visegrad Four: Towards a Mutually Beneficial Relationship*, Bratislava 2010; P. Bielik, (ed.), *Economics, Social Policy and Citizenship in the European Union: Evidence of V4 Countries and Perspectives for Ukraine*, Nitra 2010; S. Koles, (ed.), *Sharing the Experience of Visegrad Cooperation in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighborhood Countries: Project Final Study*, Budapest 2010; J. Marušiak, *Slovakia and the Eastern Partnership*, *Yearbook of Slovakia's Foreign Policy*, 1/2010; P. Kugiel, *The Development Cooperation Policies of Visegrad Countries—An Unrealized Potential*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 4/2012; W. Gizicki, *Eastern Partnership – for Security and Cooperation*, *Political Sciences*, 2/2012.

Eastern European countries. Both the recent experience of war in the Balkans and political instability in Eastern Europe seem to fully confirm this position. It is impossible to establish a sustainable security community without including the countries and regions that are still outside the EU into the processes of integration. Undoubtedly, much depends on the countries themselves - their willingness, potential and ability to cooperate. In this spirit, the Visegrád countries successfully supported the integration process of Croatia. The experiences of the presidencies of the Czech Republic⁵⁴ (2009) as well as Hungary⁵⁵ and Poland⁵⁶ (2011) show that the V4 countries do not lack determination in this area.

Finally, the areas of science and culture form a particularly significant and valuable platform for collaboration. In this respect, the Visegrád Group has devised an institutional formula whose flagship project is the International

54 R. Druláková, *The Czech EU Council Presidency - Priorities in Justice and Home Affairs Issues*, Prague 2008; P. Kaniok, *České předsednictví Rady EU - most přes minulost*, Brno 2010.

55 E. Váradi, (ed.), *The Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union: 1 January - 30 June 2011*, Budapest 2011; *Six Months in the Service of a Stronger Europe: Overview of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union: January - June 2011*, Budapest 2011.

56 G. Gromadzki, D. Král, *Energy and the Budget as Priorities of the Polish EU Presidency: the Prospect of the Visegrad Countries and Germany*, Warsaw 2011; *Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 1 July - 31 December 2011: Final Report: Preparations, Achievements, Conclusions*, Warsaw 2012; A. Legucka, (ed.), *Polska prezydencja wobec wyzwań współczesnej Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2012; J. Czaputowicz, Z. Czachór, (eds), *Prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej: bilans polskich doświadczeń*, Warszawa 2012; J. M. Fiszer, (ed.), *Prezydencja Polski w Radzie UE*, Warszawa 2012.

Visegrád Fund⁵⁷. The institution was established in 2000 and is intended to promote cooperation – especially on the social level. Youth exchange, joint research and cultural initiatives contribute to a significant extent to fostering mutual trust and encouraging the manifestation and promotion of regional activity and objectives. Establishing a security community based on the theoretical assumptions of this study is directly related to introducing cooperation that involves national communities, especially at the local level. Society is learning about real affinity, the existence of a number of common areas and development objectives. All of this contributes greatly to strengthening the effective formation of a Central European community.

Making an analysis of initiatives aimed at forming a security community with the participation of the Visegrád Group, we cannot neglect the difficult periods in its history. They were frequently serious, as they confronted the interests of the V4 Member Countries. However, for the most part, these were resolved. What's more, they did not pose a threat of ultimately suspending or solving the Visegrád initiative. Some of the key issues should be discussed at greater length.

As it has already been mentioned, differences of opinion emerged as early as at the very beginning of the cooperation. They mostly concerned the definition of the nature, scope and formulation of cooperation. After an initial period of successful activity of the Group, betwe-

57 More information: [www.visegradfund.org].

en the years 1994 to 1998, there emerged fundamental differences of approaching the priorities and objectives that were to be achieved together. This was reflected mainly in the ambitious approach to the effective and short time finalization of accession with NATO and the EU – an approach that was prevalent in the Czech Republic and Poland. Both countries began to compete for the title of leader in the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe.

Another hindrance to the Visegrád cooperation was the period when Vladimír Mečiar was the Prime Minister of Slovakia⁵⁸. There appeared legitimate concerns about a fundamental shift in the direction of the foreign policy of this country. Despite the official continuation in the Euro-Atlantic trend, the real actions indicated that there was very close cooperation with Russia. Moreover, Mečiar revealed far-reaching authoritarian ambitions. All of this seriously affected the international image of Slovakia and substantially impeded the possibility of effective cooperation with NATO and the European Union. Not only Slovak, but also international analysts and observers indeed pointed to the risk of Slovakia joining the “grey zone” of international politics. Nonetheless, the foundations worked out in the twilight of Czechoslovakia and shortly after

58 M. F. Goldman, *Slovakia Since Independence: A Struggle for Democracy*, Westport 1998; K. Henderson, *Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility*, London 2002; R. Zende-rowski, *Nad Tatrami błyska się... : słowacka tożsamość narodowa w dyskursie politycznym w Republice Słowackiej (1989-2004)*, Warszawa 2007; P. Bajda, *Elity polityczne na Słowacji w latach 1989-2010: kręta droga do nowoczesnego państwa*, Warszawa 2010.

its dissolution allowed the V4 to survive this difficult period and to return to its fundamental political course in the years to come.

As mentioned above, the stability of the Eastern region and the Balkans is in the interest of Central European countries⁵⁹. It appears that the Visegrád Group did not make the most of the opportunity offered by a clear manifestation of its interests in Eastern Europe. The main omission is the lack of support for so-called Eastern Partnership and the failure to proclaim on behalf of the V4 that there is a justified need for its initiation, the Partnership being the concretization of the European Neighborhood Policy. Poland was supported in this regard by Sweden. In order to reinforce the importance of the region, such support from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary would be a major achievement and a powerful argument in emphasizing the importance of the region on the European forum. If the Group intends to build its positive image and act as a regional player, it should, among other initiatives, take advantage of such opportunities.

The list of problems that accompany Visegrád cooperation is of course much longer and the examples provided have been used simply to illustrate the scale of differences. Nevertheless, the experiences of two decades of the Visegrád Group show that the countries are aware of

59 A. Lorek, *Poland's Role in the Development of an 'Eastern Dimension' of the European Union*, München 2009; I. Filipova, *The Visegrad States on the EU's Eastern Frontier: Visa Policies of the V4 vis-à-vis the Eastern Neighbors - a Challenge for the Regional Co-operation*, Saarbrücken 2011.

the regional initiative and of its importance and to a great extent manage to successfully overcome the emerging difficulties. In this context, one can confirm the assumptions that this results from the existence of well-established ties that link them.

PART THREE

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

The aforementioned historical and social conditions connected with various periods of the functioning of the Visegrád Group countries as independent entities and parts of great, multinational dynasties have their relevance in regard to the current political and legal systems. We cannot directly formulate a thesis concerning fundamental and close similarities in this regard, yet it is possible, as it appears, to notice several characteristic features of each Visegrád country. We can also find examples of analyses highlighting their distinctness from other European political and legal systems⁶⁰.

60 J. Fitzmaurice, *Politics and Government in the Visegrad Countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia*, Basingstoke 1998; E. J. Kircher, *Decentralization and Transition in the Visegrad: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and*

All of the Visegrád countries have based their legal systems on civil law, relying on a strong connection with Roman law. The law has a hierarchical character. In every case we can find features of German legislation, in Poland there is also French, and in Hungary – Austrian. The formal and legal impact and pressure of the USSR, which lasted several dozen years after the Second World War, was of considerable importance. All aspects of a state's functioning as well as its legal basis were a copy of Soviet solutions. The Constitutions of all the discussed countries during the mentioned period were very subordinate to Stalin's ideology⁶¹. The political direction was set by the determination to shape the society and create the „peace-loving” socialist regime! Social resistance in this regard was strong and it translated, despite political thaw after Stalin's death, into vividly-manifested and active opposition, as well as independence events. All this resulted in the necessity for resolute actions in the legislative area, in the period after 1989. And this was not an easy process. The attachment to resistance against externally-imposed formal and legal solutions has led to the substantially-selective treatment and the mistrustful approach to legal regulations, also in alre-

Slovakia, Basingstoke 1999; P. Fiala, R. Herbut, *Středoevropské systémy politických stran: Česká Republika, Maďarsko, Polsko a Slovensko*, Brno 2003; A. Antoszewski, (ed.), *Systemy polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Perspektywa porównawcza*, Wrocław 2006; W. Gizicki, (ed.), *Political Systems of Visegrad Group Countries*, Trnava-Lublin 2012.

61 On the manuscript of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland of 1952, we can find handwritten amendments made by Joseph Stalin!

ady sovereign entities. However, this situation is gradually improving.

A constitution is the main source of law, including security, in each of the discussed countries. However, the methods and times of accomplishing modern constitutional acts were different. The Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced a bit more obvious and favorable conditions for an instantaneous adoption of their new constitutions. The split of Czechoslovakia into two independent, sovereign state entities, which ultimately took place on January 1st, 1993, was preceded by the adoption of two separate acts, one for each of the two countries. In the case of the Czech Republic, this happened on December 16th, 1992, and for Slovakia, on September 1st, 1992. Due to this, the constitutional order in both these countries was adopted before the documents actually went in force. In the case of Poland and Hungary, the process of adopting new basic laws lasted longer, respectively eight years for Poland on April 2nd, 1997 – and twenty two years for Hungary, on April 18th, 2011. Before the adoption of the new constitutions, both these countries amended acts from the socialist period, which were in force. Undoubtedly, this did not facilitate their smooth reformation in the formal and legal, and also socio-political context.

Each of the Visegrád Group countries has made efforts to implement necessary reforms in the field of national safety concepts⁶². These processes were complicated

62 J. Usiak, *Strategy in Visegrad Group's Countries*, Visegrad Group Safety 2011.

due to the long-standing functioning within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and subordination to defensive doctrines formulated in the USSR. What is more, each of the analyzed countries has explicitly formulated its security priorities, closely connected with their membership in NATO and the EU. The process of shaping formal and sovereign security strategies included several stages and numerous documents. Each time, they were adapted to the dynamically-changing international conditions at the turn of the 21st century. In the case of the Czech Republic, the present binding document is from September 8th, 2011, for Hungary from April 18th, Poland from November 13th, 2007, and Slovakia from September 23rd, 2005. The objectives and tasks encompassed by these documents particularly highlight the legitimacy of transatlantic cooperation, consolidating democratic rules, developing collective security, and engaging in international cooperation.

The political system in the discussed countries is fairly dynamic. The pace and scope of changes are relatively high. The character of the legislative power can be illustrated by two distinct systemic concepts. In the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, we have bicameralism, i.e. a parliament consisting of two chambers. On the other hand, Hungary and Slovakia are characterized by unicameralism with one chamber of parliament. It is worth noting, however, that in each case a term in parliament lasts four years. All the Visegrád countries feature dualistic systems of executive power. In all cases, the President is the head of state elected for a five-year term, and his

or her authority is fairly limited. Despite this, he or she can actively engage in both internal and foreign political processes. Much depends on the personality, charisma, and determination in holding the office. His or her main competences are connected with representing the country abroad and signing international agreements. Moreover, the president also serves as a commander-in-chief. The position of a head of state is relatively the strongest in Poland, owing to the right of veto. The main authority in terms of the executive power lies in the hands of the government, elected for a four-year term. This also includes setting directions for foreign and internal policy, including security. Specific solutions in respect to judicial power, the party and voting systems are fundamentally similar, in terms of formality, to the European standards. However, in the two latter cases (parties and voting), numerous complicated phenomena specific to still-evolving republics can be observed.

Table 2. Political systems of V4.

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Government	Parliamentary Republic	Parliamentary Republic	Parliamentary Republic	Parliamentary Republic
Constitution	December 16, 1992	April 18, 2011	April 2, 1997	September 1, 1992
Legislative Powers	Bicameralism: Senate – 81 Members The Chamber of Deputies – 200 Members	Unicameralism: National Assembly – 386 Members	Bicameralism: Senate – 100 Members Sejm – 460 Members	Unicameralism: National Council – 150 Members
Executive Powers	Dual Executive: 1. The Head of State, President, 5-year term 2. Council of Ministers, with Prime Ministers	Dual Executive: 1. The Head of State, President, 5-year term 2. Council of Ministers, with Prime Ministers	Dual Executive: 1. The Head of State, President, 5-year term 2. Council of Ministers, with Prime Ministers	Dual Executive: 1. The Head of State, President, 5-year term 2. Council of Ministers, with Prime Ministers
Judicial Branch	The Supreme Court The Constitutional Court	The Supreme Court Constitutional Tribunal	The Supreme Court State Tribunal Constitutional Tribunal	The Supreme Court The Constitutional Court
Party System	Multi-party	Multi-party	Multi-party	Multi-party

Source: personal research work.

Poland

Changes in the political system and in national politics made in 1989 did not transfer onto a rapid modernization of the constitution⁶³. The time needed to prepare the text of a new constitution, which governs all areas for the functioning of a democratic state was relatively long. Poland's constitutional bases in the first years after 1989 were still regulated by the statute from 1952. Of course, records that are unsuitable for a democratic state were crossed out. The transitional stage paving the way for the modern document was the so-called Small Constitution of 1992. Its framework primarily includes a departure from the socialist system and indicates the competencies of state institutions, including the president, who is the supreme representative of the Republic of Poland, the guard of sovereignty and security.

In 1997, eight years after the recovery of practical sovereignty, the new **Constitution of the Republic of Poland** was approved of⁶⁴. It is a modern document, regulating the basic principles of a formal and legal democratic state. As a consequence, there is clear reference to the new geo-political and social realities. The first sentence of the preamble clearly indicates the fact that the Nation of Poland in 1989 recovered full sovereignty

63 W. Kitler, M. Czuryk, M. Karpiuk, (eds), *Aspekty prawne bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP: część ogólna*, Warszawa 2013; W. Kitler, M. Czuryk, M. Karpiuk, (eds), *Aspekty prawne bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP: część szczegółowa*, Warszawa 2013.

64 *Constitution of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw 1997, [www.sejm.gov.pl].

and democratic self-determination. At the same time, it highlights the obvious need for cooperation with all nations. This is a necessary condition for international peace and stability. Poland strongly pursues this particularly significant postulate and declaration at both the formal and practical levels.

The Constitution introduces new solutions for the development of national security. Basic, subjective and objective principles and obligations of the state are stated in Article 5. They are in accord with the values that are common within the framework of a democratic nation's laws: "The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development". This quoted passage from the Constitution clearly indicates that in the area of security, we must take into account a number of considerations, both military and those which have a non-military character. Article 26 gives the general provisions concerning the purpose and principles of operation of the armed forces. The Constitution points to their defensive character and civilian control. In Article 89, the Constitution also states the detailed rules for making international agreements, in particular in the field of international cooperation on security issues (i.e. alliances and military systems). Article 90 gives the possibility for transferring the competence of internal organs to other international subjects.

Relevant solutions in the area of security concern the constitutional division of tasks and responsibilities between the institutions of the legislative and the executive powers. Articles 116 and 117 define the powers of the Parliament in the case of declaring a state of war, entering into peace and fulfilling obligations deriving from common defense concluded under international agreements. Special competence in the area of security is given to the President of the Republic of Poland. It is contained in several articles. Article 126 clearly emphasizes his role as guardian of „the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory”⁶⁵. The president plays a particularly important role in representing the state externally (Article 133). He is also the head of the armed forces, which is strongly emphasized in Article 134. In this regard, the Constitution represents a broad spectrum of privileges, which are further described in several statutes. Support for the decisions made by the President is the National Security Council, appointed by him under Article 135. Next, Article 136 indicates the power to mobilize state defense in time of danger. Assignments for the Council of Ministers in the area of security are set out in Article 146. Several sections of this article point out the

65 This is also included in the text of the oath that the President makes to the National Assembly at the time of taking office (Article 130): “Assuming, by the will of the Nation, the office of President of the Republic of Poland, I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution; I pledge that I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the Nation, the independence and security of the State, and also that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation”.

tasks of providing security and internal order, accomplishing tasks for external security, and the overall management of activities for international relations, international agreements and the area of defense.

An important part of the regulations concerning security issues is contained in Articles 228-234. The chapter covering these articles deals with emergency situations, including the state of war. All important state institutions have duties in this respect. However, a special role is played by the President, who formally announces decisions in this regard.

After the system transformations in 1989, Poland clearly changed its strategic goals⁶⁶. Since then, Poland obtained membership in NATO and the UE. Cooperation was almost immediately undertaken towards reaching goals within these structures. In the area of safety, the priority was cooperation in the framework of NATO; therefore, Poland undertook formal dialogue with the Alliance and entered and started to work out new **strategic documents** in the area of safety. This was not an easy process. In the initial period of building a new sphere of safety, the future of the Alliance in the framework of the Warsaw Pact was still significantly important. This can be clearly perceived in the 1990 Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Poland.

66 R. Kuźniar, (ed.), *Poland's Security Policy 1989-2000*, Warsaw 2001; S. Koziej, *Współczesne problemy bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego i narodowego*, Warszawa 2003; R. Zięba, *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa 2010; J. Pawłowski, (ed.), *Współczesny wymiar bezpieczeństwa: między teorią a praktyką*, Warszawa 2011.

This document included general instructions in the area of Poland's defense Policy. Responsibility for this realm was directed to every subject: political, economic and social. In several places, the universality of security and the related with it necessity to undertake defensive responsibilities by society was also stated. The *Doctrine* points out that a primary goal for Poland is the nation's and people's existence. Security policies were to be achieved based on full sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, it was unanimously indicated that Poland's security is closely tied with the external situation. Therefore, this document contains the obligation that we should strive for international cooperation based on peaceful dialogue and the use of armed forces as a defensive measure, but they should be limited to defensive purposes. The situation in Europe at the beginning of the 1990's had a significant meaning. The *Doctrine* stressed the meaning of building mutual trust and carrying out anti-war politics. War in Europe, particularly atomic warfare, would bring tragic consequences for both Europe as well as the entire world.

The document also included detailed regulations related with the Republic of Poland's armed forces. The types of armies were specified, and the way of utilizing them was outlined. General assignments were placed on the normal army, but readiness to defend the country was also attributed to enforcement services, civil defense and the public. These possibilities in the military sphere were tied with economic development. That is why we continued to base the military on mandatory draft, though the

possibility of creating a professional army was not excluded. An important element concerned the legitimacy of using the army beyond Poland's borders. In essence, this possibility was ascribed only to sending soldiers on peace keeping missions under the auspices of the UN. It is important to mention that the *Doctrine* does not contain in any place a phrase related with the Euro-Atlantic direction, meaning basing Poland's security directly on NATO. However, it is stressed that an important part of the Republic of Poland's security politics includes membership in the Warsaw Pact! We ought to remember, however, that in 1990 the Pact still formally existed, since Poland still stationed Russian soldiers and the President of the Republic of Poland was General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Perhaps this document was designed quite conservatively for these reasons, although it contained a new approach to the security policy, which was necessary in the new geopolitical reality.

In 1992, the Security Policy and Defense Strategy was accepted, the first document specifying the goals and principles in the area of Poland's safety in the new international conditions. The entire document clearly questions the period of cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Pact. However, it was clearly written in it that Poland's goal is to obtain membership in NATO. It was underlined that Poland does not have a defined enemy or a clear plan of military operations related with this. Particularly essential and breakthrough in significance were the indications included in the document related with the

new non-military approach to security. This concerned taking into account the entire spectrum of conditions, including the geopolitical, social and economic. The need for disarmament, modernization of the armed forces, and international partnership cooperation, including neighboring and regional, were pointed out. Respect for human rights, freedom, democracy, rule of law and international solidarity became essential. Belief in the need to enter into and build a complex international security system was also essential.

Poland, having obtained membership in NATO (1999), along with Czech and Hungary, required updating essential formal and legal resolutions. This resulted, among others, in preparing and accepting a new strategic concept. Security Strategy of Poland in 2000 gives a precise account of Poland's security policy goals. They can be linked with two essential categories. First, there is a concentration on guaranteeing basic values in the framework of external functioning: these include independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state and the state's democracy and the protection of civil rights, as well as social, economic and cultural development (national identity). Second, this involvement is done through the implementation of external functions, in undertaking regional and global challenges: these include building sustainable peace, promoting democracy and human rights. The document also points to a number of principles which have important significance in achieving the above goals. This analysis allows us to state that Poland clearly perceives the

need to base its safety on international cooperation, related to the multidimensionality and complexity of modern security. The goal of activity in the safety sector is the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the case where the need arises for military involvement in any region of the world, we should strive to be in line with the formal legal rules, particularly the United Nations and other international organizations. Such intervention cannot threaten and question human rights.

The next version of the Strategy: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, was adopted fairly quickly, as early as 2003. The world was struggling with new challenges, symbolized by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. The main objectives and principles remained the same. However, this version of the document is the result of reaction to the new international reality. In addition to indicating the problems of combating terrorism, we focused on the dangers resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, non-democratic and authoritarian regimes, and failed states. Poland strongly incorporated into a global offensive against those threats.

Contemporary foundations for Poland's security were described in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2007⁶⁷. This document contains strategic interests, goals and principles for creating this policy.

67 *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw 2007, [www.wp.mil.pl].

The first words of the document confirm that Poland is presently a safe nation. In presenting national interests, it was stated that they have not changed in several years. These have been grouped into three categories: vital, important and other essential matters. The framework of vital interests primarily means ensuring the survival of the state and its citizens.

Important matters are related with activities on behalf of guaranteeing a civilization's growth and economic development. In the area of other essential interests, we pointed to the need to build and promote a stable, strong international position for Poland. Tied with this accomplishing of the above mentioned interests, close correlation between internal and external activities was stressed. When indicating Poland's strategic objectives, it was stressed that they are linked to the international environment and the obligations arising from this, especially in the framework of NATO and the EU. The overriding goal is about ensuring the realization of national interests by eliminating risks, making a realistic assessment of the challenges and using international development opportunities to their fullest potential. The main strategic objectives are very versatile. In this framework, we can discern political objectives (such as the continuity of the state, international cooperation), economic (including the development and promotion of the economy, support for entrepreneurs), legal (including the guarantee of civil rights and human rights), cultural (including the protection and development of cultural heritage, including the develop-

ment of science), environmental (such as environmental protection). All of the above mentioned goals indicate the necessity of a complementary approach to security.

Today's global challenges set new assignments for participants in international relations. Thus, Poland's Security Strategy encompasses many sectors that make up national security, both internal and external. Military security is just one of them. Equally important, however, are civil, social, economic, ecological, information and communication safety. Regardless of the changes and additions which accompanied the adoption of the new version of the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, we should note that since 1990, the essential objectives and principles of Poland's security policy have not changed. The main objectives are focus on: ensuring independence, sovereignty, the territorial integrity of nations and the inviolability of their borders; to protect the democratic constitutional order, including in particular the rights, freedoms and the safety of citizens; the comprehensive and stable social and economic development of Poland, the wellbeing of citizens, preserving the nation's heritage and the development of national identity; to contribute to building a lasting, democratic, lawfully just and peaceful order in Europe and the world. The accepted principles supporting the process of forming Poland's security at the regional and global levels take particular account of such elements as: the complexity and multi-factors of security, the need to respect the formal and legal frameworks, both the internal and international dimensions,

activity in the Euro-Atlantic region, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. After 2001, the activities in terms of eliminating risks associated with global terrorism increased significantly.

In this spirit, we proceeded to work on the analysis of Poland's contemporary security space. On November 24, 2010, the President of Poland, Bronislaw Komorowski, issued an instruction which points to the legitimacy of the organization and carrying out the National Security Strategic Review. The goal of this initiative was tied to the need to assess Poland's overall national security, to perform both a diagnosis and to forecast the development of the security situation. The reasons for this were changes in the global security space, the multiplicity and complexity of the circumstances in this matter, and the analysis of the theory and practice of safety in Poland. The necessity to point out conclusions, to prepare eventual system changes and to formulate new strategic perspectives was indicated. The Commission called to do this was made up of representatives from many institutions involved in issues of safety: Presidential delegates, the National Security Bureau, state and local administrations, NGOs and universities. The main result of nearly two years of the Commission's work is the document entitled "The National Strategic Security Review. Main Conclusions and Recommendations for Poland"⁶⁸.

68 *The National Strategic Security Review*, Warsaw 2012, [www.bbn.gov.pl].

The most important conclusions are included in five main points. The first of these undertakes a diagnosis of Poland's strategic interests and goals. Four elements make up the strategic potential: the systemic and political potential, armed defense, security protection, and social and economic development. The second point concerns the evaluation and prognosis of the safety environment and points to three dimensions: the global, regional and national. The third and fourth points of the document indicate three strategic and preparation operation options: maximum security for Poland, its sovereignty and self-sufficiency and sustainable development. The fifth point contains an essential recommendation in the area of the nation's safety goal. These include, among others, presenting the new National Security Strategy in 2013, accepting or modernizing the acts in the area of internal and external security, highlighting possible scenarios of the development of the political and formal-legal situation in the subjective region.

Visegrad Partners

The **Constitution of the Czech Republic** from December 16, 1992, points to fundamental solutions in the area of the development of security⁶⁹. However, there are

69 *The Constitution of the Czech Republic*, Prague 1992, [www.psp.cz].

not many direct references to this issue. The state's basic objectives are emphasized: sovereignty, democracy, rule by law and the security of its citizens⁷⁰. Article 63 indicated that the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces. There are many more references to safety contained in the so-called constitutional rights, especially from April 22, 1998. Already in article 1, the basic obligations of the state are pointed out: "Protection of sovereignty and Territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, preservation of its democratic principles and protection of lives, health and property values are the state's basic obligations"⁷¹. The document also points to the specific powers of the government in the area of security. This is related, among others, to the introduction of the state of emergency, danger or war. The government's competency also includes acting in the case of crises situations by convening the State Security Council (SSC), which is also attended by the President⁷².

The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic was adopted four times, in 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2011. Therefore, it seems that the regulations on the basis of strategic security were adopted quite late (six years after the dis-

70 M. Kindlová, (et al.), *The Introduction to Czech Constitutional Law*, Prague 2009; B. Štědroň, *Introduction to Law*, Prague 2010; M. Tomášek, (et al.), *Czech Law Between Europeanization and Globalization*, Prague 2010.

71 *Constitutional Act of Law No. 110/1998 Coll., April 22, 1998, on Security of the Czech Republic*, Prague 1998, [www.psp.cz].

72 V. Kvasnička, *Obrana, bezpečnost a krizové stavy: souhrn vybraných právních předpisů ČR a mezinárodních smluv*, Prague 2004; M. Potůček, (et al.), *Strategic Governance and the Czech Republic*, Prague 2009.

solution of Czechoslovakia). The basic solution contained in this document is consistent with the basic legal acts of the Czech Republic, the Constitution and constitutional acts. All important state authorities were involved in writing the document, from the legislative and the executive branches, as well as other important public institutions. The general assumption related to the adoption of the Strategy relates to its universal, particular and non-party message. The main objectives of the main part of the document are related with ensuring internal and external security, foreign policy and defense. In a document from 2011⁷³, (which is a revision of the document from 2003), four areas of security are specified: 1. Principles; 2. Interests; 3. Environment; 4. Promoting. It should be noted that the implementation of the security policy resulting from the document is based on the complementary involvement of all relevant actors and public institutions. Each version of the document has evolved into a more detailed definition of the security environment for the Czech Republic. It is also associated with involvement in a number of European and transatlantic initiatives.

The **Hungarian Constitution** of April 18, 2011 much more broadly and directly addresses the issue of security⁷⁴. The main objectives of the nation in this regard have been given in the Preamble. Among others, it is indicated that: „We hold with the common goal of citizens and the

73 *The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*, Prague 2011, [www.mzv.cz].

74 *The Fundamental Law of Hungary*, Budapest 2011, [www.komany.hu].

State is to achieve the highest possible measure of well-being, safety, order, justice and liberty”. Articles E and Q clearly indicate the need to be involved the construction of a stable and secure space in Europe and the world. Also stressed is the need to ensure social security (Article XIX), and a person’s right to liberty and security are indicated (Article 4). Article 9 contains a paragraph indicating that the President is the head of the armed forces. The final part of the constitution describes in detail the issue of the functioning of the armed forces (Article 45) and the subsequent articles (46-53) give the rules of conduct in situations that threaten the state and its security. These rules govern the mutual relationships, rights and responsibilities of the various state institutions in this regard.

Developing the strategic security concept for Hungary was characterized by high dynamism. Various names were given to the documents regulating this area. Some of them were prepared a few years after the system changes (for example, 1993), next in relation with the accession to NATO (1999) and the EU (2002 and 2004). In the period of 2009-2012, the strategic document was approved of three times under various titles. The currently binding **National Military Strategy** was adopted in 2012⁷⁵. It is to a large extent a continuation of Hungary’s previous strategic objectives in terms of security. Two of its major cells seem to be unchanged: 1. their personal military assets and 2. cooperation within the framework of NATO. The document

75 *Hungary’s National Security Strategy*, Budapest 2012, [www.kormany.hu].

clearly states how to renew the armed forces by increasing their range of activities, including in foreign missions. The strategic objectives set out in the most important legal instruments in the area of security for Hungary can be divided into two complementary types: 1. internal (among others, ensuring the sovereignty and stability of the state and its citizens); 2. external (such as the promotion of democracy and peace, transatlantic cooperation, and stabilization of the immediate environment). Regardless of this, they require undertaking specific actions that are consistent with the nation's interests.

The **Constitution of Slovak Republic** from September 1, 1992, contains a number of direct and specific references to the issue of security⁷⁶. Article 7 regulates the conditions and opportunities for international cooperation, including collective security. Article 25 points to the duty to defend the state. The competence and powers of the various state institutions are regulated in several places in the Constitution. In the case of the National Council, this includes article 86 (agreeing to military contracts). The President's powers are included in article 102 (he is the head of the armed forces). Government powers are defined in article 119 (including economic and social security, using the military, internal and external policies). As in the case of the Czech Republic, detailed solutions in the area of safety are included in the constitutional acts. One of these from April 11, 2002 states that „Slovakia exerci-

76 *Constitution of the Slovak Republic*, Bratislava 1992, [www.slovakia.org].

ses state power in order to maintain peace and security in the country, mainly to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and democratic order, protection of life and health, fundamental rights and liberties, property and the environment, and meets the obligations of membership in organizations of mutual collective security and international agreements”⁷⁷. Generally, constitutional acts regulate, among others, the security issues during times of war, a state of crisis, and management of security and defense.

The **Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic** from 2005 fundamentally defines the objectives and tasks of the state in the analyzed area⁷⁸. An earlier version was adopted in 2001 and seems to better reflect the above mentioned needs, responsibilities and security environment for Slovakia. The current document is divided into three parts. They include such things as: 1. Interest; 2. Environment; and 3. Security Policy. Security interests are also associated with both obligations to the state and citizens, as well as the external environment. The strategy points to the changed conditions in the external security environment and the need to engage Slovakia in promoting stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. It lists a broad spectrum of challenges and threats (such as terrorism, crime, regional conflicts, failed states, migration). In the area of security policy, it emphasizes its main ob-

77 *Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll. on State Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency, and State of Crisis*, [www.nrsr.sk].

78 *The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, Bratislava 2005, [www.mosr.sk].

jective: to ensure the safety of citizens and the state and its contribution to building a stable security area. Taking into account the experience of other V4 countries, it seems that the main task of Slovakia is to prepare and adopt a new strategic document in the near future.

PART FOUR

SECURITY DILEMMAS

Adopting responsible – internal and foreign – policies requires taking into account potential and real threats and challenges. This obviously concerns each Visegrád country individually and also the whole cooperating Group. Threats and challenges can be of various origins. They are connected mainly with geopolitical location, historical conditions, and political transformations. They are fundamentally connected with the political, economic, and social changes which took place after 1989. While analyzing this area of functioning in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, it may appear that the majority of these conditions are similar. The young, reborn democracies, returning to their rightful place in an integrating Europe, have to take this aspect into account. While analyzing the challenges and threats against the effective development of security in the countries of the Visegrád

Group, we should pay attention to their complexity, multidimensionality, and convergence. This applies, among others, to socio-political⁷⁹, demographic⁸⁰ and energy issues, as well as to natural disasters, organized crime, and terrorist attacks. It should be noted that most of them are of a non-military character. Thus, after 1989, we are again dealing with a consolidation of the fluctuating security environment⁸¹. The scale of these conditions, and, many a times, their similarity indicates that issues that are to be faced can comprise a platform for multilevel cooperation. Therefore, it is justified to take joint action to overcome them. This can make up yet another example of creating space for cooperation and acting within the framework of a broadly-defined community security area.

All the countries of the Visegrád Group are so-called young democracies and are still regaining their socio-political stability and their rightful place in Europe. Howe-

79 M. A. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford 2005; B. Sissenich, *Building States Without Society: The Transfer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary*, Lanham 2007; J. Pickles, R. M. Jenkins, (eds), *State and Society in Post-Socialist Economies*, Basingstoke 2008; T. Kavaliauskas, *Transformations in Central Europe between 1989 and 2012: Geopolitical, Cultural, and Socioeconomic Shifts*, Lanham 2012.

80 T. Kucera, O. V. Kucerova, O. B. Opara, E. Schaich, (eds), *New Demographic Faces of Europe. The Changing Population Dynamics in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, Berlin 2000; D. Philipov, *Fertility in Times of Discontinuous Societal Change: the Case of Central and Eastern Europe*, Rostock 2002; A. Thornton, D. Philipov, *Developmental Idealism and Family and Demographic Change in Central and Eastern Europe*, Vienna 2007.

81 J. B. Spero, *Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and Regional Security Dilemmas*, Lanham 2004; G. Voskopoulos, (ed.), *Transatlantic Relations and European Integration: Realities and Dilemmas*, Hyderabad 2006; J. Jeszka, S. Wojciechowski, (eds), *The Faces and Problems of Modern Europe: Case Studies*, Poznań 2010.

ver, they can still be prone to errors and threats resulting largely from long-standing functioning within a non-sovereign system⁸². Due to this, their main problems can reappear, exerting smaller or greater impact on these countries. Regaining full self-determination and individual, social, national, and state freedom paved the way for successful development at each of these levels. On the other hand, there appeared the question regarding competent utilization of this gift of freedom. In many fields, there can be tendencies to exercise one's rights at the expense of fulfilling one's duties. What is more, we can also notice shifting the responsibility for many actions on others, closing up in one's circle of private matters, and little involvement in issues concerning the society as a whole with a simultaneous increase in demanding attitudes. As a consequence, we observe a decrease in the demand for everyday, common social solidarity. A growth of populist attitudes, anti-system attitudes, and mistrust in the state are other issues⁸³. The turnout of voters in the Visegrád

82 R. Anderson, S. Fish, S. Hanson, P. Roeder, *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy*, New York 2001; G. Ekiert, S. E. Hanson, (eds), *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule*, Cambridge 2003; G. Pridham, *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Postcommunist Europe*, London 2005; J. Kucharczyk, J. Zbieranek, (eds), *Democracy in Poland 1989–2009. Challenges for the future*, Warsaw 2010.

83 M. Bútorá, O. Gyárfášová, G. Mesežnikov, T. W. Skladony, (eds), *Democracy and Populism in Central Europe: The Visegrad Elections and their Aftermath*, Bratislava 2007; P. Čajka, D. Iľdinský, P. Terem, *The Dynamics of the Transformation Processes in Central Europe (The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland)*, Banská Bystrica 2008; J. Ušiak, P. Nečas, *Nový prístup k bezpečnosti štátu na začiatku 21. storočia*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2010.

countries still leaves much to be desired; in fact it is one of the lowest in Europe. Moreover, the quality of the law in force and the expertise of the so-called political elites is still fairly unsatisfactory. This is clearly visible while analyzing the political systems of the V4 countries, especially in the area connected with frequent electoral changes at the level of legislative and executive powers. Unfortunately, politicians also contribute to such a state of affairs. It is quite common among people to rather mistrust politicians, and to believe that they are insensitive to the current social and citizens' issues. People also point out increasing authoritarian and centralistic tendencies. Simultaneously, the politicians' sense of idea is weakening, which translates into the lack of clear indication for the society to make political choices. There is also much to be done in the field of fighting with corruption at the political, local-government, and administrative levels. All this comprises a serious challenge for all of the discussed countries. Social indications prepared during public opinion polls confirm the existence of these problems. Of course, many things have improved over the course of the last twenty years. The scale of the portrayed phenomena differs. It appears that changes are headed in an optimal direction; however, more determined actions are needed by all sides.

As already stated, the Visegrád countries have to further define their common declarations on the legitimacy of maintaining their close cooperation, which has been ongoing for more than twenty years. It is obvious that explicitly identical understanding of goals and means

connected with building the position of individual countries and of the whole region is a necessary starting point for all such initiatives. However, it is of key importance to define the ideas and the practical areas of cooperation. It appears that it is necessary to search for areas which can make up even better platforms for reaching the target objectives, both in internal and foreign policies. A success in this respect is connected with a pragmatic focus on several benefits that are possible to achieve. Such examples are quoted in several places in this publication: the EU's financial perspective, engagement in the modernization of strategic assumptions in the framework of the EU and NATO, work to achieve energy solidarity in Europe⁸⁴, etc. These directions should be thus maintained. Of course, the postulated pragmatism does not rule out broader ambitions of searching for universal areas of supporting integration ideas in Europe. Nevertheless, the reflection on striking a balance between wishes and abilities, and the optimization of legitimacy and benefits from broader involvement in large projects is also needed. It is unqu-

84 M. Hua Chen, J. Kulhánek, M. Thim, (eds), *Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe*, Prague 2008; A. Gusev, *Energy Relations between the European Union and Russia: Content, Problems, Prospects*, Nice 2008; A. Virág, *Is Dependence Really Interdependence? Gas Strategies seen from Central -Eastern Europe*, Politics in Central Europe, 1/2009; P. Mickiewicz, P. Sokołowska, (eds), *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Europy Środkowej*, Toruń 2010; A. Nosko, A. Orbán, W. Paczyński, F. Černoch, J. Jaroš, *Energy Security*, Bratislava 2010; K. Andzsans-Balogh, (et al.), *Security of Energy Supply in Central and South-East Europe*, Budapest 2011; J. Świątkowska, (ed.), *Energy Security of the V4 Countries: How do Energy Relations Change in Europe*, Cracow 2011; P. Bučka, P. Nečas, S. Žechowska, *The New Geopolitics of Energy Security*, Kiev 2012.

estionable that we should strive for subjective, not objective participation in such initiatives. Among the decision-making circles of the EU, there exists a pretty common treatment of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia as a fairly stable region. Thus, it is justified to use such a position to coherently manifest common stances on many issues.

Identifying a fairly coherent stance regarding the geopolitical situation in Central Europe is, undoubtedly, a challenge to Visegrád cooperation. Becoming independent of Russia's possible plans to increase its involvement in Central Europe has been clearly visible in the policies adopted since 1989. At the same time, each of the V4 countries is interested in facilitating good relations with Russia. The consolidation of joint actions and mutual support are very important in this regard⁸⁵. Undoubtedly, it would be detrimental to treat such relations as competition, as it has already taken place in a few cases. Russia⁸⁶ does not make it a secret that, due to maintaining interest in the so-called proximate foreign countries, including Central Europe, a prospective lack of agreement and cooperation in the most important matters among the Visegrád Group countries would be a sign of weakness and justify their marginalization in European politics. The reaction of the

85 A. Orban, *Power, Energy and the New Russian Imperialism*, London 2008; I. Samson, *Visegrad Countries, the EU and Russia: Challenges and Opportunities for a Common Security Identity*, Bratislava 2010.

86 A. Rácz, *The Greatest Common Divisor: Russia's Role in Visegrad Foreign Policies*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 4/2012.

V4 countries on the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 can be seen as an example of such a misunderstanding. Defining common policy regarding Ukraine is also really problematic. Ukraine's real sovereignty, democratization, and the perspective of Europeanization are in the interest of the whole of Europe. This has been noticed by many politicians and international relations analysts. Zbigniew Brzeziński even said that Ukraine is a geopolitical keystone of the region's and Europe's security and stability⁸⁷. Three V4 countries share a common border with Ukraine. The Czech Republic, despite not having a border with this country, is directly exposed to all possible political issues connected with Ukraine. Therefore, the involvement in optimal pro-European development of Ukraine's foreign policy is one of the most important points in the cooperation between the Visegrád countries. This involvement was especially visible during several years at the turn of the 21st century. However, in more recent years we can observe a decline in actual support in this area. Needless to say, the issue is largely attributable to Ukraine itself. Internal political choices, governmental priorities, the lack of clearly-defined integration directions (East or West) do not facilitate external support. Ukraine that is stable, democratic, and integrates with Europe is a natural buf-

87 Z. Brzeziński, *The Grand Chessboard*, Warsaw 1997; K. Dezseri, (ed.), *Economic and Political Relations after the EU Enlargement: the Visegrad Countries and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova*, Budapest 2004; T. Kapuśniak, *Ukraina jako obszar wpływów po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa-Lublin 2008; K. Wolczuk, (et al.), *Beyond Colours: Assets and Liabilities of, Post-Orange' Ukraine*, Warsaw 2010.

fer against Russia for Central Europe. Yet this should not be seen as a confrontation and hostility towards Russia, which is an important partner for the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, due to its superpower attitude, the existence of sovereign and stable neighboring countries remains in the interest of Central Europe, which unites the East and the West, and does not separate them.

Yet there are more challenges and threats. The aforementioned ones appear to be the most fundamental for the Visegrád countries. What is more, there are quite a few which are characteristic of individual members. Thus, we find it justified to take a closer look at them. Most certainly, some are similar in principle, which only makes it more important to cooperate within the V4.

Poland

Challenges and threats facing Poland are to a large extent diagnosed in strategy documents concerning security. This follows from the observation of objective events in the proximate and further international environment. They have a direct impact on the current activity of the various entities involved in security policy, both internally and externally. A few of them seem to be particularly important.

The main challenge facing Poland is the issue of stimulating demographic processes⁸⁸. The need is due to the ongoing low birth rate since the 80's of the twentieth century. The fertility rate, coming out to 1.31 in Poland, is one of - the lowest in Europe. In addition, some Poles, including to a large extent young people, are migrating abroad, often with their entire families. Estimates show that the population of Poland in 2060 might be lower by as much as 10 million people! This has a direct impact on social and economic development. Society is clearly aging; the demographic drop is entering into educational institutions and adversely affects the labor market. It is therefore necessary to take systematic action in this matter, action which will be able to improve this situation, which in a substantial way affects the processes of economic and social security.

Clearly, it is important to improve Poland's energy policy, including the diversification of oil and gas supplies⁸⁹. To a large extent, this is dependent on the supply of raw materials from Russia. The purchasing price of gas from Russia is one of the highest in the EU, and the supply contract signed in 2010 will be in force until 2037. The North and South Stream pipeline projects are unfavorable for Poland. In bypassing Poland, it joins Russia

88 J. Osiński, *Współczesne problemy demograficzne. Rzeczywistość i mity. Ujęcie krajowe, regionalne i globalne*, Warszawa 2011; Z. Strzelecki, A. Potrykowska, (eds), *Poland in Europe. The Demographic Future*, Warsaw 2012.

89 B. Nowak, *Energy Policy of the EU. Chosen Legal and Political Aspects and their Implications for Poland*, Warsaw 2009; *Energy Policies of IEA Countries - Poland 2011*, Paris 2011, [www.iea.org].

and the EU member states. Polish industry, electric power plants and the majority of individual customers use energy derived from coal. Increased demand for energy supplies will require new system solutions. The issue of nuclear power plant construction is back in Poland, with greater momentum. However, this gives rise to hot political and social disputes. Finally, very interesting in the context of energy security, including independence from Russian supplies, is the question of shale gas reserves in Poland and the possibility of their being used. Poland has to show high resistance in this regard, both in the Russian and the Western European lobby, who are unwilling to give Poland this initiative.

Increasingly and more often, there appear situations of crisis related with environmental issues. In a direct way, they affect both individuals and entire communities, and require the interaction of many national and international institutions. Events of this type are a good example of the need for cooperation between the V4 nations. Poland, like the Czech Republic and Slovakia, experienced several major floods in the last few years, (among others in 1997 and 2009). The scale of the damage covered a large part of the nation, particularly in the valleys and basins of the Vistula and the Oder. Household farms as well as medium and large enterprises found themselves underwater. Rebuilding the infrastructure took many years. Risks arising from increased wind activity are rising at a similar rate. Previously unprecedented on such a scale powerful storms and tornadoes caused great damage. The scale of the above

phenomena seems to increase, hence the need for broader activities related to the creation, development and proper functioning of early warning systems and counter acting the effects of natural disasters. There is a need to create a transnational, synchronized network, including covering environmental issues⁹⁰.

A relatively new challenge is the area of cyberspace⁹¹. It is, however, undergoing dynamic development, also in the area of generating threats. Poland is undertaking activities related to their elimination. They have formal, legal and practical forms at the same time. However, this area also needs substantial support. Cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime are serious threats, particularly for the critical infrastructure, and every effort should be made to develop systems to prevent its occurrence, both at the state level and in the private sector. It is also necessary to develop the ability to counter-act specific risks associated with new global circumstances. Possible attacks and damage to infrastructure may pose a number of complications, such as the so-called „Domino effect”. We should, therefore, take on a comprehensive and long-term approach to the issue. Cyberspace is dynamic; hence, it cannot be limited to one-time measures. It is essential to be closely involved in international cooperation, in particular within the framework of NATO.

90 A. Gradziuk, E. Wyciszkievicz, (eds), *Energy Security and Climate Shange: Double Challenge for Policymakers*, Warsaw 2009.

91 J. Świątkowska, (ed.), *V4 Cooperation in Ensuring Cyber Security – Analysis and Recommendations*, Cracow 2012.

Poland's accession to the EU is also related with taking up the duties that have a significant relationship with her internal security on the European-wide scale. Poland is the country with the longest border shared with the external eastern states (nearly 1200 km) and has taken on the need to monitor its integrity in the context of eliminating possible threats⁹². A particular challenge in this regard is to prevent illegal migration, organized and popular crime. The Eastern area is particularly intensely exploited in this regard. Hence, the threats coming from this region are real. To a large extent, this applies to smuggling and human trafficking, the illegal goods trade, and smuggling drugs. Responsibility for this aspect of security is extremely high. In view of the open space within the Schengen Agreement's framework, the security of the external borders of the EU in relation to the above mentioned phenomena is a necessity. The eastern border is particularly important. Among other things, Poland is the headquarters of the Frontex agency, responsible for the management of border cooperation.

In the perspective of Poland's security threats, the persistently high level of instability of the eastern neighborhood countries in the near and distant future should be analyzed. An example of this is the continuing undemocratic policies of the Belarusian authorities. President Aleksandr Lukashenko has repeatedly disavowed the ac-

92 W. Gizicki, A. Podraza, (eds), *Polish-Ukrainian Border's Significance for the Region and Europe*, Lublin 2008; A. Moraczewska, *Transformacja funkcji granic Polski*, Lublin 2008.

tions of EU nations, including Poland. He has shown a confrontational attitude towards the proposed changes. This indicates the need to expand cooperation in the CIS system, which includes the nations of the former Soviet Union. Serious problems involve Ukraine, which from Poland's perspective is a particularly extremely important element of international security⁹³. Embedding anti-democratic attitudes, the lack of a decision in terms of integration with the EU and NATO means that Ukraine is becoming an unpredictable partner. The situation in Caucasus also looks disturbing, including Russia's policies in regards to Georgia. Poland has shown clear support for Georgia's plans for membership in NATO.

In the area of the further environment, there is concern about the confrontational politics of Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, and after the so-called Arabian revolutions, we also include Syria. Poland, wanting to play a visible role in the global security policy, must clearly indicate the ways and means of overcoming the above mentioned crises. From this perspective, we should emphasize the importance which Poland attaches to the so-called missile defense project. The United States has associated this project with Poland. The proposed construction of this system based in Poland and the Czech Republic was stopped due to opposition from Russia, which stated that the shield threatens its interests and is detrimental to its

93 K. Wolczuk, R. Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?*, London 2002.

security policy. It is hard to expect to be able to build a permanent air defense system without Russia's participation. However, the experience of the past few years shows that the negotiation of a common position, among others as where to locate the system, for example in Poland, will not be easy.

An obvious threat to Poland is terrorist activity⁹⁴. Although such cases have not yet occurred on its territory, Poland's active involvement in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is one of the circumstances that may result in such acts in the future. Therefore, it is particularly important to monitor the situation with the involvement of intelligence services, uniformed individuals and society as a whole. Any suspicious behavior should raise vigilance. The attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) showed that the coalition nations are particularly vulnerable to attacks, and acts of terrorism threaten and harm civilians. Terrorist attacks are directly linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Illegal access to weapons, the possibility of using materials for its production and trade undoubtedly have a major impact on the intensification of terrorist threats.

A major catastrophe for Poland was the government's plane crash, with President Lech Kaczyński and 95 other people on board, which took place on April 10th, 2010 in Smolensk (Russia). The crash killed the head of state, the

94 K. Liedel, *Zwalczanie terroryzmu międzynarodowego w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2010; K. Jałoszyński, *The Role of the Republic of Poland in the Context of the Terrorist Threat: Report*, Stockholm 2011.

head of the General Staff of the Polish Army, six generals, the commanders of all the military troops, the head of the National Security Office, the head of Poland's National Bank, the representatives of the Polish Parliament, the heads and representatives of many public institutions, persons accompanying them and the crew. The effects of this event are still being felt at both the political and the social levels. There was a need to reconstruct many spheres of political and social life on an unprecedented scale in recent world history. The assessment of the causes and effects of the event introduced deep divisions among politicians and the public. In addition, this is felt in the relationship between Poland and Russia, in particular as regards the investigation. All of this creates great challenges in the optimal and responsible search for solutions to this complex situation for the nations after the crash. It seems, however, that the divisions associated with this event obscure the meaning of this tragedy and draw conclusions for the future.

Visegrad Partners

In the **Czech Republic**, the problems of security, challenges and threats, counteraction and coping with all these is complex⁹⁵. In the area of demographic challenges,

95 P. Drul M. Kořan, *Visegrad Group's Goals and Challenges in Recent Europe: Czech Reflections*, International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2011.

the situation in Czech is decidedly serious⁹⁶. There is a clear drop in childbirth and there is progressive migration. This will of course have obvious consequences on future economic and social policies. The childbirth indicator is even lower than in Poland, and comes out to about 1.27. Estimates carried out by public institutions indicate that the population number of this nation might fall in the next fifty years by even two million, with a general level coming out to no more than 8.5 million in 2060.

Energy policies are also one of the essential issues, and should be taken into account in the case of creating security⁹⁷. Czech to a significant degree uses energy coming from the exploitation of lignite (brown coal) and uranium. They also possess two atomic electric power plants. Czech is significantly marked by the liberalization of their market and the export of electricity surplus is essential. However, the Czech Republic needs to import natural gas and petroleum, particularly from Russia. This fact is adversely affected by the influence of the accomplished North and South Stream projects. Due to this, it is in the interest of the Czech Republic to finance the Nabucco project, giving Central Europe a real opportunity to be independent and to diversify the supply from Russia. Problems related with environmental challenges are a result of great floods. In 1997, this particularly includes the Oder

96 T. Sobotka, D. Hamplová, A. Šťastná, K. Zeman, *Czech Republic: A Rapid Transformation of Fertility and Family Behaviour*, Vienna 2007; P. Drulák, V. Strítecký, (et al.), *Hledání českých zájmů*, Praha 2010.

97 *Energy Policies of IEA Countries - Czech Republic 2010*, Paris 2010, [www.iea.org].

and Morawa rivers, and in 2002 the Vltava and the Elba. It was similar in 2010. Losses due to these catastrophes came out to tens of billions of Czech crowns. Victims included people who lost their lives, health or part or all of their property. In addition, the severe damage affected the infrastructure and historical buildings, especially in Prague. The Czech Republic is involved in stabilization missions in the fight against terrorism. Thus, despite the absence of an imminent external threat, they must take into account the possibility of uncontrolled retaliation from terrorists. There is also an increase in Islamic migration into neighboring countries, Austria and Germany. It will become more common for these migrants to possibly settle in the Czech Republic. With the development of new technologies, the importance of gaining security in cyberspace is increasing. Hence the Czech Republic adopted a strategic document on March 14, 2012, which contains the essential objectives and tasks related to the protection of the activities of the State and its citizens.

Security dilemmas in Hungary are subject to a number of internal and external factors. Demographic perspectives are not encouraging⁹⁸; the rate of childbirth is about 1.41. The population forecast over the next fifty years may be, according to the pessimistic scenario, about 2.5 million fewer people and may be a total of about 7.5 million in 2060. Hungary's energy policy is ambiguous,

98 *Demographic Portrait of Hungary 2012*, Budapest 2012, [www.demografia.hu].

but beneficial from the perspective of their own interests⁹⁹. Hungary has its own lignite coal supply, a nuclear power plant, and to a large degree imports petroleum and oil. Yet it undertakes intense efforts to diversify energy supplies and its security. Currently, this nation is actively involved in the preparation of the South Stream and Nabucco projects, essentially competing among themselves from a political point of view. Each of these projects includes Hungary in its infrastructure. In addition, energy cooperation with Russia is intensifying. From the perspective of their energy interests, this is treated as another opportunity rather than a threat. This does not mean subordination, subjection or political dependence on Russia. Hungary wants so skillfully seize the favorable economic perspective as a result of its geopolitical considerations. Environmental hazards are due to seasonal flooding and floods, for example, those in 2010, which involve the Danube, the largest river in the region. One of the biggest environmental disasters in recent years was a red sludge leakage into the Danube in 2010. This was the result of many years of neglect in Hungary related with the aluminum industry. This disaster exposed the lack of security and control concerning this sector. In addition, heavy rains and snow blizzards are more frequently occurring. The active and numerous participation of soldiers in many military missions around the world, especially in Afghanistan, means that Hungary must be prepared for a possible terrorist at-

99 *Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Hungary 2011*, Paris 2011, [www.iea.org].

tack. It is also necessary to regularly secure the computer data infrastructure against cyber attacks. This is clearly articulated in Hungary's security strategy. Moreover, there are institutions set up to protect this sector, such as the Hungarian Information Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme. In terms of social security, it is necessary to actively minimize the problems appearing among the large Romanian minority.

Slovakia's security dilemmas also arise from global and European tendencies. In the area of demography¹⁰⁰, the childbirth rate is not significantly different from the other V4 countries and comes out to 1.37. There is some hope due to the fact that there was an increase in births in the last two years. This is related with the introduced favorable changes in the pro-family legislation a few years ago. Despite this, the projected population in Slovakia in 2060 might amount to about 4.5 million. Slovakia's energy policy is highly complex¹⁰¹. The country is almost entirely dependent on oil and petroleum supplies from Russia via Ukraine's infrastructure. Each time there are difficulties in Russian-Ukrainian relations, the Slovaks are affected. That was the situation in January 2009, and the consequence was the introduction of a state of emergency in Slovakia. Therefore, the state must actively seek sources

100 *Popultion in Slovakia in 2011*, Bratislava 2012, [www.infostat.sk].

101 *Energy Policies of IEA Countries - Slovak Republic 2005*, Paris 2005, [www.iea.org]; J. Petrovič, *Energy Security in the Slovak Republic*, Yearbook of Slovakia's Foreign Policy, 1/2009; M. Blišťanová, P. Blišťan, *Možnosti zvýšenia energetickej bezpečnosti SR využitím podzemného splyňovania uhlia*, Košice 2012.

to diversify the supply from Russia. The Nabucco project is an opportunity for Hungary as well as for Poland and the Czech Republic. Risks due to catastrophes and natural environmental disasters in Slovakia are similar to those in Poland and the Czech Republic. They primarily concern floods (among others from the Poprad River in 2010) and there are major snowstorms in the winter. These bring death casualties every time, many are injured and there is damage to infrastructure and buildings. Slovakia's security policy foresees the possibility of terrorist threats, although it is minimal, in connection with participation in foreign missions. A specific challenge is the issue of regulating relations with the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the large Romanian community. Slovakia is committed to providing computer data security. It has a number of documents on the subject. The most important of them was adopted on August 27, 2008: the National Strategy for Information Security of the Slovak Republic.

PART FIVE

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICS

The issue of internal and external security comprises an inseparable element of the analysis of a nation's political safety. These issues are complementary and related with each other in an obvious way. The goal of a nation's activities in the area of internal safety is reacting to every instance of danger in the legal, public and universal order. This is related both with threats of a criminal character and also results from natural circumstances (natural disasters and catastrophes). The level of internal defense resulting from formal and legal resolutions has a significant meaning, as well as the feeling of safety among the citizens. Optimal activity on behalf of defense both in the legal order of a nation and the subjective and objective laws of individuals and the community is necessary. In the case of external security, this concerns undertaking activities that ensure securing territorial sovereignty and

the nation's independence. This has obvious consequences on building lasting bilateral and multi-sided agreements, participation in international organizations and overall involvement on behalf of international stability. Of priority significance are diplomatic abilities, strategies for building trust and practical involvement.

Internal politics is based on many complementary spheres related with ensuring an optimal level of social development. This is not an easy area to analyze due to its broad spectrum of subjective issues. Everything that concerns a nation's politics is included here, excluding external matters, even though external conditions most certainly have an influence on shaping internal politics. However, several issues seem to be particularly essential, even from the perspective of Visegrád cooperation. Ensuring internal defense should be based on efficient and stable institutions, ministries and bodies. Their effective and efficient work depends on the level of trust and feeling of safety in society. Due to this, every nation ought to make an effort to have a high level of training and equipping such services as the police, fire department, border guards and the country's civil defense. This concerns activity on behalf of, among others, eliminating internal threats, crimes, illegal migration, and natural disasters. Some of these are common to all the Visegrád nations¹⁰².

102 M. Caparini, O. Marenin, (eds), *Borders and Security Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalized World*, Münster 2006; K. Rękawek, *Non-military Aspects of Security in V4 Countries - Prospects for Co-operation*, Warsaw 2011; T. Szczurek, *Od deskrypcji do antycypacji wykorzystania potencjału militarnego w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa nowo-*

The effects of the floods in 1997 and 2007 effected Czech, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. These kinds of events make us aware of the need to coordinate activities and monitor the situation on a supranational level. This also has a broader dimension, particularly in the framework of cooperation with the EU¹⁰³. At the time of entering into cooperation with the Schengen region, the demands in this respect increased. This is particularly evident in the analyzed countries, since apart from Czech, the eastern border of each of these nations is also the external border of the EU. Of similar significance is the development of operational abilities and cooperation on the political level. This is related with accomplishing obligations resulting from cooperation within Europol. Therefore, responsibility for the level of security in Europe is significant.

In the area of external politics, the Visegrád nations present a similar goal. The two main goals, established just after 1989, meaning membership in NATO and the

czesnych wspólnot państwowych wobec rozwoju zagrożeń niemilitarnych, Warszawa 2012. 103 P. Gowan, *European Union Policy Towards the Visegrad States*, London 1996; Z. Czachór, (et al.), *Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union: Problems and Prospects of Integration 1996*, Gütersloh 1996; K. Henderson, (ed.), *Back to Europe?: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, Philadelphia 1999; J. Apap, M. Kaniewska, M. Sitek, M. Walewski, K. Szczygieski, (eds), *Policy Makers or Policy Takers?, Visegrad Countries Joining the EU - Selected Studies*, Warsaw 2003; A. Mayhew, *Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries*, Poznań 2001; R. Druláková, *Visegrad Group within the EU: A Stable or Diluted Coalition?* Praha 2007; J. Wojnicki, *Droga Europy Środkowej do Unii Europejskiej (Czechy, Słowacja, Słowenia, Węgry)*, Warszawa 2007.

EU¹⁰⁴, were achieved and to an unquestionable degree determine their contemporary foreign policy¹⁰⁵. However, significantly broader international involvement is in the interest of the Visegrád nations. Thus, activities in this area are multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. They are to lead to a promotion of each of these nations and their national interests in the international space. This transferred onto stable development and a predictable community, including strengthening its regional significance. Of essential meaning is the strengthening of the positive dimensions of democracy, the strengthening of legal principles, sovereignty, respecting territorial independence and a nation's vital goals. An important link for achieving these goals for foreign policy is the United Nations and involvement on behalf of its actual reform, meaning strengthening the universal, global mandate. A significant direction of international activities are organizations which act in the economic sphere,

104 D. N. Nelson, T. Szayna, *NATO's Metamorphosis and Central European Politics: Effects of Alliance Transformation*, Luxemburg 1997; A. Podraza, *Central Europe in the Process of European Integration. A Comparative Study of Strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia Towards Deepening and Widening of the European Union*, Praha 2000; W. Jacoby, *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe*, Cambridge 2004; A. Lašas, *European Union and NATO Expansion. Central and Eastern Europe*, Basingstoke 2010.

105 E. Nečej, R. Ondrejcsák, V. Tarasovič, *Vývoj bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky Slovenskej republiky, Poľska, Maďarska a Českej republiky v kontexte transatlantickej dimenzie a EBOP*, Bratislava 2005; R. Logothetti, E. Nečej, L. Póti, J. Takács, *The Security Strategies of Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the Context of European Security Strategy*, Budapest 2005; P. Marton, *The Sources of Visegrad Conduct: A Comparative Analysis of V4 Foreign Policy-making*, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 4/2012; M. Baun, D. Marek, (eds), *The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanisation*, New York 2013.

among others IMF, WTO and OECD. There are also many dilemmas which are related with the necessity to undertake concrete, often difficult decisions. Here we ought to stress that part of the activities undertaken in relation to accomplishing the assumed goals in external politics has a different character in each nation. This has an influence on achieving understanding and manifesting regional solidarity, particularly within the framework of the EU.

The essential problem related with the external space and the undertaken choices is the relationship between cooperation on behalf of safety accomplished in the framework of NATO and the EU. The Visegrád nations often manifested their unanimous ties to their own defence policies with the Allies. The goals emphasized in the framework of this organization and the methods and tools used to ensure security seem to be significantly more concrete and advanced. In addition, the involvement of the United States and basing our safety on strong ties with this superpower are of significant importance. This was quite clearly stressed in the common declaration of Visegrád nations from the 18th of April 2012 during the meeting of foreign ministers of the V4 nations in Prague¹⁰⁶.

106 “We, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, declare our decisive resolve to promote regional and Euro-Atlantic security by strengthening our political commitment and enhancing defence capabilities. NATO, founded on strong bonds between North America and Europe and offering the assurance of collective defence, will continue to remain the cornerstone of our security. Keeping the transatlantic partnership strong and stable is in our shared and vital interest”.

Declaration of the Visegrad Group *Responsibility for a Strong NATO*, [www.mfa.gov.pl].

This stands in perceivable collision with the vision of European security preferred by Europe's superpowers, particularly Germany and France. Both nations often accused the Visegrád nations, particularly Poland, of over-involvement in building transatlantic relations at the expense of Europe¹⁰⁷. An example of this would be the anti-missile shield project, which was based on Czech and Poland. The V4 nations also pointed out the need to strengthen cooperation between NATO¹⁰⁸ and the EU (in the framework of its CSDP)¹⁰⁹. Creating a stable area for Euro-Atlantic security can and should be treated complementarily, not in competition, as a separate European or American project. The issue of security understood in this way was also present during Czech's (2009), Hungary's (2011) and Poland's

107 M. Štastný, (ed.), *Iraq Crisis and Politics in USA, Europe and V4 Countries*, Bratislava 2003; Z. Zelenická, *The Visegrad Group and the EU – Balanced Relationship between the Visegrad Group and the EU?*, Political Sciences, 4/2009.

108 J. Gryz, *Proces instytucjonalizacji stosunków transatlantyckich*, Warszawa 2004; D. Eggert, *Transatlantycka wspólnota bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2005; K. Kubiak, P. Mickiewicz, (eds), *NATO w dobie transformacji: siły zbrojne w transatlantyckim systemie bezpieczeństwa początku XXI wieku*, Toruń 2008; P. Nečas, M. Kelemen, P. Spilý, *Core Security Elements of a New NATO Strategic Concept*, Political Sciences, 4/2009; P. Nečas, P. Terem, M. Kelemen, *From Washington to Lisbon: a New NATO Strategic Concept, Defence and Strategy*, 2/2009; B. Górka-Winter, M. Madej, (eds), *NATO Member States and the Strategic Concept: an Overview*, Warsaw 2010; M. Pietraś, J. Olchowski, (eds), *NATO w pozimnowojennym środowisku (nie) bezpieczeństwa*, Lublin 2011; M. Soja, *Stosunki UE-NATO w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego i obrony na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, Toruń 2011; R. Grodzki, *Problemy bezpieczeństwa Czech, Polski i Węgier w kontekście poszerzania NATO*, Poznań 2011.

109 R. Zięba, *Visegrad Group Towards Common European Security and Defence Policy*, Athenaeum, Polish Political Science 2002; R. Khol, *Policies of the Visegrad Countries Towards CFSP/ESDP*, Prague 2003; J. Nađ, I. Gyarmati, T. Szatkowski, L. Frank, *Trans-Atlantic Security*, Bratislava 2010; C. Törő, (ed.), *Visegrad Cooperation within NATO and CSDP*, Warsaw 2011.

(2011) taking leadership of the European Union Council. Each case accented that this region is particularly important for Europe. The necessity for broader involvement of the EU in global problems and searching for optimal equilibrium in relationships between the EU and the USA was indicated.

Poland

Legal bases for the implementation of tasks in the area of **internal security** are laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as well as in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2007. Most of the key regulations in this respect, concerning particular institutions responsible for this area, are described above. Furthermore, legal acts equivalent to laws and regulations are also of great validity. Here we should mention, among other things, the Act of September 4th, 1997 on concerning the Government Administration Sectors. It includes a catalogue of rights, tasks and duties of the individual bodies of the government administration, including in the scope of the internal security. At present, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration takes responsibility for this area. It should be also emphasized that tasks resulting from the implementation of the internal security policy have an impact on the responsibility of individual territorial units. These engagements take place at the level of

government, regional, county and commune administration. There are, at all levels, appropriate, cohesive formal and legal solutions and institutions established to respond to any risk that occurs.

This is of principal significance, especially in cases of direct threat to public order, terrorist attacks and natural disasters. An example of this are the above mentioned more and more frequent heavy floods, periodic and local droughts or periodic whirlwinds¹¹⁰. These problems have been increasing in Poland over the years. The loss of property connected with them is particularly acute severe for the greater majority of the society. Legal regulations and experience of uniformed and civil services are of vital importance for the appropriate functioning of public and universal order in Poland. This is predominantly in relation to the Police, Border Guard, Fire Service, and National Civil Defense. The need for making their actions effective, including the implementation of several systemic changes, is subsequent to both the specificity of political and social challenges in Poland and the necessity to cooperate on the international forum. It is especially meaningful as part of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU¹¹¹.

110 G. Sobolewski, D. Majchrzak, *Zarządzenie kryzysowe w systemie bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa 2011; W. Fehler, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne współczesnej Polski. Aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne*, Warszawa 2012.

111 P. Bryksa, *Wybrane zagadnienia polityki bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego Unii Europejskiej. Szanse i zagrożenia dla Polski*, Warszawa 2008.

In today's Poland, the Police¹¹² was established pursuant to the Police Act of April 6th, 1990. The main goal of this service is to protect the lives and health of the nationals and to protect property against unlawful attempts at trespassing. The number of police officers is around 100.000. There are over 2.000 police stations throughout Poland, whose activity is based on three fundamental types of services: preventive, criminal and supportive. An important task performed by the Police is to combat organized crime (drug, economic and transnational crimes). This is the duty of a special unit- the Central Bureau of Investigation. Apart from that, the Police perform tasks to fight against terrorism. The Bureau of Anti-Terrorist Operations deals with this. Poland's Police are successfully cooperating on the international forum. It has been a member of Euro-pol¹¹³ since November 1, 2004 thanks to which it has been fully engaged to improve European security.

The Border Guard of the Republic of Poland functions under the Border Guard Act of October 12th, 1990. The primary duty of this important service is national border surveillance and border traffic control. After Poland's accession to the EU in 2004, the Border Guard has an important part to play aimed at protecting Schengen-Acquis and securing the eastern border of the EU¹¹⁴.

112 A. Letkiewicz, *Polish Police*, Szczytno 2012.

113 In 2001, the Polish Police, as the first police unit from the EU candidate countries, undertook regular pre-accession cooperation with Europol.

114 J. Sakowska-Bogusz, M. Szaciłło, (eds), *The Border Guard of the Third Republic of Poland*, Warsaw 1999; B. Wiśniewski, Z. Piątek, (eds), *Współczesny wymiar funkcjonowania Straży Granicznej*, Warszawa 2006; A. Konopka, G. Sobolewski,

The length of Poland's borders is 3511 km total, including 1185 km with non-EU countries¹¹⁵.

It is, therefore, clear that the significance of the Border Guard is extremely substantial both from the point of view of the Republic of Poland and the EU. This concerns first and foremost the need for security and impermeability of borders against illegal migrations and trans-border organized crime. However, an indispensable element of actions of the Border Guard is the ongoing performance of tasks related to the flow of and access to border traffic. The ongoing work of this unit is subject to Poland's Police Headquarters and 10 local departments supported by 3 training centers. The total number of the employees of the Border Guard is around 20.000 people. Moreover, Poland is the seat of the FRONTEX agency established to support the implementation of tasks within the EU borders.

The activity of the Fire Department in Poland is based on the State Fire Service Act of August 24th, 1991. The purpose of the Fire Department is to fight fires, natural disasters and other non-criminal threats. The tasks of this formation are executed by the National Headquarters of the Fire Department, 16 Regional Headquarters and around 850 territorial units. Employment in the above-mentioned structures amounts to over 30.000 people.

Bezpieczeństwo granic Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Białystok 2011; M. Ilnicki, *Stużby graniczne w walce z terroryzmem: polskie warunki ustrojowo-prawne*, Toruń 2011; D. Magierek, *Rola Straży Granicznej w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa Polski (1990-2004)*, Toruń 2012.

115 The border with Ukraine is 535 km, Belarus – 418 km and Russia 232 km long respectively.

Apart from legal objectives, the significant fields of tasks performed by the units of the Fire Service are, inter alia, chemical, biological and medical rescue. Professional training is supported by the Volunteer Fire Service operating according to association rights. It is a popular community organization in Poland comprising a large number of territorial units (about 17.000) and volunteer firefighters (about 680.000 people!). As regards the above mentioned universality and scope, its support for ensuring internal security is extremely crucial. Moreover, the Volunteer Fire Service (OSP)¹¹⁶ performs social and educational functions by engaging local communities in various dimensions.

The goals and tasks of the National Civil Defense result from the Act of November 21st, 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland (as amended). They focus on three areas: 1. protecting people, companies, publicly used facilities and culture heritage; 2. saving and providing assistance to people suffering from war; and 3. cooperating in order to combat natural disasters and catastrophes. The National Civil Defense is organized at all levels of state administration and is managed by the Chief of the National Civil Defense, whereas at lower levels, provincial governors, starosts (village foremen), city presidents, mayors and commune heads are in charge of basic territorial units.

116 L. Berliński, *Zarządzanie i dowodzenie Ochotniczą Strażą Pożarną. Wiedza, nowoczesność i tradycja*, Warszawa 2012.

An indispensable element of effective reaction to emergencies is to properly shape social attitudes. Being aware of a real threat that may occur and the necessity of responding appropriately must be a part of education to guarantee safety. The area of dissemination of knowledge in this field is regularly developed at all levels of education in Poland. However, this still requires improvement and close cooperation between national and local bodies and nationals.

The level of public confidence and the evaluation of the level of security are relevant to implement the internal security policy. An example is a change in the perception of security achieved in the last 20 years. Systematic public surveys clearly show that assessment of the feeling of security depends on many factors, mainly non-military. Problems resulting from political, social and economic instability frequently had underlying significance; hence in the situation of full employment and national social care, during the period under socialism, they claimed to have a high feeling of security. Once the political shift took place in 1989 and radical socio-economic reforms were carried out, the feeling of stability and personal security markedly decreased. During part of this period, statements concerning security were "fluctuating" depending on the carried out reforms and their real impact on the lives of Poles. The situation stabilized and the level of security increased together with the necessity to deal with a new reality based on democracy, private property and the market economy. The majority of contemporary Poles indicate that they feel safe, both on internal and external dimensions.

The implementation of objectives and tasks relating to **external security** results directly from assumptions made in the foreign policy in 1989. Entering into the formation of a stable Euro-Atlantic space contributed to accession to NATO and the UE¹¹⁷. Both organizations constitute basic area of activities for Poland. Therefore, practical activities require special analysis in this dimension. However, a significant meaning for external security is institutional commitment within other relevant entities. It strengthens a country's position, actions and stresses the multidimensionality of actions as part of the global space of comprehensive and collective security.

According to Poland, the security provided by the UN is multidimensional, interdependent and involves regional as well as global problems. The UN, from Poland's point of view, is a necessary organization serving the international agreement in matters of peace and security. Poland, however, advocates the need to undertake effective UN reforms, especially of its Security Council¹¹⁸. It is necessary to enlarge its make-up by new countries, which will give impetus and make the activities of the UN objective. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) does not just have a leading role, but also assists with security for Poland on a regional and global scale.

117 K. Longhurst, M. Zaborowski, *The New Atlanticist Poland's Foreign and Security Policy Priorities*, London 2007; R. Kuźniar, *Poland's Foreign Policy after 1989*, Warsaw 2009; S. Bieleń, (ed.), *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Warsaw 2011.

118 S. Koziej, (ed.), *The United Nations: Threats and Challenges in the 21st Century*, Warsaw 2004.

In addition, the OSCE is an important element in the processes of democratization, stabilization and mitigation of conflicts. One of the major goals of Poland's engagement in the works of the Council of Europe is to strengthen democratic security in Europe. This is proved by Poland's actions in the area of promoting this idea, especially towards countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Belarus in particular. The activity of Poland in several regional initiatives is connected with the conviction of their great meaning for building common interests and stability. Poland, as the only (in an institutional sense) country from Eastern Europe has been constantly cooperating with Germany and France in the framework of the Weimar Triangle since 1991. This institutionalized cooperation also aims at implementing new initiatives in the field of defense policy, justice and internal affairs. Wide access to the sea is the reason for increased activity since 1992 as part of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. This translates into stabilization and security in the region as well as initiating and conducting wide international Baltic cooperation¹¹⁹. The result of this was strong support of membership for the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) in NATO. An additional dimension of Poland's commitment to the implementation of objectives and tasks in the foreign policy is, among others, support for Georgia and the Baltic

119 D. Bleiere, *Cooperation of the Baltic States with the Visegrad Countries: Security Aspects*, Riga 1997.

countries. All this influences the credibility and interest in Poland by other entities having great importance for regional and global stability.

The issue of Poland's **position in NATO's** security system is complex¹²⁰. Poland is one of the 28 member states of the Treaty involved in cooperation based in principle on partnership. The international situation is not determined by a bipolar division. There is no explicitly defined enemy. The objective of the Treaty is to guarantee security to all member countries. Poland's position in the NATO security system and present actions in this field are primarily determined by the regulations contained in the strategic documents of the Alliance. After 1989, NATO has become the only genuinely operating organization in the scope of security which must take on the burden of preventing conflicts. The need to respond to the new regional challenges (for instance, the Balkan Wars), gaining capacity to act outside the mandated territory, restructuring and modernizing the armed forces of the member countries are also important. Furthermore, it is necessary to effectively prevent terrorist and cybernetic threats, nuclear and energetic problems.

Apart from these, building new defense systems (among others, anti-missile shields) and regulating and strengthening cooperation with other entities, including

120 A. Krzeczunowicz, *Krok po kroku: polska droga do NATO 1989-1999*, Kraków 1999; J. Kaczmarek, *NATO-Europa-Polska 2000*, Wrocław 2000; R. Kupiecki, *NATO u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2000; A. Ajnenkiel, (ed.), *Poland's Way to NATO*, Warsaw 2001.

Russia, India, China, the UN and the UE are important issues. It is justified to enter into a dialogue in favor of a reduction and complete shift away from nuclear weapons. From Poland's point of view, the defensive solidarity expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Naval Treaty is of highest priority. Civil defense and the territory of the member countries are main tasks that NATO upheld and strengthened in the last strategy of 2010. The effectiveness of regulation will be proved by the transition from the level of facultative treatment of the support coalition for the benefit of genuine cooperation of all members.

Given the above mentioned priorities of NATO, it should be emphasized that Poland is actively participating in the practical implementation of objectives. This activity also took place in the pre-accession period. At that time, Poland already undertook political and military cooperation with NATO. This was necessary for a good preparation of the future alliance commitments connected with much greater responsibility for engaging in direct actions after official accession (e.g. IFOR's stabilization mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995).

The implementation of duties resulting from Poland's membership in NATO is proceeding successfully, although this process is not without problems. Part of the challenges particularly concern two countries, i.e. Russia and the USA. Poland has oftentimes been perceived as overly concentrated on cooperation with NATO and the USA to the detriment of initiatives in the EU. NATO's strategy of 2010 clearly shows the need to enter

into cooperation to build an anti-missile shield in Europe. The USA planned to carry out this project in Poland. In fact, the proposition to build the system in Poland and Czech Republic was withheld due to the objection of Russia which considered that the shield puts its economic interests at risk and is detrimental to its security policy. Increasingly, Russia has been demanding that the USA clearly state that this project will not be aimed at Russia. Therefore, we can hardly be expected to build a sustainable air defense system without Russia. However, experiences gained in recent years reveal that negotiating a common position concerning, among others, the location of the system, will be no easy task. Another problem constitutes differences of opinion on energy issues between Poland, as a member of NATO and the EU, and Russia. On the one hand, Poland is highly dependent on the supply of raw materials from this country, but on the other hand, Poland is trying to acquire other sources of supplies, independent of Russia. Moreover, Poland was against the initiative to build the Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia and Germany. Similar disagreements are related to the institutional future of such countries as Georgia and Ukraine, also within the framework of NATO. As in the past, Poland shows a strong understanding for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these countries. The "open door" policy included in the strategy of NATO gives a chance to implement the idea of the accession of other countries. This is not, however, a situation that is easy to predict as regards

time and that is explicitly evaluated in the framework of NATO as well as in the EU¹²¹.

Poland is one of the largest European countries possessing considerable political, economic and social potential. It is also one of the most vital elements of the security policy in East-Central Europe connected with the general need to strengthen democracy in the new political conditions¹²². The expansion of the EU towards the East and full membership of **Poland in the EU** is a crucial event connected with reinforcing the EU's position in the world. The stable, secure and strong position of Europe, as compared with the other continents, comprises a significant place in Poland's and the EU policy. It must, however, be acknowledged that the EU has not developed satisfactory spheres yet, connected with political integration, including security. Therefore, the involvement of particular countries, along with Poland, in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is moderate. Poland adopted all of the EU's legislation without any transitional periods in this respect. At the same time, Poland guaranteed that the priorities of its foreign policy, aiming at supporting processes of security, democratization and stabilization in Europe, clearly fall within the scope of actions of the CFSP. Poland's declarations and actions concerning active

121 J. Simon, *Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, Lanham 2004; M. Kozub, (ed.), *Polska w transatlantyckiej przestrzeni bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2009.

122 K. A. Wojtaszczyk, (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo Polski w perspektywie członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2002; J. M. Fiszer, (ed.), *Polska w Unii Europejskiej: aspekty polityczne, międzynarodowe, społeczno-polityczne i wojskowe*, Warszawa 2009.

participation in the implementation of the EU's eastern policy, with particular regard to the issues of security, have a similar meaning as well. Poland is convinced of the possibility to support this EU's policy effectively. In this respect, full membership in NATO, the EU and distant regional and global activity, also confirmed by the actions in the international organizations, are strong advantages. Poland's cooperation in the CFSP is oriented towards taking political and military actions with the assistance of activity in the scope of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In the pre-accession period, this was rather of a consultative nature¹²³.

After its accession to the EU, Poland virtually joined the CSDP. Furthermore, Poland has decided to contribute to building stand-by forces, to take part in stabilization missions and to join the processes of forming defense industries in the EU. It is also relevant that implementing European security in the framework of the EU can and should, according to Poland, take place through the development of cooperation with NATO, also in the scope of the defense policy. This is in compliance both with the regulations specified in NATO's Strategic Concept of 2010 and the European Security Strategy of 2003. The main goals are endeavors to strengthen transatlantic partnership and special bonds connecting the USA and the EU. Po-

123 Consultations mainly involved participation in cooperation as part of the WEU which, in fact, was an organization shaping security policy in the EU at that time. Poland as a candidate could not fully participate in that process. That issue gave rise to a number of discussions and meetings often at the highest level.

land expressed that fact in the Security Strategy of 2007. The security policy involving NATO and the EU cannot be pursued on the basis of competitiveness, but on mutual support.

Visegrad Partners

In order to maintain internal security, relevant institutions operate in the Czech Republic, similar to those of other European countries. Fighting crime and all its forms threatening the keeping of public order as well as acts of terrorism are of essential meaning for the activities of these institutions¹²⁴. We should take into consideration the number of police forces, which exceeds 41.000 officers¹²⁵. In the area fire activity, there are about 83.400 firefighters (about 9000 professional and 74.400 volunteers)¹²⁶. All of Czech's neighbors are nations functioning within the Schengen area. Thus, to a lesser extent, they are forced to be active in the areas of protection and securing of borders. Yet an important element is the area of customs security.

124 K. Williams, D. Deletant, *Security Intelligence Service in New Democracies: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, Basingstoke 2001; J. Čapek, (et al.), *Selected Aspects of the Population Safety and Protection*, Pardubice 2010.

125 K. Filák, (et al.), *Zákon o Policii České republiky s komentářem*, Praha 2009.

126 *Fire Rescue Service of the Czech Republic*, [www.hzscr.cz].

The implementation of the external dimension of security requires mutual and multilateral involvement¹²⁷. Cooperation within NATO and the EU is essential for making actions in this dimension effective. The Czech Republic, since the beginning of its democratic transition, made efforts to obtain early membership in both organizations. The road to obtaining memberships was not free from problems and even partial competition, including within the V4, which was already pointed out above. However, the goal was achieved relatively quickly¹²⁸. The issue of membership and the involvement of the Czech Republic in cooperation within NATO are regulated at the level of the Accession Treaty and other internal acts. The Act of November 18, 1999 is particularly important for regulating such issues as the use of the armed forces, foreign missions and the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Czech Republic. Working in the framework of NATO includes both political and military cooperation. The main objectives are related with ensuring the processes for collective security within the framework of sustainable and predictable military alliance. EU membership

127 *Czech National Interests*, Prague 1993; J. Janda, (et al.), *The Security Policy of the Czech Republic*, Prague 1997; O. Pick, V. Handl, *Zahraniční politika České Republiky: 1993-2004: úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy*, Praha 2004; M. Belko, M. Kořan, M. Hrabálek, *Česká zahraniční politika: aktéři, struktura, proces*, Brno 2007.

128 D. Matějka, *Česka republika po vstupu do NATO: úvahy a problémy*, Praha 2000; I. Gabal, L. Helsensova, T. S. Szayna, *The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military and Defence*, Santa Monica 2002; J. A. Ort, (et al.), *Bezpečnost Evropy a Česká republika*, Praha 2005; J. Procházka, (ed.), *10 years of the Czech Republic's Membership in NATO*, Prague 2009.

was understood as a natural process resulting in particular from geopolitical considerations. The Czech people are involved in all the processes of integration; however, they have a reputation for being a pragmatic nation, one which not always unconditionally follows proposals stemming from European institutions. This was particularly evident during Vaclav Klaus' presidency. There appeared, among others, problems with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, lack of commitment to the Fiscal Pact, and skepticism about the imminent adoption of the euro¹²⁹. Nevertheless, the Czech people clearly show that they are generally beneficial to the processes of European integration. However, they must essential take into account the perspective of the Member States.

Internal security in Hungary is to a great extent considerably based on the work of two forces that joined in 2008: the police and border guards. This decision stemmed from the conviction that there are increasing requirements for entering into the Schengen area. These forces include about 45.000 officers and their actions require a major commitment, among others due to the fact of having a common border with Ukraine and Serbia, countries outside the EU, and Romania, which is still outside of the Schengen area. Hungary has also additional troops

129 J. Rupnik, J. Zielonka (eds), *The Road to the European Union, Volume 1: the Czech and Slovak Republic*, Manchester 2003; M. Braun, *Modernisation Unchallenged: the Czech Discourse on European Unity*, Prague 2008; M. Kořan, (et al.), *Czech Foreign Policy in 2007-2009*, Prague 2010; M. Dan, M. Baum, (eds), *The Czech Republic and the European Union*, Abingdon 2011.

committed to fighting the threat of terrorism (Counter Terrorism Centre). Services dedicated to fighting against various types of threats and disasters operate within the National Directorate General of Disaster Management. They number about 25.000 officers¹³⁰.

The foreign policy of Hungary, related to cooperation with NATO and the EU, is carried out with varying intensity¹³¹. In the case of NATO, cooperation is basically carried out successfully. There are no major differences in the perception of the main objectives between Hungary and the Alliance. Many agree that in fact, NATO's security is the real support for the nation's defense, hence their involvement in various political and military initiatives. Particularly important from the perspective of Hungary was support given to Croatia during its negotiations with NATO and accession in 2009. Similar actions are undertaken for Montenegro. The Balkans are therefore a particularly important element of Hungary's foreign policy, both within NATO and the EU. European integration is

130 *Brochure National Directorate General of Disaster Management*, [www.katasz-trofavedelem.hu].

131 T. Palankai, *The European Community and Central European Integration: the Hungarian Case*, New York-Prague 1991; R. Joó, (ed.), *Hungary: A Member of the NATO*, Budapest 1999; J. Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations*, Lanham 2003; P. Tamás, *Hungary's New "Realpolitik": Strategic Question Marks*, *The Analyst - Central and Eastern European Review*, 03-04/2008; T. Magyarics, *Hungary and the European Security and Defense Policy*, *Foreign Policy Review* 2008; L. Turkewitsch, *The Europeanisation of Hungarian Foreign Policy: from Warsaw Pact to Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Budapest 2009, G. Varga, *Central European Security Identity and Transatlanticism – a Hungarian Perspective*, *International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 4/2009.

a very important part of Hungary's foreign policy. This is clearly highlighted in both the new constitution, as well as in other strategic documents. However, due to the undertaken necessary reforms by V. Orbán's government, news covering Hungary-EU relations are not always satisfactory. It seems that the charges against the current government are rather associated with a different understanding in the area of axiology rather than economic policy. While performing Presidential duties for the EU Council in 2011, Hungary showed that it was a reliable and effective member of the EU.

Slovakia's internal security is in accordance with the strategic documents, coupled with the system of international security. Part of ensuring public peace and security includes the work of relevant departments and guards. The main responsibility is placed on the police service, numbering approximately 21.500 officers. The fire department carries out tasks related to fires and states of natural disaster. The number in this service is estimated at around 94.000 (4000 professional and 90.000 volunteers). Undoubtedly, a lot of responsibility rests on the border protection services. Slovakia is also a nation with an external border for the EU. It borders with Ukraine, therefore it is required to ensure the integrity of its Eastern border, which is at the same time a border of the Schengen area. Slovakia's foreign policy, mainly concerning cooperation within NATO and the EU, is peculiar in the light of the other V4 countries. This is due to at least two

reasons. The first case relates to NATO¹³². In 1993, Slovakia, as a sovereign state, clearly outlined the priorities of its security policy associated with membership in the organization. For this, it conducted appropriate formal action in this area. However, they had their own primary problems associated with the mentioned period of V. Mečiar's government¹³³. Delays in the negotiations, lack of a coherent vision and, what seems to be the most important, significant political cooperation with Russia during this period meant that membership was not possible in 1999, which was to be received along with its V4 partners. It was only achieved in 2004, yet we must note that after obtaining membership, Slovakia is an active and reliable partner¹³⁴. It fulfills all the requirements for membership, both political and military. NATO as a collective security organization also remains the main guarantor of external stability with the state's allies. The second reason is related to the EU¹³⁵. Accession to this organization was shared with the remaining nine countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. It was also a natural consequence of the cold war, the chosen direction in

132 I. Samson, *The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance as Seen by the Slovak Security Community*, Bratislava, 2010.

133 V. Leška, *Slovensko 1993-2004: léta obav a nadějí*, Praha 2006.

134 D. Malová, E. Láštík, M. Rybář, *Slovensko ako nový členský štát Európskej únie: Výzva z periferie*, Bratislava 2005; R. Ondrejcsák, R. Nečej, (eds), *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky po vstupe do Severoatlantickej aliancie a Európskej únie (východiská a prístupy)*, Bratislava 2004.

135 V. Bilčík, *Slovak Priorities in the European Union*, Yearbook of Slovakia's Foreign Policy, 1/2009.

foreign policy. Yet Slovakia is the only V4 nation that has already adopted a single currency, the euro¹³⁶. Hence, its position within the EU, particularly its united currency and monetary value, is a bit different than the other countries in the region

136 J. M. Carrol, *Slovakia and the Euro: How Slovakia has Out-paced its Visegrad Neighbors on the Path to Economic and Monetary Union*, Cambridge 2012.

PART SIX

MILITARY AND DEFENSE POLICIES

It seems that after the fall of the bipolar world and the cold war, most significant for the V4 nations was achieving three goals: 1. Regaining sovereignty and full self-determination; 2. Withdrawing Russian military forces from their territories; and 3. Initiating and making dynamic their cooperation with NATO and the UE¹³⁷.

The sphere of military and defense politics also determined the choice of a certain vision in the area of foreign politics. The Nations of Central Europe after the fall of the bipolar division of the world quickly became aware of the need to obtain membership in a strong and stable military

137 H. Binkowski, A. Ciupiński, *Security and Defense Policies of the Visegrad Group Countries*. Warsaw-Tuchów 2002; M. Šastný, (ed.), *Visegrad Countries in an Enlarged Trans-Atlantic Community*, Bratislava 2002.

block¹³⁸. After 1989, only NATO had such a character. Realizing this goal and entering into the EU reinforced the need for reform in the area of defense politics. This particularly concerns restructuring the armed forces, as well as activities related with participation in military missions¹³⁹.

The main objectives of the military and defense policy are closely associated with membership in both NATO and the EU. As pointed out above, the most important factor for all V4 countries is to strengthen cooperation between these two organizations. Effective co-operation rather than possible competition will help foster a sense of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Central European region and the territory of each of the analyzed countries. The main task which is still to be implemented is to strengthen collective defense, crisis management¹⁴⁰ and cooperative security¹⁴¹. This is reflected with the need to

138 R. Khol, *Perspektivy stredoevropské vojenské spolupráce*, Praha 2003; Ch. Krupnick, (ed.), *Almost NATO Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security*, Lanham 2003; V. Blažek *Obrana a krízový manažment regiónu*, Bratislava 2006.

139 A. Forster, T. Edmunds, A. Cottey, *The Challenge of Military Reform in Post-communist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*, Basingstoke 2002; N. Hynek, P. Marton, (eds), *Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction*, London and New York 2011; T. A. Nagy, P. Wagner, *NATO and Afghanistan: What Role for Visegrad Countries*, Bratislava 2013.

140 R. Ivančík, V. Jurčák, *Mierové operácie vybraných organizácií medzinárodného krízového manažmentu*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2013; M. Marszałek, *Operacje reagowania kryzysowego NATO. Istota, uwarunkowania, planowanie*, Warszawa 2013.

141 J. Gotkowska, O. Osica, (eds), *W regionie siła? Stan i perspektywy współpracy wojskowe j wybranych państw obszaru od Morza Bałtyckiego do Morza Czarnego*, Warszawa 2012; V. Střítecký, *Doing More for Less: V4 Defence Cooperation in a Time of Austerity*, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 4/2012.

conduct and participate in joint training, improving military fighting capabilities, to engage in restoring order and stability in areas of war, readiness to accept new members, and strengthening the partnership policy. Political cooperation within NATO is therefore quite successfully¹⁴². An example of this is a number of initiatives in which the Visegrád countries are actively involved. These include, among others, the Joint Forces Training Center, the Third NATO Signal Battalion, the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence (NATO MP COE), Bydgoszcz, Poland or the Multinational Military Police Battalion, (MNMPBAT), Mińsk Mazowiecki, Poland. The V4 countries are also actively involved in foreign operations under the auspices of the Alliance.

Equally important is the commitment to the CSDP forum. In 2011, it was decided to put into practice the idea of a joint V4 Battle Group (BG), which will attain full capacity in 2016, and the quota will consist of approximately 2800 soldiers from each of the Member States. Poland plays a special role in this initiative. It was decided that Poland would be the so-called framework state, where the BG's principal activity is based. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are also determined to enter into deeper cooperation among themselves. This includes many

142 M. Wągrowka, *Visegrad Security Policy: How to Consolidate its Own Identity*, International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2009; I. Samson, *The Visegrad Four: from Loose Geographic Group to Security Internationalization?*, International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2009; J. Blocher, *Conditions for Visegrad Defence Cooperation: A Transatlantic View*, Foreign Policy Review 2011.

different areas. It is essential to prepare particular plans for defense cooperation, armaments cooperation, and the implementation of joint purchases for army and air defense needs. This clearly involves additional possibilities in providing regional security and, what is especially important in times of financial crisis, a reduction of costs and expenses individually incurred. To a significant extent, the strategically important aspect of military and defense policy is more open to other partners within the concept of the V4+. This applies primarily to such countries as Austria, Croatia and Slovenia.

The framework of analyzed issues does not lack, of course, difficult and conflicting matters. Some of them seem almost essential. They result from the different evaluations of their abilities, in relation to key superpowers or some other political motivations. An example of this is the lack of similar decisions such as in the field of air weapons. This is based on three different combat aircraft: the Gripen in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the F-16 in Poland and the MiG in Slovakia. In addition, depending on the ruling political option, especially the socialists in Hungary and Slovakia, Russia's role in ensuring regional and national security is treated differently. In past times, we could observe an increase in Russia's impact on Slovakia's and Hungary's politics. In general, Russia is considered an important link in security, both at global and regional levels. However, Russia will be a welcome partner for the V4 countries only when it will become stable, predictable and democratic. Building positive relationships at

the level of NATO-Russian relations and in their bilateral contacts requires Russia to subjectively treat Central Europe as a region and each country that creates this region. Imperial plans for Russia to reestablish influences in the so-called close foreign neighborhood are negatively evaluated by all. Therefore, it is so important, as we have often emphasized, that we be committed to shaping European security space with the United States¹⁴³. It is in the interest of each of the V4 countries that this superpower be significantly interested in the problems of Europe. From this point of view, the U.S.A.'s gradual transfer of interest from Europe to Asia and the Pacific is unfavorable.

The Visegrád Group countries, due to their territorial size and population, have different needs and opportunities in the field of military and defense policy. This is evident, among others, in the state of the number of troops and allocating a certain amount of GDP on defense. These are significant measures only in the case of Poland, which in the years after 2012 are yet to grow. All of the analyzed countries do not consider it highly likely that an armed conflict will occur on its territory. But they do not ignore this issue, because they consider any military action in the area of NATO member states potentially unfavorable for their own security. Therefore, the reform of the armed

143 P. Hlaváček, *Comparing National Security Strategies of the United States Towards Central Europe and East Asia after the Cold War*, *Politics in Central Europe*, 1/2011; D. Kałan, *The End of a "Beautiful Friendship?" U.S. Relations with the Visegrad Countries under Barack Obama (2009–2013)*, *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 4/2012.

forces, armaments and international activities are closely related to the financial assumptions and possibilities of a structural and demographic nature.

Table 3. Defense spending in 2012.

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Soldiers (thousand)	21.7	25.5	100	14
Budget (billion USD)	2.5	1.3	9.8	1
Percent of GDP	1.1	1.1	1.9	1.4

Source: personal research work.

Poland

After 1989, one of the primary objectives of the security policy in Poland was a radical reform of the armed forces. In the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Army numbered more than 400.000 soldiers. It was the second great force, after the Soviet Army, in its structures. In the case of the need for national defense during a war, it was possible to assumed and mobilize even over 1.1 million soldiers. The collapse of the bipolar division

and the end of the Cold War brought the need to set new strategies for defense and army operation. This involved independent actions without the obligation to strictly fulfill orders issued by the USSR. At the same time, Poland conducted actions aimed at participating in a lasting and stable military alliance. Therefore, it was obvious for Poland to pursue membership in NATO¹⁴⁴.

Since 1989, the **Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland** have been systematically modernized, both in the personal dimension and in terms of weapons¹⁴⁵. A crucial objective that has been implemented nowadays is the process of army professionalization. It was a strategic decision which has had far-reaching consequences for the implementation of Polish security policy. According to the objectives of the reform that has been in progress since 2008, the armed forces will be entirely comprised of professional soldiers. The basic aims in this respect are set out in the special “Program of Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces for 2008 – 2010,” adopted on September 5, 2008. The necessity to increase the number of soldiers to 120 thousand (100.000 in the professional army and 20.000 volunteers within the National Reserve Force) was pointed out. Nonetheless, increasingly often there appear opinions and projects that verify these objectives

144 W. Gizicki, *Od Układu do Paktu. (R)Ewolucyjna zmiana w polityce bezpieczeństwa Polski*, Lublin 2011.

145 B. Balcerowicz, *Siłły zbrojne w stanie pokoju, kryzysu, wojny*, Warszawa 2010; D. S. Kozerawski, Ryszard Niedźwiecki, *Profesjonalna armia w teorii i praktyce – kontekst strategiczny*, Warszawa 2012; B. Pacek, *Udział sił zbrojnych RP w bezpieczeństwie wewnętrznym państwa*, Warszawa 2013.

and mention further reduction of the number of troops. The reform has also imposed the necessity to undertake numerous actions within other institutions functioning in the area of security. Also, there arose the necessity to introduce a number of legislative changes. Seven legislative acts were introduced or amended concerning, among other things, general defense obligation in the Republic of Poland, professional soldiers, or military discipline. There was a departure from general, so called "basic" military service. Thus, doing away with involuntary drafts is a unique revolution. Equipment modernization has been implemented on an equally large scale. The outdated weapon reserves that remember the times of the Warsaw Pact have been replaced on a systematic basis. However, it is necessary that the equipment comply with NATO standards. These are long-term actions and the process of their implementation is not always satisfactory.

One can point out two main reasons for the mode in which modernization actions are carried out in the Polish Armed Forces¹⁴⁶. The first reason is change in the international situation in terms of security. Currently, there are no bases for the outbreak of a general armed conflict (regional or world war). Yet, dissymmetric threats

146 J. Zalewski, *Wojsko polskie w przemianach ustrojowych 1989-2001*, Warszawa 2002; S. Jarmoszko, *Wojsko Polskie pierwszej dekady transformacji: (w poszukiwaniu teorii przemian)*, Toruń 2003; W. Chojnacki, *Army Professionalization in Sociological Studies*, Warsaw 2008; T. Szczurek, (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i współpraca sojusznicza w kontekście działań Sił Zbrojnych RP: (wybrane zagadnienia)*, Warszawa 2010; A. Orzyłowska, (ed.), *Wojsko polskie 20 lat po transformacji ustrojowej w badaniach empirycznych* Wojskowego Biura Badań Społecznych, Warszawa 2011.

emerge that require a new approach and new solutions. The second significant, though prosaic reason, are budgetary savings. As a result of the departure from general, involuntary drafts, the maintenance costs of personnel, facilities, and weaponry can be reduced. Reform of the armed forces is aimed at increasing the possibilities and effectiveness of operations carried out by Polish troops in the new, dissymmetrical international conditions. Moreover, it is necessary to note that the National Reserve Forces are being created as part of the army. These forces can be joined by the members of military reserve forces who are willing to be involved in the armed forces by their readiness to perform tasks as soldiers, should any military and non-military needs or threats emerge. The target number of these forces is 20.000. They can play a significant role, especially in terms of needs related to ecological threats and natural disasters (flooding, cataclysms, etc.). Recent experiences of many countries in this area have clearly confirmed the legitimacy of such internal actions.

The organizational structure of the armed forces in Poland is complex and reflects a range of conditions, including geopolitical circumstances. These forces are comprised of four types of troops closely cooperating with one another.

Land Forces have the largest number of soldiers – 60.000¹⁴⁷. Their main task is to defend the country's ter-

147 Polish Land Forces Organization and Equipment, [www.army.mil.pl].

ritory against land or air aggression¹⁴⁸. These are military units with great power potential, since they are mobile, motorized, and use modern warfare methods. Land Forces have at their disposal three divisions, five main brigades, eight types of military forces and other combatant units. The command is divided into two departments: one responsible for command and planning (military staff), and one responsible for military training.

The equipment of this unit comprises more than 700 battle tanks of various types, including the German Leopard 2, Polish PT-91 and most numerous are the Soviet T-72. The army has at its disposal more than 1500 armored (wheeled or tracked) personnel carriers. These are mostly old Soviet BMP-1 carriers and the modern *Rosomak* manufactured in Poland. Land Forces are equipped with about 380 reconnaissance vehicles, nearly 150 armored recovery vehicles and several dozen command vehicles. The missile and artillery troops have at their disposal predominantly the 2S1 Gvozdika (122-mm) self-propelled howitzers, the model 77 DANA (152-mm) gun howitzer, BM-21 and RM-70 multiple rocket launchers, mortars, sets of anti-armor guided weapons of various types (i.e. SPIKE, FAGOT, and 9P133 Maljutka-P). Special equipment forms a significant proportion of equipment owned by the land forces. These are engineering reconnaissance vehicles, amphibians, pontoon and bridge set, chemical

148 W. Kaczmarek, *Działania operacyjne wojsk lądowych*, Warszawa 2004; I. T. Dziubek, *Antyterrorystyczne przygotowanie żołnierzy wojsk lądowych: wybrane problemy*, Warszawa 2011.

reconnaissance and radar surveillance systems, as well as radars. Additionally, land formations possess helicopters for various purposes. General-purpose and heavy machine guns manufactured in the Soviet Union and Poland are the main types of crew-served weapons. As far as individual weapons are concerned, they are primarily the Polish P-64, P-83 and WIST-94 pistols, as well as PM-63 and PM-84 submachine guns. There is a vast diversity of rifles – from the Soviet SKS dating back to 1940's, through various types of the AK, to the current and modern Finnish SAKO rifles, and Polish Tor and Bor rifles.

Air Forces are the second type of armed forces¹⁴⁹. They consist of more than 17.000 soldiers and they are responsible for the defense of airspace¹⁵⁰. These forces are comprised of three types of troops responsible for the efficiency of flying units, fighting air forces of the enemy, providing reconnaissance and securing locations. The Air Force command is similarly divided into two levels – staff and training. 48 United States F16 fighter jets¹⁵¹ are the main element as far as Air Force equipment is concerned. The Russian MiG-26 (31 fighter planes) still remains a significant part of the Polish air fleet. The Air Forces possess

149 Polish Air Force Organization and Equipment, [www.sp.mil.pl].

150 K. Dobjija, *Army Organic Air Defense Organization and Operating Principle*, Warsaw 2012; J. Rajchel, *Aspekty polityczne bezpieczeństwa lotniczego Polski w XXI wieku*, Dęblin 2012; K. Czupryński, A. Glen, P. Soroka, (eds), *System obrony powietrznej Polski*, Warszawa 2013

151 The equipment possibilities taken into consideration in the past were, among other fighters, the Swedish Gripen and French Mirage, but eventually it was the American F-16 that was chosen.

48 Su-22 attack fighters that remind us of the times of the Warsaw Pact. The main tasks of cargo aircraft are performed with the use of three types of machines: the American C-130 E Hercules (6 units), the Spanish CASA C-295 M (11 units) and manufactured in Poland Bryza M-28 (3 units). For training purposes, pilots use PZL-130 Orlik fighters and the gradually phased out TS-11 Iskra. Although the Mi-2 (about 50 units) in the category of multi-purpose helicopters is prevalent, PZL W-3 Sokół helicopters are also becoming increasingly significant. For transport purposes, there are still about 30 Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters in use. Helicopter training courses are organized with the use of 20 PZL SW-4 Puszczczyk machines. For air defense purposes at the disposal of the Polish Army are short-, medium-, and long-range missile systems. S-200 Vega and NEWA-SC are examples of short- and medium-range missile systems respectively, and examples of long-range missile systems are man-portable 9K32M and Grom systems. Moreover, the 57 mm AZP S-60 and PKM-2 guns, quick-firing anti-aircraft weapons, are still in use.

The third formation of the Polish Armed Forces, the Navy, is its significant element owing to Poland's vast stretches of land with direct access to the Baltic Sea¹⁵². The maritime forces, consisting of more than 10.000 seamen, are responsible for maintaining the safety of the Polish coast, sea space and sea communications routes. The structure of the naval forces includes tactical command,

152 Polish Navy Organization and Equipment, [www.nw.mil.pl].

two flotillas – striking and defensive flotillas, the naval aviation brigade, as well as countermeasure, auxiliary, hydrographic and ICT troops. The navy command also has a bipartite structure based on staff and training departments. Essential units of Polish naval weapons are two Oliver Hazard Perry missile frigates whose objectives are to combat the threat of submarine and air attack, and the threat of attacks from surface vessels. What is more, they form a significant link in monitoring sea communications and protecting other naval ships. The maritime forces are also equipped with an antisubmarine corvette (Project 620), 2 Project 1241.RE missile ships, 3 small missile ships (Project 660), 5 submarines (including a Kilo-class ORP Orzeł that conforms to NATO standards, and 4 Kobben-class submarines). Of crucial importance for the naval forces are 3 mine hunters, 206FM class. They combine the characteristics of a mine hunter and obstructor. Additionally, there are 17 obstructors of various types, 5 minelayer-landing ships (project 767) and other units (including rescue, training and hydrographic ships). These include a vessel which is particularly noteworthy – the ORP Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki, a logistics support ship. As of mid-January 2013, the Polish Navy is to take charge over the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG-1); the ship will serve as the headquarters of this mission for the allied forces. A vessel that is also worth mentioning is the BŁYSKAWICA destroyer, which is currently preserved as a museum ship. The vessel plays a significant historical role as the oldest frigate of this type

in the world preserved from the times of World War II. The naval forces also have at their disposal a number of planes and helicopters used for transportation, reconnaissance and rescue purposes¹⁵³.

The fourth type of armed forces are Special Operations Forces, which include 2500 soldiers¹⁵⁴. What is unique about this formation is that they do not form part of any of the categories of troops already discussed¹⁵⁵. This allows Special Operations Forces to carry out independent military operations which can be supported by other military units, should the need arise. This formation comprises five special units which, owing to their thorough training and specialist equipment, are elite and successful units within the Polish Armed Forces. Their activities include reconnaissance, unconventional operations, water and land/water operations, as well as supporting, security and airborne operations. All special operations units function under the authority of Special Forces Command, which coordinates their tasks in terms of command and orders. From among the units listed, special attention needs to be given to GROM¹⁵⁶. This military unit has been organized by the best of American and British models. It carried out

153 K. Rokiciński, T. Szubrycht, M. Zieliński, (eds), *Rola i zadania Marynarki Wojennej RP w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa: teoria, rzeczywistość, perspektywy: konferencja naukowa*, Warszawa 2010.

154 Special Forces Organization and Equipment, [www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl].

155 B. Pacek, P. Soroka, M. Kubiński, (eds), *Wojska Specjalne w systemie obronnym RP - aspekty organizacyjne, doktrynalne i modernizacyjne*, Warszawa 2013.

156 J. Rybak, *GROM.PL. Tajne operacje w Afganistanie, Zatoce Perskiej i Iraku*, Warszawa 2005.

a number of successful rescue operations, military liaison missions and specialized training.

Moreover, it is considered as one of the world's best groups of this type¹⁵⁷. Recruitment to Special Forces units is a long and highly complex process which requires broad knowledge, skills and psychological predispositions from a candidate. Experience in this area shows that only 10% of candidates successfully complete the selection process! The equipment of special operations forces is much more advanced than the equipment used by the remaining military units – it has been manufactured in the largest army munitions plants in the world. It comprises, among other weapon types: the SIG P226, Beretta 92, Glock and Five-seven pistols, the Uzi and MP5 submachine guns, as well as the Remington Model 870 shotguns. Rifles include the HK417, the AWM-F, various heavy machine guns and the Minimi light machine gun. The armory also includes a wide range of grenade launchers, mortars, anti-armor and anti-aircraft sets, as well as off-road and amphibious vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition to the above-mentioned four types of forces, there are also other units functioning within the armed forces which have been established in order to undertake various security and defense tasks. The Polish Armed Forces have their internal military police organized as the Military Gendarmerie. Their tasks are related to the enforcement of

157 GROM is put on a par with such formations as Delta Force and DEVGRU (USA), SAS (Great Britain), and Sayeret Matkal (Israel).

military discipline, the maintenance of public order and the prevention of crimes in the army. Significant are also its activities aimed at the neutralization of internal and external intelligence threats. Hence, such formations as the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service play an important role.

Higher military education has fundamental significance as far as the realization of security and defense objectives and tasks is concerned. The system of higher military education in Poland encompasses all types of armed forces. The main spectrum of education catering for the needs of the armed forces is focused at five military universities that offer both military and civil studies. The National Defence University of Warsaw plays the key role in the field of security research, training command personnel of the highest ranks, and civil specialists. The university offers all (bachelor's, master's and PhD) degrees for studies in many fields of study and majors. The university is also an important center of analytical, advisory and special activities. The Warsaw University of Technology plays a similar role, particularly in terms of engineering degree courses. The three remaining military universities educate specialists for land (Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław), air (Polish Air Force Academy in Dęblin) and maritime forces (Polish Naval Academy in Gdynia). Each of them is a significant element of the system of scientific and didactic support for the armed forces.

The experience of **Poland in peacekeeping and stabilization missions abroad** began in the 1950's¹⁵⁸. In 1953, Poland participated in the disarmament commission supervision following the end of the Korean War; however, it was an unmilitary presence. There were many more similar missions, and some of them are still continued. Poland participates in commissions, acts as an observer, or offers humanitarian help. The first occasion when Polish troops practically participated in a peacekeeping operation was in Egypt in 1973. This operation was important and decisive, particularly due to the fact that, for the first time in the history of UN international peacemaking operations that the armed forces of a Warsaw Pact member country took part in such a mission. The event initiated the systematic presence of Polish troops in UN peacekeeping operations¹⁵⁹. After 1989, activity related to participation in peacekeeping operation considerably intensified. This was also dictated by new objectives of Polish security policy and was clearly related to Poland's Euro-Atlantic direction. On April 15th, 1992, Poland began its participation

158 F. Gągor, K. Paszkowski, *Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w doktrynie obronnej RP*, Toruń 1999; Cz. Marcinkowski, *Wojsko Polskie w operacjach międzynarodowych na rzecz pokoju*, Warszawa-Pruszków 2005; J. Zuziak, *Wojsko Polskie w misjach pokojowych w latach 1953-1990*, Warszawa 2008; M. Marszałek, J. Zuziak, *Wojsko Polskie w międzynarodowych misjach i operacjach pokojowych*, Warszawa 2010; G. Ciechanowski, *Polskie kontyngenty wojskowe w operacjach pokojowych 1990-1999*, Toruń 2010; D. S. Kozerawski, *Kontyngenty Wojska Polskiego w międzynarodowych operacjach pokojowych w latach 1973-1999. Konflikty - interwencje - bezpieczeństwo*, Toruń 2012.

159 Successive missions in which Poland took part were: UNDOF 1974-2010, UNTAG 1989-1990, UNIFIL 1992-2009, and UNTAC 1992-1993.

in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia. It was aimed at support for humanitarian help, area patrols and protection of civilians. The numbers of Polish Infantry Battalion soldiers fluctuated between 870 and 1220. Subsequent missions on the territory of Yugoslavia were an opportunity for Poland to gain experience in wartime conditions; they also provided the possibility for developing the mechanisms of cooperation with its partners within the EU and NATO¹⁶⁰. Currently, the most involving activities within peacekeeping operations in which Poland has participated are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Poland's participation in the Air Policing mission is also of major significance in relation to the implementation of its commitments within NATO.

The mission of Polish troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina has lasted since 1995. It was initially connected with IFOR, and then SFOR operations. Since 2004, after the EU took over the mission from NATO, these activities have been based on EUFOR. Since 2010, the Polish military contingent numbers about 50 soldiers. Their task is to actively participate in security area monitoring, training, cooperation with the authorities and local community.

In 1999, a Polish military contingent comprised of 800 soldiers was incorporated to NATO forces in Kosovo. As part of the KFOR (Kosovo Force), it has participated in activities related to protection of civilians, patrolling

160 Later activities were related to the IFOR 1995-1996 and SFOR 1996-1998 missions.

of borders and maintenance of border crossings. Over time, changes were introduced to the structure of the forces (from a Polish to a multinational structure, with the participation of Ukraine, Lithuania and other countries), in the number of soldiers in the contingent, and in the nature of the mission.

The Polish military mission in Afghanistan began on March 17th, 2002¹⁶¹. It was a direct response to the request from the United States and to terrorist threats initiated by the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. These operations were authorized by the international community through a UN resolution. The Polish Military Contingent (PMC) operating as part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is situated in the area of Bagram base, to the north of Kabul. The Polish mission included approximately 300 soldiers from mine-warfare, logistics, protective and chemical-defense units. Taking into account these components of the contingent, the tasks carried out by Polish soldiers have been focused on sweeping and mine-clearance activities of the area under their supervision and creating a technical infrastructure. In Afghanistan, in addition to military troops, Polish Special Forces – particularly GROM – were also involved in operations. At the end of 2012, there were around 2600 soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. The Polish Military Contingent controls Ghazni province in east Afghanistan.

161 B. R. Bydoń, (ed.), *Wojsko Polskie w Afganistanie: doświadczenia i perspektywy*, Warszawa 2012.

It is one of the largest NATO contingents. Polish soldiers are engaged in democratization efforts and undertake actions against the Taliban, directly engaging in ensuring security to the Afghans.

On March 20th, 2003, during a meeting of the Cabinet Council, the President of the Republic of Poland decided to send Polish troops to Iraq. Consequently, Poland became actively engaged in the war despite the fact that the US attack on this country came under severe criticism due to the lack of explicit consent from the UN. The participation and involvement within coalition forces were also perceived with skepticism, also by EU partners, particularly by France and Germany. Yet, Polish authorities had no doubts as to the purposefulness and legitimacy of this war. The first unit that was engaged in warfare was GROM. Additionally, in the first days of the armed conflict, an anti-chemical warfare unit was sent to the Middle East. 200 Polish soldiers were engaged in direct battlefield activities. Their involvement was highly rated by American commanders and by the President of the United States, G. Bush.

With the end of war, pursuant to a UN resolution, Poland became engaged in the missions aimed at stabilizing and restoring governance in Iraq. In June 2003, the Government of the Republic of Poland accepted a decision concerning support of Poland for stabilization activities. On September 3rd Poland took command of the international, south-central stabilization zone. The Polish contingent contained about 2500 soldiers. In the initial stage

of their operations aimed at the stabilization of Iraq, there were no major attacks in the Polish zone. Later, especially between 2004 and 2005 there were a number of attacks launched in the zone under Polish command. Polish soldiers were active as far as disarmament and supervision of the domestic situation is concerned. They also provided significant assistance in organizing humanitarian help; activities of Polish troops were also concentrated on training issues. They participated in forming Iraqi voluntary services, police and military forces. After July 2005, the nature and composition of the Polish contingent underwent significant changes – it joined the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I). Increased numbers of training and guidance specialists were coming to Iraq. In the final stage of its stay, the Polish contingent had approximately 900 soldiers. The ultimate withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq was on October 4th, 2008. However, Poland still participates in stabilization operations. About 20 soldiers take part in guidance and training projects for Iraqi security forces¹⁶².

The Air Policing mission is connected with joint protection of airspace over these NATO member states which do not possess sufficient means of such protection. This manifestation of allied unity follows directly from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the case of Poland, this concerns support for Baltic countries – Estonia, Li-

162 D. S. Kozerański, *Międzynarodowe działania stabilizacyjne w świetle doświadczeń X zmiany PKW Irak w 2008 roku*, Warszawa 2010.

thuania and Latvia. The Polish Military Contingent Orlik is a separate part of Polish Air Forces and since 2006 it has carried out, once every two years on a rotation basis, airspace protection operations concerning the above-mentioned countries. Moreover, the scope of this support includes help in emergency situations, joint exercises and protection of the army and civilians. The unit is equipped with 4 patrol aircraft with comprehensive air and ground handling.

Visegrad Partners

During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia's army was obliged to be militarily involved in the Warsaw Pact. The number of troops in Czechoslovakia during this period was estimated to be over 200.000. Today, **the Army of the Czech Republic** (ACR) is the basis for building a defense policy¹⁶³. Modernization of the Czech army after 1993 is carried out in stages and includes personnel issues, orga-

163 V. Palán, D. Nová, J. Xaverová, *Armáda České Republiky ve faktech*, Praha 1993; *The Czech Republic and Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Praha 2001; M. Žantovský, *Budoucnost armády ČR: od Varšavské smlouvy k profesionální armádě*, Brno 2002; A. Rašek, *Polistopadový vývoj armády a bezpečnostní politiky České republiky ve vztahu k Evropské unii: studijní text*, Praha 2004; *Transformation of the Czech Republic Ministry of Defense Sector*, Prague 2008; M. Tůma, J. Janošec, J. Procházka, *Obranná politika Československé a České republiky (1989 – 2009)*, Praha 2009. *Technika a výzbroj Armády České republiky*, Prague 2011; L. Dolejší, (et al.), *Vojenská policie*, Prague 2011.

nization, and equipment¹⁶⁴. In 2012, the number of troops amounted to about 24.000 soldiers. Organizationally, there are two types of forces: the Land Forces and Air Forces with the common Joint Forces Command. Within the Army, there are also Support Forces and Training Command. After 1993, there was a substantial reduction in military equipment and supplies. This upgrade is still taking place. Some equipment is Soviet produced hardware. However, there is an increase in their own modern equipment and also some purchased from well-known manufacturers. The basis of the Army's equipment is the T-72 tank, while the Soviet air force supplies equipment, mainly the MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighters and Mi-24 helicopters. However, the Czech government plans to purchase modern Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighters.

After 1989, there was an increase in **Czech's** involvement in **military missions** abroad. The first of these 31 missions began in the framework of Czechoslovakia and included taking part in the Desert Storm operation in Iraq. Most significant from the perspective of quantity and quality were these missions: UNGCI (United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq), lasting over twelve years (1991-2003), IFOR missions (Implementation Forces) and SFOR (Stabilization Forces), due to the large number of soldiers (about 6300). Currently (at the end of 2012), there are five missions with the participation of the Czech Republic. These include two NATO missions (ISAF in Afghanistan

164 Organization and Equipment of the Czech Armed Forces, [www.army.cz].

with 416 soldiers and KFOR in Kosovo with 11 soldiers), two under the auspices of the EU (NAVFOR in Somalia and EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the peace-keeping mission in Egypt (MFO10). The Czech people, as a participant in foreign missions, are particularly valued because of their activity in the field of chemical and medical support.

The Hungarian army at the end of the Cold War numbered about 150.000 soldiers. Modernization began in 1988 and has systematically led to a reduction in quantity and quality, both on the personal level as well as hardware¹⁶⁵. **Hungarian Defence Forces** currently number about 25.500 soldiers. They are divided into two main types of troops: the Hungarian Ground Force and the Hungarian Air Force¹⁶⁶. In addition, there are combat support units and other service units. The equipment of the army is largely obsolete and needs to be replaced. Some of these arms date back to the Soviet inventory. The basic equipment is the Hungarian Ground Force T-72 tank. The Hungarian Air Force leases 14 JAS 39 Gripen fighters and has more than a dozen Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopters. The main problem in the area of equipment is frequent changes in plans, including new orders and contracts starting over 10 years ago. In addition, in some cases, the

165 *Army and Security Policy in Hungary*, Budapest 1993; T. Kovács, J. Nyers, J. Padányi, *The Capabilities of the Hungarian Defence Forces and the Challenges of Disaster Management, 2000–2011*, Budapest 2012.

166 Organization and Equipment of the Hungarian Defence Forces, [www.honvedelem.hu].

purchased equipment was not always compatible with NATO's systems.

Hungary's participation in **foreign missions** was already evident before 1989, although this process became clearly more dynamic after 1990. At first it was associated with observations, but then they decided to actively participate in a number of particularly dangerous places in the world. The conflict in the Balkans, because of its proximity, was also an opportunity for Hungary to engage in IFOR missions in 1994, which were later transformed into SFOR. The most important activity presently is in the framework of ISAF¹⁶⁷. Hungarian forces (in 2012) currently number about 580 soldiers. Moreover, Hungary, to a large extent, determines the strength of the KFOR mission, with around 200 soldiers involved. Significant forces were also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the EUFOR mission. The contingent consisting of about 160 soldiers was the most numerous from among the EU nation. Participation in foreign actions has a very significant impact on the level of training and combat experiences. Hungary also played a part in the area of command, security and medical logistics. They also declared to support the Air Policing mission in 2015.

167 V. Dévényi, *ISAF-misszió: a Magyar Honvédség Afganisztánban*, Budapest 2009; L. Z. Kiss, *Hungarians in Peacekeeping*, Budapest 2011.

The Slovak army, just as every country from among these young democracies, is going through a thorough modernization¹⁶⁸. A large part of the army is experiencing the expected results. The purpose of this process was to reduce the potential difference between the Slovak army and the armies of the European countries. The armed forces currently number about 14.000 soldiers, (but further reductions are planned, even down to 10.000) for the main divisions the **Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic**: the Ground Forces, Air and Air Defense Forces¹⁶⁹. In addition, there are Training, Support Forces and Special Forces under the command of the General Staff. The equipment causes a major difficulty. Most of the hardware at the army's disposition comes from the period of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it is outdated equipment, often not fully functional and not very efficient. As in the case of the Czech Republic, the basic equipment for the Ground Forces is the T-72 Tank, while the military aircraft used are the MiG-29 and the Mi-17 helicopter. Due to their frequent failures or total disability, plans are being made to rent several functioning MiG-29 fighters and to engage in wider co-operation, among others with Poland, including monitoring the airspace from the outside. Under the cur-

168 V. Kmec, M. Korba, R. Ondrejcsák, *Transformácia NATO a bezpečnostná a obranná politika SR*, Bartislava 2005; E. Nečej, V. Tarasovič, *Development of Security and Defence Policy of the Slovak Republic in the Context of Transatlantic Dimension and European Security and Defence Policy*, Bartislava 2005; R. Ivančík, *Alokačná a technická efektivnosť financovania obrany v Slovenskej republike*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2012.

169 Organization and Equipment of Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, [www.mil.sk].

rent situation, the Slovak government has no real ability to increase spending on the armed forces. This is a serious problem in the area of making their defense capabilities more effective¹⁷⁰.

The implementation of the obligations arising from participation in the carried out foreign missions is going quite successfully. Since 1993, Slovakia has participated in several important initiatives. Initially, these missions were under the leadership of the UN, then NATO and the EU. The most important place of activities with the participation of **Slovak** soldiers in **missions** was the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (since 2001) and the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2005). Particularly important, however, are missions under the auspices of NATO. They are a real opportunity to increase combat skills and gain experience in direct military actions. Activity in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (now 234 soldiers) ongoing since 2002 is essential in this regard. This mission includes operational and training activities as well as medical support. Participation in the Kosovo Force mission (until 2010) was also essentially important.

170 R. Ivančík, M. Kelemen, *Obrana štátu: Ekonomika, plánovanie a financovanie obrany*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2010.

PART SEVEN

ECONOMIC POLICY

The Visegrád Group countries are still grappling with the problems associated with changes in the political system¹⁷¹. However, they have already gone through the most

171 J. P. Hardt, R. F. Kaufman, (eds), *East-Central European Economies in Transition*, New York 1995; L. E. Crayson, S. E. Bodily, *Integration into the World Economy - Companies in Transition in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary*, Luxemburg 1996; E. De Boer-Ashworth, *The Global Political Economy and Post-1989 Change*, Basingstoke 2000; J. Adam, *Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-socialist Countries: the Case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary*, New York 2000; W. Kostecki, K. Żukrowska, B. J. Góralczyk, (eds), *Transformations of Post-communist States*, London 2000; G. W. Kolodko, *From Shock to Therapy: the Political Economy of Postsocialist Transformation*, Oxford 2000; F. Bönker, *The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central-Eastern Europe: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic from 1989 to EU Accession*, Cheltenham 2006; J. A. Tucker, *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 1990-99*, New York 2006. J. Pickles, (ed.), *State and Society in Post-socialist Economies*, Basingstoke 2007; S. Sergi, W. T. Bagatelas, J. Kubicová, (eds), *Industries and Markets in Central and Eastern Europe*, Aldershot 2007; T. Lelek, *New Economy and its Economic and Regional Aspects: Dissertation Thesis*, Pardubice 2010.

difficult period in adjusting to the political, economic and social system requirements of a democracy. Therefore, the experience gained during the initial transitional period is now a considerable capital. They allow for efficiently evaluating opportunities in the area of effectively coping with the crisis and the search for optimal solutions to minimize such. The crisis, the need to mitigate its effects has been accompanied by the countries of Central Europe for over 20 years. It seems, therefore, that they can significantly better adapt to the new, often difficult, reality¹⁷². Overcoming the difficulties arising from the communist period required many sacrifices and radical actions¹⁷³. Therefore, it seems that these countries and their societies are much better prepared for the potential effects of a crisis. Ongoing since 2007, the economic crisis is not the result of negligence and errors stemming from the analyzed parts of Europe. Moreover, it is not the V4 countries that are in the worst political and economic situation, which comprise a major challenge and an internal problem within the Eu-

172 J. Prust, (et al.), *The Czech and Slovak Federal Republik: An Economy in Transition*, Washington 1990; J. Kornai, *The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: the Example of Hungary*, New York 1990; J. Temesi, E. Zalai, (eds), *Back to a Market Economy*, Budapest 1999; R. Outrata, M. Gajdošová, *Effects and Perspectives of Cooperation of Visegrad Countries and of their EU Integration*, Bratislava 2002; M. Sikula, (ed.), *Monitoring Preparations of Transition Countries for EU-accession*, Bratislava 2003; A. Seleny, *The Political Economy of State-society Relations in Hungary and Poland: from Communism to the European Union*, Cambridge 2006; T. M. Workie, M. Radvanský, (eds), *Regional Disparities in Central and Eastern Europe. Theoretical Models and Empirical Analyses*, Bratislava 2010.

173 E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, (ed.), *Five Years of the EU Eastward Enlargement Effects on Visegrad Countries: Lessons for the Future*, Warsaw 2009; L. Lukášek, *The Visegrad Group. Its Development in the Years 1991 – 2004*, Hamburg 2012.

ropean Union. The real problem in the development of integration processes in Europe are now the Southern states, particularly Portugal, Spain and Greece.

The Visegrád Group countries are in a relatively good situation during the crisis. With increases in the GDP and trade, exports remains at a satisfactory level. Public debt remains at a lower level than the EU average. Of course, there is no shortage of problems. Unemployment is still high and inflation is a serious barrier to the increased domestic demand. There is, therefore, an absolute necessity to take further action in modernization, especially encouraging entrepreneurship, tax reforms and activation in the workplace. Also necessary are reforms in public finances and the rationalization and making efficient funds received from the EU's budget. This is particularly important in the financial perspective of 2014-2020, since this budget is subject to a clear reduction and will be the result of a serious dispute among the Member States at the European Council during negotiations. An important issue is the share of monetary integration. Slovakia is the only V4 country that is a member of the Eurozone. Therefore, in many cases, it adjusts (or rather must comply with) the decisions made in the monetary framework of the Union¹⁷⁴. The remaining three countries are facing a serious inter-

174 K. Dyson, (ed.), *Enlarging the Eurozone: The Euro and the Transformation of East Central Europe*, Oxford 2006; L. Zahumenska, *Similar but Different: The Currency Development in the Visegrad Countries*, Saarbrücken 2008; Ł. Białek, *Overview Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe*, Warsaw 2012; T. G. Grosse, *W objęciach europeizacji: wybrane przykłady z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Warszawa 2012.

nal debate and decision as to the dates for the eventual adoption of the common currency. Each of them will have to weigh the benefits and costs of such a move and make internal structural adjustments. In addition, an important issue is the public's relation to such radical changes and minimizing the social impact associated with a change of currency. In the event of an uncertain future, the Eurozone situation seems to be very complicated.

Table 4. Select economic indicators of the Visegrád Group in 2011.

	GDP (PPP) \$	GDP Growth	Inflation	Unemployment
Czech Republic	27 062	1,7	1,9	6,7
Hungary	19 591	1,7	3,9	10,7
Poland	20 334	4,3	4,3	10
Slovakia	23 304	3,4	4,2	13,5
EU Average	34 000	1,6	2,9	9,8

Source: Personal research report based on Eurostat.

Taking into consideration the current activities in the framework of the Visegrád Group, in the area of counteracting the effects of the economic crisis, we ought to state that Czech, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary show moderate abilities and willingness to cooperate. Essential for this are the internal problems and convictions about primarily manifesting the national interests in the current political debate¹⁷⁵.

In addition, it seems that many issues of the analyzed nations came to an agreement on another action strategy. It concentrates on applying other mechanisms in relationships with the remaining EU member states and its institutions. Essentially, we can agree that the mentioned differences can be pictured in classifying the V4 nations into two groups: 1. Slovakia – Poland and 2. Czech – Hungary. This division is certainly a result of the formalized, bilateral activities of the above mentioned nations and other subjects. Yet it is rather a result of observing the practical decisions undertaken by the mentioned nations in the areas of politics and economy in several concrete situations of struggling with the crisis. They do not cross out the legitimacy and lasting cooperation in the frame-

175 K. Bandasz, *Poland and Slovakia During the Economic Crisis 2008-2010*, Society and Economy 2012; J. Kloczkowski, O. Krutlik, A. Wołek, (eds), *Kryzys Unii Europejskiej: polska i czeska perspektywa*, Kraków 2012; J. Groszkowski, *The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic: Two Strategies for the Crisis Time in Europe*, Warsaw 2012, [www.csm.org.pl]; *Analysis of Economic Situation in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, Warsaw 2012, [www.nbp.pl]; *Approaching Storm. Report on Transformation Central and Eastern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis*, Krynica 2012, [www.pwc.pl].

work of the Visegrád Group, and do not cause its rupture. Most certainly, they make difficult searching for common resolutions and influence the unstable determination in this respect.

In the case of the first group of countries, Slovakia and Poland, we are dealing with a great openness to suggestions coming from the EU and its greatest members. The solutions undertaken by these two countries are consistent with the vision of sharing the effects of the crisis at all costs. The second group of countries, the Czech Republic and Hungary, in many cases, has shown a different policy in response to the crisis. They make decisions that are headed in a different direction than those in the EU and in many cases are exposed to strong criticism. We have to admit, however, that at least in several cases it appears to be unjustified¹⁷⁶.

176 T. Szemler, *V 4 Trade and FDI Observer*, Bratislava 2012.

Poland

Poland's economic security is a result of many conditions¹⁷⁷. We ought to take into consideration both the things that transfer onto the individual as well as the nationwide dimension. These have an impact on the decisions and actions undertaken in the internal and external dimensions. There was a general conviction in Poland that it needed to undertake economic reform after 1989, just as in the remaining European Union nations. These reforms were felt by every citizen, in the workplace, and throughout all of Poland. Going from a centralized economy steered by the market carried with it serious difficulties. Many people were not able to deal with the ongoing situation and securing basic needs. State-owned enterprises, including those of strategic importance, were closed, seriously restructured or privatized. At the same time, it was not always possible to avoid group lay-offs, which caused a sudden increase in unemployment. Along with the development of a democratic state, some negative trends could be reversed, or we tried to minimize their negative effects. There are still many areas of challenges and threats. These problems affected such sectors as defense, which was hit in the early 90's of the twentieth century by a number

177 S. Gomułka, *The Polish Model of Transformation and Growth*, Poznań 1998; J. E. Jackson, J. Klich, K. Poznańska, *The Political Economy of Poland's Transition*, Cambridge 2005; A. K. Koźmiński, *How It All Happened. Essays in Political Economy of Transition*, Warsaw 2008; T. Kowalski, S. Letza, C. Wihlborg, (eds), *Institutional Change in the European Transition Economies: the Case of Poland*, Poznań 2010.

of negative effects due to the economic transformation. Today, however, defense is successfully coping in a tough military market. Part of this production is on a world class scale. However, it seems that a necessary system process is the consolidation of the fragmented structure of Poland's military group on competitive world markets.

The foundations of the economic system in Poland were clearly set in Article 20 of the Constitution. It points to its social and market character, to the freedom of market activity. Particular traits for doing business were stressed, such as private property, solidarity, dialogue, partnership, and the cooperation of various social entities. Poland's economy is showing systematic development. In the last ten years, the GDP is constantly rising, reaching the level of 4,3 in 2011¹⁷⁸.

This transfers onto obtaining a high position both in the EU (6th place) as well as in the World (20th place). Poland's Economic growth is one of the fastest in Europe. It is described as a leader in the transformations in Central – Eastern Europe and is an example in confronting the last crisis present in the world since 2007. Economic indicators were beneficial for Poland in the last period. In 2009 Poland was the state to obtain a positive value in economic growth (Poland +1.7%, EU average -4.2%). It is difficult to say how much this favorable economic situation is the result of government actions, and how much

178 S. Bakalarczyk, *Diagnosis of the Polish Economy. Present State and Perspectives*, Warsaw 2008; *Polska 2012 raport o stanie gospodarki*, Warszawa 2013, [www.mg.gov.pl].

is due to other favorable circumstances. The Polish economy is based both on the private sector (about 62% of the workforce) and the state (about 38% of the workforce). The main sectors that affect the GDP are services (about 62.5%), industry (34%) and agriculture (3.5%). The area of non-market services is dominated by jobs related with public administration, education and health. Market services are primarily trade and repairs, real estate and business services, transport and telecommunications, and financial offers. Industry plays a major role in the extraction of natural resources, especially black coal, energy sources, and metallurgy. Agriculture in Poland is characterized by high quality products, natural methods of production, dominated by the production of potatoes and sugar beet.

Poland has a significant internal market. Private consumption provides a considerable potential. This undoubtedly is an asset for possible investments and the engagement of external actors. Poland's economy forms part of the global network of economic connections. But a challenge for the Polish economy is the rapidly improving foreign trade turnover. Exports for 2011 were 190.2 billion USD and imports 212.3 billion USD (balance: -22 billion USD). The structure of trade after political transformations is focused on the EU – mainly Germany – and Russia¹⁷⁹. Poland has actively cooperated in the area of economic so-

179 Foreign trade turnover and major partners in 2011:

I. Exports: 1. Germany 26.1%; 2. United Kingdom 6.4%; 3. Czech Republic 6.2%.

II. Imports: 1. Germany 22.3%; 2. Russian Federation 12.1%; 3. China 8.7%.

See: *Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics of Poland 2012*, Warsaw 2012.

lutions in Europe. It has supported and introduced initiatives, mostly in terms of cooperation with Germany and France. This has been particularly visible in making effective the proposals within the EU. The solutions applied by the Member States of the euro area in the framework of the Fiscal Compact and the Euro Plus Pact have gained firm support. The date of possibly reaching stage three of the Economic and Monetary Union by Poland and changing the official currency from the Zloty to the Euro still remains an open issue¹⁸⁰. It seems that Poland's sticking to its own currency had a positive effect on Polish economy in the most difficult period of the crisis after 2007.

Ensuring energy security is an immensely important issue¹⁸¹. Poland's energy policy is to a great extent based on hard coal resources. It has been used as the main raw material both at the level of households and industrial customers. This is why the initiatives of Poland with regard to solutions for CO₂ emissions are of great significance. Poland possesses both oil and gas deposits. These are significant amounts albeit insufficient in terms of the energy demands for such a large country. Poland has been to a great extent dependent on raw material supplies from Russia. Thus, a significant element of energy security policy is the diversifi-

180 E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, *New Member States of the Euro Zone: First Experiences and Lessons for Poland*, Warsaw 2009; M. Gorynia, B. Jankowska, *The Influence of Poland's Accession to the Euro Zone on the International Competitiveness and Internationalisation of Polish Companies*, Warsaw 2013.

181 G. Bartodziej, M. Tomaszewski, *Polityka energetyczna i bezpieczeństwo energetyczne*, Warszawa 2009; T. Z. Leszczyński, (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski w Unii Europejskiej - wizja, czy rzeczywistość?*, Warszawa 2012.

cation of supplies. In this respect, wider use of supplies from the Black Sea Region and the extension of the gas port and oil port at the Baltic Sea shore are of crucial importance. There are high expectations related to the exploration and possible future exploitation of shale gas deposits. It has been estimated that, provided that there are large reserves of this raw material and that their recovery is possible and cost-effective, Poland's energy security would be guaranteed for many years. A challenge that will necessarily have to be answered is nuclear energy. Energy supply demands have been continuously rising and the construction of a nuclear power plant has been referred to with increasing seriousness.

Several problems can be pointed out in the area of Poland's energy security. Overcoming the existing difficulties is a necessity if this sphere of policy is to become more effective. The ownership structure of Poland's banking sector is prevalently based on external capital. This may give rise to problems in terms of financial stabilization should economic or political turbulences occur. The same is true, among other sectors, for telecommunications and the media.

The sphere related with social capital poses a serious challenge. Public trust in state authorities has been at a very low level in Poland. Positive opinions with regard to the functioning of politicians range below 25%. There has seen dynamic growth in recent years in the percentage¹⁸²

182 An exception to this rule are opinions on the activities of the President, who enjoys positive opinion from more than 65% of the society.

of university graduates (more than 21% of the overall population). However, the disturbing phenomena of increasing unemployment rates and emigration of young, well-educated people are evident.

When combined with the above mentioned low fertility rates, this gives rise to serious problems in shaping the security of society and economy in the future. Increased discipline in the area of the financial policy of Poland also seems a necessity. This pertains to limiting Government debt, inflation and increasing prices. The elimination of bureaucratic hurdles in the development of entrepreneurship poses a serious challenge as the loads of legislative regulations and the number of employees in the budget sector (more than a million Government officials) has been disturbingly rising. The communication, road and railway infrastructures require robust and prompt actions toward improvement. Although EU aid measures are used in this area, the networks of motorways, express roads and high-speed railways are still unsatisfactory. The future of economic integration within the EU poses an important issue¹⁸³.

In its Treaty of Accession, Poland has undertaken to adopt the euro as its currency. Nowadays, it is a fact that

183 D. Milczarek, O. Barburska, (eds), *Poland in the European Union: First Experiences: Selected Political, Legal and Social Aspects*, Warsaw 2008; M. Kałużyńska, K. Smyk, J. Wiśniewski, (eds), *5 Years of Poland in the European Union*, Warsaw 2009; E. Cała-Wacinkiewicz, K. Flaga-Gieruszyńska, D. Wacinkiewicz, (eds), *Poland in the European Context: Selected Legal, Economic and Political Aspects*, Szczecin 2009; K. Łastawski, *Polska racja stanu po wstąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2009; J. Jańczak, *Policies and Politics of the European Union*, Poznań 2010.

Polish currency is to a greater extent exposed to the speculative practices of depreciation and downgrading. These practices have been introduced on several occasions during recent years. Falling export volumes and decrease in domestic production can trigger damaging consequences. These may result in rising unemployment rates, as well as in the necessity of expenditure cuts and the reduction of social spending. It seems that it is necessary to prepare optimal solutions that will minimize the listed possible negative effects that may appear due to close financial connections. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the direction of processes within the EU itself and whether accepting the euro would have clearly beneficial effects.

Visegrad Partners

The Czech Republic's economy is one of the fastest growing among the countries of the former socialist bloc¹⁸⁴. Of course, services (over 60%) take the dominant

184 M. Hájek, (et al.), *A Macroeconomic Analysis of the Czech Economy, (1990 – 1994)*, Prague 1995; E. Klvačová, (et al.), *Czech Experience of Economic Transition and EU Accession Processes*, Prague 2005; *Macroeconomic Development in the Czech Republic in 2006: Tendencies and Factors (in Context with Long-term Trends)*, Prague 2007; M. Soušková, *Legal Regulation of the Labour Market in the Czech Republic*, Prague 2008; J. Drahokoupil, *Internationalisation of the State in the Czech Republic: Igniting the Competition for Foreign Investment in the Visegrád Four Region*, *Czech Sociological Review*, 3/2009; M. Žárová, D. Procházka, J. Roe, *Financial Reporting in the Czech Republic*, Prague 2011; A. Zemplerová, *Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: the Case of the Czech Economy*, Prague 2012.

position in the economy. Next, an essential basis of the economy is the important heavy industry (about 38%), especially machine engineering and metallurgy. The agricultural sector comprises only about 2%. The Czech people are also known for their production of cars (Skoda), glassware and the growing defense sector. Their main economic partners are the EU countries, especially Germany (about 31% of exports), as well as Slovakia (about 9%) and Poland (6%). It is similar in the case of imports. The Czech Republic shows a positive balance in its extensive exports and imports (about 7 billion U.S. dollars). However, a major challenge is to prepare for the long-term perspective of potential economic shocks that have their origins outside of the country¹⁸⁵. In addition, an important issue is to effectively respond to energy needs, especially the supply of raw materials, petroleum and gas.

The Hungarian economy experienced serious problems in the last few years¹⁸⁶. This was the result of neglects in the socio-democratic government led by Socialists under Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (2006-2010). After Victor Orbán reclaimed power, it was necessary to introduce drastic but necessary reforms. This caused his government to receive major comments from financial institutions and the EU. Hungary's policies in this area are

185 L. Dušek, *Political Risk of Social Security: the Case of the Indexation of Benefits in the Czech Republic*, Prague 2007; *The Czech Economy Development in 2010*, Prague 2011.

186 P. Meusburger, H. Jöns, (eds), *Transformations in Hungary: Essays in Economy and Society*, New York 2001; A. Chikán, E. Czakó, Z. Zoltay-Paprika, (eds), *National Competitiveness in Global Economy: the Case of Hungary*, Budapest 2002.

consequential, however, and we can see its positive effects. The basis of the economy are services (about 64%), industry (about 31%) and agriculture (about 5%). Industry is dominated by mining, metallurgy and pharmaceuticals. Agriculture is based on the cultivation of wheat and corn, and wine production (the famous Tokaji). Export is directed to EU countries, especially Germany (25% of exports, Italy and Romania (about 5%). A characteristic feature of the Hungarian economy is the growing share of Asian countries. Exports to Taiwan are at about 4.5%, and more than 7% of imported goods are from China. This trend is still rising. The balance of exports and imports is positive and amounts to about 6.5 billion dollars. A challenge for the Hungarian economy is the rapidly improving financial situation of citizens and increase in confidence in financial institutions, while at the same time maintaining national priorities¹⁸⁷.

Slovak economy¹⁸⁸ had its good period in 2007. A consequence of this was the decision to adopt the euro in 2009.

187 J. Köllő, B. Nacs, *Flexibility and Security in the Labour Market: Hungary's Experience*, Budapest 2005; I. P. Székely, D. M. G. Newbery, (eds), *Hungary: an Economy in Transition*, Cambridge 2008; L. Halpern, Ch. Wyplosz, (eds), *Hungary: Towards a Market Economy*, Cambridge 2010.

188 L. Faltán, J. Pašiak, (eds), *Regional Development of Slovakia – Solutions and Present Situation*, Bratislava 1995; M. Šikula, (ed.), *Economic and Social Context of Slovakia's Integration into EU*, Bratislava 2003; B. S. Sergi, W. T. Bagatelas, *The Slovak Economy and EU Membership*, Bratislava 2004; M. Trník, *The Role of Investment Promotion Agencies at Attracting Foreign Direct Investment and Their Impact on Economic Development in Central Europe (The Czech Republic and Slovakia in Comparative Perspective)*, Budapest 2007; M. Šikula, (eds), *Stratégia rozvoja slovenskej spoločnosti*, Bratislava 2010; K. Morvay, (ed.), *Hospodársky vývoj Slovenska v roku 2011 a jeho výhľad do roku 2013*, Bratislava 2012.

From the perspective of a few years, it seems that this decision was premature, especially from the perspective of the citizens themselves. The close relationship with the union currency and monetary value on the one hand provides the opportunity to participate in decisions undertaken in the Euroregion, but on the other hand makes it necessary to participate in tough decisions and to support other nations which are in crisis in the Euroregion. Slovakia particularly felt this in 2011 when, as a result of opposition to support Greece, Iveta Radicova's government fell. Slovakia's economy is based largely on services (about 69%, industry at about 27%, agriculture at about 4%). Industry is dominated by the metal and chemical sectors. There is an increasing participation of the automotive industry, mainly due to Slovakia being the location of several brands of car production assembly plants (Volkswagen, Peugeot, and Kia). Agriculture, just as in Hungary, concentrates on the cultivation of wheat, corn and livestock. Exports mainly go to Germany (approximately 21.5%) and neighboring countries: the Czech Republic (about 15%), Poland (about 8%) and Hungary (about 8%). These countries are also important partners for import. An important nation in the case of import for Slovakia is Russia, whose share in this area is about 11.5%. The account from exports and imports is also positive, but it only comes out to 1 billion US dollars. Challenges for the economy of this country are the areas of innovation and entrepreneurship that require support.

CONCLUSION

Security is a basic social need. Undertaking cooperation on behalf of stability, safety and peace is one of the main goals of nations. Achieving this assignment must take place on many complementary levels, taking into consideration the dynamics of changes in the international sphere. For this, we need balanced activity both on the national and international, regional and global levels. Each of these dimensions is equally important and in a decisive way influences the subjects of international relations.

The thesis of the presented analysis is the functioning of the Visegrád Group based on a safety community. The mentioned examples of activity, both from the perspective of successes as well as failures give us a basis for confirming this. In accord with the assumptions of the communications and constructivist theory, Czech, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary are four Central-European nations that are cooperation in the framework of, among

others, the Visegrád Group, linked by particular ties. Each of these nations is aware of the essence of the common initiatives and activities. The basis for multi-dimensional cooperation is the essential historical, social and cultural bonds. They have great meaning for the effective realization of close and clearly formulated goals. In addition, they give us justified hope in overcoming difficulties that arise. Due to this, upholding the accepted in 1991 commitments, even though basic goals have been achieved, makes it possible for the Visegrád Group and the nations that form it to manifest a common position on the international forum, particularly in the framework of the EU and NATO.

The Visegrád nations' cooperate with each other is not accidental. They share similar histories, showing great determination in the development of their sovereign interests on the level of national states. In this they are aware of the necessity to stand for a common position on many dimensions of international cooperation. A very important element is the positive reception of each of these countries and nations is social awareness. Social research in each of these Visegrád countries shows that the level of mutual acceptance and sympathy among the communities of these nations is exceptionally high. Cooperation on the level of national authorities is written into the declaration creating the V4. However, the local dimension of this cooperation is of essence. In this case, many years of experience shows that it is highly rewarding and systematically undertaken. The territorial proximity in a natural

way translates onto potential possibilities for cooperation. Yet, in the case of the Visegrád nations, an additional, favorable element is the conviction of the existence of a series of common area, goals and tools of cooperation. The overall effect, despite the local differences which appear, is positive. In the sphere of an integrating Europe, the concept of a peculiar Central-European identity is being formed, with its common interests and challenges. Emphasizing that which unites us, not the naturally existing differences, has a significant meaning. Overcoming them shows a mature approach to the most important, commonly shared interests.

The effects of Visegrád cooperation undertaken in 1991 are essentially satisfactory. They give us a basis to continue forward. All four countries obtained the main goal: membership in NATO and the EU. Accomplishing this goal was, not without obvious problems, a result of determination, pragmatic cooperation and mutual support. The Visegrád nations comprise an important link in trans-Atlantic relations. They show a great interest in the current work on the level of both organizations. In addition, understanding the need for broader involvement and eliminating divisions in Europe, they actively lobby on behalf of further accessions. This mainly includes the Western Balkans and the Eastern European nations of Ukraine and Georgia. It seems that all the nations of the Visegrád Group rely on maintaining cooperation in its current form. Declarations made during official and various work meetings on the political level are proof of this.

Central Europe is a geopolitical fact. Therefore, it is in the interest of the entire region to maintain and develop close cooperation at the institutional level. The Visegrád Group, despite existing problems, proves to be effective in many important areas. However, the dynamics of cooperation and raising them to a higher level depends on the members of the V4 nations, including a strong mandate for cooperation within NATO and the EU. It is related, among others, with activity on the forum for reforming security cooperation in the framework of the CSDP. The Visegrád countries are characterized by a specific geopolitical situation. The nature and development of the political system are closely related with each other. They are struggling with several similar challenges and threats in the area of security. The adopted formal and legal solutions for security in the region are also relatively close. This is especially evident in the analysis of the constitution and security strategy. In these, the objectives and tasks of the nations are defined in a similar way. Equally significant convergent features are visible at the level of internal and external policies. These include the type and nature of the internal ministries, level of social security and foreign policy choices. Similarities can also be pointed out in the field of military cooperation and economic problems.

Cooperation at the levels of scientific, cultural and social life appears extremely successfully. The Visegrád Fund activity provides unquestionable support, set up to promote such initiatives. Natural differences also appear in all the analyzed areas. The main differences are prima-

rily related with territorial and demographic potential. Poland as a major European country seems to be the natural basis of the undertaken collaboration, but on an equal, partnership basis. The Visegrád countries somewhat differently approach a number of specific problems in the process of EU integration (including reactions to the economic crisis and choice in the types of weapons). The differences are noticeable in defense policies. They primarily concern army expenditure, the types of weapons and involvement in foreign missions. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia contribute to trans-Atlantic security cooperation on behalf of a strong belief in the merits of partnership relations and national identity. In successfully defeating with problems associated with the political subjection by the USSR during the Cold War, these nations have are highly determined to actively support today's safety processes. They are interested in an effective and multi-dimensional, harmonious cooperation based on NATO and the EU, with significant support from the United States. Young democracies are well aware of the merits of collaboration and the need for deepening it. New divisions in Europe will never favorably affect its stability and development.

The Visegrád Group successfully promotes the interests of Central Europe in the trans-Atlantic security space. This project, despite the many skeptical voices, is maintained and developed on many levels. Strong emphasis on this fact seems to be justified, without penetrating deeply into a discussion on the hard and political dimensions of

this cooperation. Meetings at various levels show a strong desire for cooperation, mutual understanding and support showed. Emerging issues, paradoxically, reveal the need for close cooperation. The Visegrád countries are systematically aware that they are close to each other, not just territorially. They can also actually manifest their interests in the framework of international politics. It is necessary, however, to minimize the differences, provincialisms, individual and competitive projects on behalf of setting common directions and priorities for security and development.

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**ABSTRACTS IN THE
NATIONAL LANGUAGES**

Bezpečnostní jednota. Polsko a její visegrádští partneři: Česká republika, Maďarsko a Slovensko

Spolupráce v rámci Visegrádské skupiny představuje příklad kolektivního přístupu k bezpečnostní problematice v regionálním i globálním rozměru. Společná historie, kulturní dědictví a střeoevropská regionální identita, to vše představuje šanci na překonávání vzájemných předpoklů a hledání konstruktivních základů spolupráce. Za důkaz lze považovat v zásadě jednoznačné definování cílů zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky ve čtyřech střeoevropských zemích, České republice, Maďarsku, Polsku a Slovensku, a přesvědčení onezbytnosti vzájemné spolupráce. Zdá se, že i rozdílné cíle bude snazší dosahovat, manifestující jednotu a kooperaci. Země V4 si totiž uvědomují, že existuje mnoho společných témat a deklarují a uskutečňují vzájemnou spolupráci a společné aktivity v politické, ekonomické, sociální i kulturní oblasti. Nahrává tomu jak jejich geografická blízkost, tak vzájemné historické zkušenosti, jakkoli často nelehké.

Cílem předkládané monografie je představení zvláštností bezpečnostní politiky Polska, České republiky, Ma-

ďarska a Slovenska, resp. jejich vzájemné spolupráce na tomto poli v rámci tzv. Visegrádské skupiny (V4). Tato iniciativa může být pojmána jako specifické bezpečnostní společenství. Což je i hlavní výzkumná teze monografie, opírající se o teorii komunikace Karla Deutsche, resp. o konstruktivismus. Ze zřejmých důvodů je největší prostor věnován rozboru zvláštností visegrádské spolupráce z polské perspektivy. Aniž by to nicméně jakkoli limitovalo rozsah částí týkajících se bezpečnostních problémů V4 a angažmá v ní ze strany ČR, Maďarska a Slovenska.

Struktura jednotlivých kapitol, s výjimkou kapitoly č. 2, je vždy identická: nejprve je představena obecná charakteristika procesů v dané oblasti týkajících se celé V4, následně jsou komentovány polské charakteristiky a konečně v třetí části i charakteristiky zbylých tří zemí, přičemž metodologickým cílem bylo umožnit jejich vzájemné porovnání.

Kritické analýze jsou v monografii podrobeny dosavadní oblasti spolupráce, přičemž stejný prostor je věnován jak jejich pozitivním, tak negativním aspektům a výstupům. Navzdory rozmanitosti zájmů a představ, je historie V4 plná zjevně úspěšných společných projektů. Za stejně zásadní lze označit v monografii provedenou srovnávací analýzu příslušných systémových řešení v bezpečnostní oblasti. A jako důležitá se jeví i indikace dalších potenciálních oblastí vhodných ke kooperaci, včetně širšího regionálního, resp. globálního rozsahu. Pro regionální iniciativy a je tvořící země představuje šanci společně prezentovat paletu strategických zájmů a cílů. Jednu ze

slibných příležitostí v tomto smyslu představují nové integrační iniciativy Evropské unie, včetně vize vypracování nové bezpečnostní strategie Unie. Obdobně pak lze hledat příhodnou platformu pro kooperaci v rámci NATO.

Překlad Jan Holzer

Biztonsági közösség. Lengyelország és visegrádi partnerei: Csehország, Magyarország és Szlovákia

A biztonságpolitikai problematika regionális és globális kontextusban történő közösségi megközelítésére jó példa a visegrádi együttműködés. A közös történelem és történelmi örökség, a közép-európai identitás módot kínál arra, hogy ezen régió országai legyőzzék kölcsönös előítéleteiket és keressék a konstruktív együttműködés lehetőségeit, amelynek számos területe van. Mindegyik visegrádi ország egyértelműen meghatározta célját a kül- és biztonságpolitikában. Ennek következtében kirajzolódott a meggyőződés az ezen a területen való együttműködés szükségességéről, ugyanis világos volt, hogy a partikuláris, részben közös, célokat könnyebb elérni egységet és együttműködést mutatva. Ez utóbbi nem volt mindig ideális és harmonikus, ugyanakkor a visegrádi kooperáció létrejött és szisztematikusan működik, és a kitűzött eredményeit megvalósította. Mi több, a cél elérése után is folytatódott az együttműködés. A visegrádi országok tisztában vannak azzal, hogy számos, ezen államokat összekötő elem létezik. Kölcsönös támogatást deklarálnak

és gyakorolnak, közösen tevékenykednek politikai, gazdasági, társadalmi vagy kulturális téren. Ezt nem csak a visegrádi országok földrajzi közelsége segíti elő, hanem a gyakran terhes történelmi tapasztalat is.

Az alábbi monográfia célja Lengyelország, illetve Csehország, Magyarország és Szlovákia biztonságpolitikája jellegzetességeinek, valamint az ezen országok a visegrádi csoport keretein belül történő kölcsönös együttműködésének a bemutatása. Ez utóbbi kezdeményezést egyfajta biztonságpolitikai közösségként is lehet értelmezni. Ez a kötet főbb tézise, amely Karl Deutsch kommunikációs elméletére és a konstruktivista elméletre alapul.

Értelemszerűen a legnagyobb teret a szerző a visegrádi együttműködés lengyel szempontból történő elemzésének szenteli, ugyanakkor a többi V4-es ország bekapcsolódása ebbe az együttműködésbe, ill. a biztonságpolitikájuk szintén fontosnak mondható. Az egyes fejezetek felépítése, a másodikat kivéve, hasonló jellegű: először bemutatásra kerülnek a V4-eket érintő folyamatok általános jellemzői, utána következnek a Lengyelországra, majd a többi visegrádi országra vonatkozó (Csehország, Magyarország és Szlovákia) jellegzetességek. Hasonló vagy ugyanolyan problémák kerültek elemzésre, ami lehetőséget ad azok összehasonlítására. A monográfiában kritikai analízisnek van alávétve az együttműködés eddigi területe, a szerző figyelmet fordít ennek mind pozitív, mind negatív aspektusaira. A természetesnek mondható és sikeres közös projekteknél ugyanis zavart okoztak a csoport életében kitalálható érdek- és víziókülönbségek.

Indokoltnak látszik elvégezni az összehasonlító elemzést a rendszermegoldások tekintetében is. Fontosnak tűnik kihangsúlyozni az együttműködés potenciális terét és rámutatni arra, hogy az mennyiben tud megvalósulni, mind regionális, mind globális tekintetben. A regionális kezdeményezések számára esélyt jelent az együttműködésben résztvevő országok közös érdekeinek és stratégiai céljainak a bemutatása, akár az euroatlanti kontextusba beágyazva. Úgy tűnik, az egyik ilyen terület az Európai Unió fórumain megjelenő, új integrációs ötletek felkarolása, többek között az EU új biztonságpolitikai stratégiájának kialakításában. Hasonló irányt jelentenek a NATO keretein belül megvalósuló megoldások támogatására létrejövő platformok is.

Fordította Lagzi Gábor

Wspólnota bezpieczeństwa. Polska i jej wyszehradzcy partnerzy: Czechy, Węgry i Słowacja

Przykładem wspólnotowego podejścia do problematyki bezpieczeństwa w wymiarze regionalnym i globalnym jest współpraca w ramach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Wspólna historia, dziedzictwo kulturowe, środkowoeuropejska tożsamość regionalna, stanowią szansę na pokonywanie wzajemnych uprzedzeń i poszukiwanie konstruktywnych podstaw współpracy. Dotyczy to wielu wymiarów. Potwierdzeniem tego wydaje się być jednoznaczne zdefiniowanie celu w obszarze polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa we wszystkich państwach wyszehradzkich. Konsekwencją tego było ostateczne przekonanie o konieczności współdziałania w tym zakresie. Zdano sobie sprawę, że partykularne, choć stosunkowo zbieżne, cele łatwiej będzie osiągnąć manifestując jedność i współpracę. Nie była ona zawsze idealna i zgodna, niemniej jednak została podjęta i systematycznie prowadzona; dała też założone efekty. Co więcej, mimo osiągnięcia celu, jest nadal kontynuowana. Państwa wyszehradzkie zdają sobie sprawę z tego, że istnieje wiele przestrzeni je łączących.

Deklarują i praktykują wzajemne wsparcie, podejmują wspólne działania w obszarze politycznym, ekonomicznym, społecznym, kulturalnym. Sprzyjają temu zarówno bliskość terytorialna, jak również trudne często doświadczenia historyczne.

Celem prezentowanej monografii jest przybliżenie specyfiki polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski oraz Czech, Węgier i Słowacji i ich wzajemnej współpracy w ramach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Inicjatywa ta może być postrzegana jako swoista wspólnota bezpieczeństwa. Jest to główna teza przyświecająca przedmiotowemu badaniu, oparta na teorii komunikacyjnej Karla Deutscha i teorii konstruktywistycznej. Z oczywistych powodów najwięcej miejsca zajmuje analiza specyfiki współpracy wyszehradzkiej z perspektywy Polski. Jakkolwiek część dotycząca zaangażowania i problemów bezpieczeństwa pozostałych państw V4, Czech, Węgier i Słowacji jest również istotna.

Układ poszczególnych rozdziałów, z wyjątkiem drugiego, jest taki sam: w pierwszej kolejności przedstawiana jest ogólna charakterystyka procesów obejmujących całą V4, w drugiej przedstawione są charakterystyczne cechy Polski, w trzeciej zaś te dotyczące pozostałych trzech państw V4, Czech, Węgier i Słowacji. Analizą objęto podobne lub tożsame problemy, co jest uzasadnione próbą porównania ich w poszczególnych państwach.

W monografii krytycznej analizie poddano dotychczasowe przestrzenie kooperacji. Uwaga zwrócona jest zarówno na pozytywne, jak i negatywne aspekty podejmowanych działań. Oczywiście i udane, wspólne projekty

były bowiem zakłócanie przez spotykaną w historii Grupy różnicę interesów i wizji. Zasadne jest również dokonanie analizy porównawczej rozwiązań systemowych w przedmiotowym temacie. Ważne wydaje się uwypuklenie potencjalnych przestrzeni współpracy i wskazanie na rzeczywiste możliwości jej konkretyzacji, również w szerszym regionalnym i globalnym wymiarze. Szansą dla inicjatyw regionalnych jest prezentowanie spektrum wspólnych interesów i celów o strategicznym znaczeniu dla państw ją tworzących, całej inicjatywy, jak i w szerszym euroatlantyckim kontekście. Wydaje się, iż jednym z takich wymiarów jest wsparcie dla nowych pomysłów integracyjnych na forum UE, m.in. w zakresie wypracowywania nowej, spełniającej oczekiwaną rolę strategii bezpieczeństwa UE. W podobnym kierunku można poszukiwać platform wsparcia dla rozwiązań podejmowanych w ramach NATO.

Wojciech Gizicki

Bezpečnostné spoločenstvo. Poľsko a jeho vyšehradskí partneri: Česko, Maďarsko a Slovensko

Príkladom spoločného prístupu k bezpečnostnej problematike v regionálnej a globálnej dimenzii je spolupráca v rámci Vyšehradskej skupiny. Spoločná história, kultúrne dedičstvo a stredoeurópska regionálna identita predstavujú šancu na prekonávanie vzájomných predsudkov a hľadanie konštruktívnych východísk pre spoluprácu. Týka sa to viacerých dimenzií. Potvrdzovať to môže jednoznačné definovanie cieľa v oblasti zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky vo všetkých vyšehradských štátoch. Dôsledkom toho bolo definitívne presvedčenie o nevyhnutnosti spolupráce v tejto oblasti. Vyšehradskí partneri si uvedomujú, že partikulárne, hoci relatívne identické ciele budú ľahšie dosiahnuteľné, ak budú manifestovať jednotu a spoluprácu. Uvedená spolupráca nebola vždy ideálna a konsenzuálna, napriek tomu však bola nadviazaná a systematicky sa realizuje. Zároveň priniesla očakávané efekty. Navyše, napriek tomu, že svoje ciele splnila, naďalej pokračuje. Vyšehradské štáty si uvedomujú, že existuje veľa oblastí, ktoré ich spájajú. Deklaru-

jú a realizujú vzájomnú podporu, spolupracujú v oblasti politickej, ekonomickej, sociálnej a kultúrnej. V prospech tejto spolupráce hovorí jednak územná blízkosť, jednak neraz ťažké historické skúsenosti.

Cieľom prezentovanej monografie je priblížiť špecifické črty bezpečnostnej politiky Poľska, Česka, Maďarska a Slovenska a ich vzájomnú spoluprácu v rámci Vyšehradskej skupiny v tejto oblasti. Táto iniciatíva môže byť vnímaná ako formovanie špecifického bezpečnostného spoločenstva. Je to hlavná téza predkladanej práce, ktorá vychádza z teórií konštruktivismu a komunikácie Karla Deutscha. Z pochopiteľných dôvodov najviac priestoru zaujíma analýza špecifických aspektov vyšehradskej spolupráce z hľadiska Poľska. Dôležité miesto v knihe však zaujíma aj časť, týkajúca sa participácie a bezpečnostnej problematiky ostatných štátov Vyšehradskej skupiny – Česka, Maďarska a Slovenska.

Poradie jednotlivých kapitol, s výnimkou druhej, tomu zodpovedá. Na prvom mieste je prezentovaná celková charakteristika procesov, týkajúcich sa celej Vyšehradskej skupiny. Po nej nasleduje analýza charakteristických črt Poľska, v tretej zas charakteristiky ostatných troch štátov V4: Česka, Maďarska a Slovenska. Analýza sa dotýka podobných alebo identických problémov, čo je motivované snahou porovnávať ich riešenie v jednotlivých štátoch.

V monografii boli kritickej analýze podrobené doterajšie priestory pre spoluprácu. Pozornosť sa sústredila jednak na pozitívne, jednak na negatívne aspekty realizo-

vaných aktivít. Pochopiteľne, aj realizácia úspešných spoločných projektov bola v dejinách Vyšehradskej skupiny komplikovaná rozdielnosťou záujmov a vízií. Zásadný význam má aj porovnávací analýza systémových riešení v oblasti sledovanej problematiky. Dôležité je zvýraznenie potenciálneho priestoru pre spoluprácu a poukázanie na reálne možnosti jej konkretizácie. Týka sa to aj širšieho regionálneho a globálneho rozmeru. Šancou pre regionálne iniciatívy je prezentácia spektra spoločných záujmov a cieľov, ktoré majú pre účastnícke štáty, celú iniciatívu i v širšom euroatlantickom kontexte strategický význam. Jednou z takýchto dimenzií je podpora nových integračných projektov na pôde EÚ, napr. v oblasti vypracovania novej bezpečnostnej stratégie EÚ, ktorá by splňala očakávané úlohy. Podobne je možné hľadať platformy podpory pre rozhodnutia, prijímané v rámci NATO.

Preklad Juraj Marušiak

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